More semantic games from people desperate to evade taxes.
Tax protesters claim that, before anyone can be liable for a tax, there must be a statute that specifically says that the person is liable for the tax (and must use the word "liable"). However, that is not what the law requires.
In its various subsections, section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code says that "There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of every [married individual, surviving spouse, head of a household, unmarried individual, or married individual filing a separate return] a tax determined in accordance with the following table.. .."
As explained in the regulations:
"Section 1 of the Code imposes an income tax on the income of every individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States ...." Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(a)(1).
The word "impose" means "to establish or apply as compulsory; levy." So how can a tax be "imposed" if no one is compelled to pay it? The answer is that it can't. If a tax is imposed on a person's income, then that person is liable for the tax as a matter of law.
So what have the courts said about the claim that there is no one is liable for the tax imposed on their incomes?
"The payment of income taxes is not optional ... and the average citizen knows that payment of income taxes is legally required." Schiff v. United States, 919 F.2d 830, 834 (2nd Cir. 1990).
"Purportedly in support of his claim, plaintiff submitted a statement along with the Form 1040, in which he argues that no provision of the IRC establishes an income tax 'liability.' The plain language of the IRC, however, belies this assertion, stating in section 1 that a tax is 'hereby IMPOSED on the taxable income of every individual' (emphasis added). Although plaintiff attempts to distinguish between 'imposing' a tax and creating a 'liability' for a tax, there is no difference. Every individual has an affirmative duty to pay taxes. Gabelman v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 609, 611 (6th Cir. 1996)." Porcaro v. United States, 84 AFTR2d Par. 99-5547, No. 99-CV-60406-AA (U.S.D.C. E.D. Mich. October 25, 1999).
"Sasscer makes the puzzling argument that section 1461 is the only provision in the Internal Revenue Code that imposes liability for payment of a tax on 'income.' Without belaboring the issue, the Court notes that 26 U.S.C. section 1 could hardly be more clear in imposing a tax on 'income.' See generally United States v. Melton, 86 F.3d 1153, 1996 WL 271468 *2-3 (4th Cir. May 22, 1996) (unpublished opinion)." United States v. Sasscer, 86 AFTR2d Par. 2000-5317, n. 3, No. Y-97-3026 (D.C. Md. 9/25/2000).
"Plaintiff's arguments are no less frivolous here. [Footnote omitted.] First, Plaintiff argues the Code does not impose a tax "liability". The plain language of the Code belies this, stating the tax is "imposed". See 96 [sic] U.S.C. section 1. He attempts to distinguish between "imposing" a tax and creating a "liability" for tax. The Court fails to see a difference. Individuals have an affirmative duty to pay taxes. Gabelman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 86 F.3d 609, 611 (6th Cir. 1996)." Tornichio v. United States, 81 AFTR2D PAR. 98-582, KTC 1998-71 (N.D.Ohio 1998), (suit for refund of frivolous return penalties dismissed and sanctions imposed for filing a frivolous refund suit), aff'd 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5248, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) Par. 50,394, 83 AFTR2d Par. 99-579, KTC 1999-147 (6th Cir. 1999), (with sanctions imposed for filing a frivolous appeal).
See also, United States v. Moore, 692 F.2d 95 (10th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Slater, 545 F.Supp. 179 (Del. 1982).
"As the cited cases, as well as many others, have made abundantly clear, the following arguments alluded to by the Lonsdales are completely lacking in legal merit and patently frivolous: ... (7) no statutory authority exists for imposing an income tax on individuals...." Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990).
An attorney named Thomas J. Carley argued before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that "[n]owhere in any of the Statutes of the United States is there any section of law making any individual liable to pay a tax or excise on 'taxable income.'" The Second Circuit responded that "Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.) (hereinafter the Code) provides in plain, clear and precise language that '[t]here is hereby imposed the taxable income of every individual ... a tax determined in accordance with' tables set-out later in the statute. ... Despite the appellant's attempted contorted construction of the statutory scheme, we find that it coherently and forthrightly imposed upon the appellant tax upon his income for the year 1980." Ficalora v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 751 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. den. 105 S.Ct. 1869 (1985).
Oddly enough, the same attorney raised nearly the identical argument before the Eighth Circuit, arguing that there was "no law imposing an income tax" on his clients. The Eighth Circuit held that the appeal was "frivolous" and imposed a penalty on the appellants of double the Commissioner's costs of the appeal. Lively v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 705 F.2d 1017, 1018 (8th Cir. 1983).
Even more incredibly, only a year after losing the Lively appeal, and six month after losing the Ficalora appeal, the same attorney, Thomas J. Carley, raises the same idiot issue with the 10th Circuit, questioning "Whether there is any law or statute imposing an income tax on appellants for the year 1977 and, if such a law or statute is claimed to exist, what is the precise citation of such law or statute?" The 10th Circuit quoted from both the Ficalora and Lively opinions, and then spent the rest of the opinion explaining why it was going to impose sanctions on Mr. Carley personally (not his clients). "It is obvious that despite having full knowledge of the learned opinions of two different Article III courts and the accurate reasoning of the Tax Court in Manley [v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 46 T.C.M. 1359 (1983), another case lost by Mr. Carley)] concerning his arguments, Carley has failed to learn that he has no right to occupy the time of such courts with frivolous, unreasonable and vexatious proceedings, and that if he does so, he exposes not only his clients but also himself personally to sanctions." Charczuk v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 771 F.2d 471, 474 (10th Cir. 1985). The court also referred to Mr. Carley's arguments as "meritless," "preposterous," "nearly silly," and "that thoroughly defy common sense."