What We've Learned From Anaconda

FOX ^ | 3/21/02 | Melana Zyla Vickers

[Tumbleweed_Connection]

A common refrain from young GIs returning from Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan has been that this was their first time in combat.

Yet they weren't the only first-timers in the field

[norton]

I think you are reading a bit too much into the Hitler thing. Perhaps as an allusion to GWB, perhaps because you liked the guy's style..

However,
The mobile and highly trained forces running amok behind enemy lines were perfected by N.B. Forrest and copied by some very good German and Allied generals throughout the war.
Those speedy and stealthy scout vehicles were more a result of WW1 treaty restrictions than strategic planning and they were replaced by road busting monstrosities as soon as they could openly exploit their industries.
The aerial vehicles used by the Axis were truely neat looking but successful only against a the tiny Polish, and Finn airforces, retreating Frenchfolk and civilians.
Last,
"the ultimate destruction of (allied) ground forces" seems to have eluded him.

[eno_]

We need fewer, but better trained and equipped combat soldiers. There will be no other infantymen than Special Forces (for fighting - our infantry still might be useful for occupying Iraq^h^h^h^h New Texas). The rifle of the future is a laser designator. Nobody can carry around (or move on treads) the kind of firepower that can be delivered from the air. We need new heavy bombers. We need new transport helicopters. We need Arabic, Farsi, and Kurdish lessons.

We hope this all works in a jungle in the Philipines and/or Indonesia.

[Free the USA]

Check the Bump List folders for articles related to and descriptions of the above topic(s) or for other topics of interest.

[0scill8r]

Wrongo, pal.

The doctrine of mobile elements operating deep in enemy territory off extended lines of supply (or off the "fat of the land") was developed by William Tecumseh Sherman. Further additions to this doctrine were added by J.F.C. Fuller of the UK and by Heinz Guderian of Germany (who came up with blitzkrieg). The Austrian Corporal had a corporal's level understanding of strategy & tactics.

[Poohbah]

BLITZKRIEG! and the man was ADOLF HITLER!

Blitzkrieg was the progeny of many fathers, including J.F.C. Fuller, Basil Liddel-Hart, Charles DeGaulle, Erwin Rommel, and Heinz Guderian.

Hitler had nothing to do with its creation beyond funding the Wehrmacht.

[Campion]

BLITZKRIEG! and the man was ADOLF HITLER!

Heinz Guderian, Erwin Rommel, and other key contributors on the German General Staff were the men responsible for blitzkrieg, not that filthy Austrian guttersnipe.

[Campion]

The Austrian Corporal had a corporal's level understanding of strategy & tactics.

Which he demonstrated by ruining his army at Stalingrad, and ruining what was left of it in the Ardennes.

[Poohbah]

I would suggest reading "Maneuvering Past Maneuver Warfare," by CAPT Wayne Hughes, USN (Retired), available at the Naval War College Review website. CAPT Hughes is an instructor in Operations Research at the Naval Postgraduate School and the author of a couple of books on naval tactics and operations research, and this article makes very worthwhile reading.

[aimlow]

What I found funny was the arguement for building more B-2 bombers. The majority of bombs were dropped by B-52's. And calling in CAS is nothing new. And once again at the end of the day it takes regular troops on the ground to take and hold.

[Sci Fi Guy]

We need fewer, but better trained and equipped combat soldiers

What if North Korea sends their million man army in South Korea tomorrow? Would we still need fewer troops??

[Hoplite]

Strange - what I learned from Anaconda is that our Afghan Allies aren't to be used as part of a security cordon, and that the success of airpower is still ultimately dependent upon our willingness to place grunts with rifles in harm's way.

The initial campaign was exhilarating, there's no denying it, but using the Taleban as a template for future adversaries is just folly, IMO.

[eno_]

We would have air superiority in about 15 minutes. And South Korea has somewhat better means to defend itself than last time we were there. Our soldiers are there so that we are committed to Korea, not because they could stop a North Korean attack at the line. Seoul is toast no matter how you look at it. Can't be defended.

[0scill8r]

Let's make sure we understand each other when we say "strategy" and "tactics". For example, "strategy" is when you divide your entire army into two; let's say, one half under the generalship of U.S. Grant and the other under W.T. Sherman. Then you have Grant engage in a static war of attrition while you cut loose Sherman in the rear of your enemy. Contrast this to a general like N.B. Forrest who never controlled units of the size of Sherman or Grant and who was merely an aggressive & colorful cavalry commander. Can't say he was an innovator as he didn't come up with any big ideas, and was pretty much "old school" with regard to his Napoleonic conceptions of cavalry warfare.

Above posts have pretty much established that the Austrian Corporal had NOTHING to do with the formulation or perfection of blitzkrieg warfare, only having found a useful tool authored by the German General Staff and applying it again and again with very little understanding. We can argue about his motivation, but I submit his early successes reinforced his delusions of invincibility. His early successes were due only to his WILLINGNESS to make war, not his ability. Where he did exert most of his will was at the level of strategy ("attack France now. Let those guys on Dunkirk escape. Okay, now invade England. No, wait--Russia. The hell with Moscow, let's go for the petroleum," etc.) where he exhibited incompetence.

As for his understanding of tactics, no man who understood blitzkrieg would be the author of the notorious "stand fast" order for static defensive warfare, thus rendering his own army vulnerable to blitzkrieg-style offensives by the enemy.

As far as your "nothing new under the sun" assertion, yes, hell, you can go back to Alexander the Great for an example of an army operating far from its logistical base. But Alexander the Great did not originate the concept of blitzkrieg, which ultimately boils down to a TACTICAL innovation.

[Eternal_Bear]

Blitzkrieg is based on massing overwhelming mobile forces usually 10-1 at a vulnerable nexus called the "schwerpunkt" and exploiting that penetration. Patton used it at Normandy on the American right wing; the Israelis used it at the Battle of the Chinese Farm between the junction of the two Egyptian armies. Americans have tended for the broad front approach. Blitzkrieg cannot be applied to Civil War commanders. It is a specific doctrine of concentrating overwhelming forces at a point and explotiting that breach with mechanized forces; it is not just operating in the rear of the enemy which is age old or moving rapidly. However Napoleon's strategic pursuit of the Prussians in 1806 is an example of what a Blitzkrieg style exploitation should accomplish.