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On the contrary, Japan thought they had surrendered. There was a miscommunication, based on cultural differences. They appeared, to us, to be waffling and we wanted unconditional surrender. That concept was foreign to them, so they surrendered in a fashion consistent with saving face, but we rejected the overture and nuked them again. At least that's how I understand it.

They appeared, to us, to be waffling and we wanted unconditional surrender. That concept was foreign to them, so they surrendered in a fashion consistent with saving face, but we rejected the overture and nuked them again. At least that's how I understand it.

The Japanese sure "understood" after that second nuke.

"...we wanted unconditional surrender. That concept was foreign to them, so they surrendered in a fashion consistent with saving face, but we rejected the overture and nuked them again. At least that's how I understand it."

Your understanding is faulty. According to John Toland's Rising Sun, an extensively researched history of WW II from the Japanese viewpoint, after Hiroshima, the Imperial Council could not agree on the advice to give the Emperor. It would have been necessary for somebody to admit they had failed in order for them to recommend surrender.

After Nagasaki, the Emperor took matters into his own hands and made an unprompted unilateral decision -- which was unprecedented.

Rising Sun is a fascinating book -- one that introduced me to the cultural divide that lay between Japan and the USA at the time. For example, the Japanese concept of war was somewhat akin to the American Indians' "counting coup". Many Japanese authorities actually believed that, after the brilliantly conceived and masterfully executed attack at Pearl Harbor, the US would immediately sue for peace. Et cetera

Point being: after Hiroshima, perhaps the Imperial Council would have eventually gotten around to accepting surrender...maybe. But it took Nagasaki to move them to action.

Your concern for non-combatants is laudable. But when confronted by a decision between the lives of enemy non-combatants and the lives of American troops, the President's first concern should be for the lives of Americans.

Hard choices require men of character. Truman had it.

What is never mentioned are some obvious facts:

1. Little boy destroyed about 5 sq. miles. The March Tokyo bombing destroyed 15 sq. miles.
2. If littly boy had been a dud, a squadon on superforts with conventional weapons would have infliced similar damage shortly thereafter.
3. If conventional bombing hadn't worked, Marshall had a plan 3 to use poison gas. That would have killed all life and in all probability would have resulted in the execution of all POWs.
4. The A-Bomb is clearly the least evil. The POW execution policy forced Trumans hand, in addition to many other considerations.