"The government is not going to change. Castro is deaf. Sanctions have a political value because they demonstrate to the whole world that Castro is a human rights abuser. The EU should not be seeking deeper relations with a totalitarian regime," she said. "The fact that we could meet Mr Michel one day, for an hour, is an isolated phenomenon.
The Cuban government allowed it to take place so the EU would see what the authorities wanted them to see. I don't understand how Mr Michel, who is an intelligent person, can think that he understands Cuba in the short time that he was here."
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He also told me that Chávez envisions an axis of power linking Brasilia, Montevideo and Buenos Aires. As it is, these populist governments aren't much for standing on principle and anything anti-Yanqui scores cheap domestic points; some may even aspire to Venezuelan-style authoritarianism. But it is also possible that cooperation with Chávez is part survival technique to ward off his use of bullying militants.
...[T]he revolution must necessarily "break the spine of democracy in the region. That is Colombia."
Colombians are specifically worried about three things. The first is Chávez's overt weapons buildup. War is not considered imminent. But there is a fear that the persistent threat from a hostile neighbor engaged aggressively in arms acquisition will take a toll politically and economically.
The second concern is Chávez support for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the smaller National Liberation Army (ELN). For years Castro has been giving their troops medical care in Cuba. But now Chávez is providing safe haven to them just across the Colombian border....
The third big worry that Colombians have about Venezuelan aggression is the likelihood that Chávez will try to interfere in the 2006 presidential elections. There is good reason to believe that Chávez will choose his Colombian protégé, fund him liberally, and should he "win," help him to consolidate power....
Castro's revolution is alive and active all over Latin America. Where he and his Venezuelan mini-me have not gained the upper hand, they have been successful in fueling violence and instability and discouraging development.
If Mr. Bolton felt, in recent years, that U.S. intelligence in the region was wanting and could end up costing U.S. interests, he was prescient....***