Thank you for posting this. There were mistakes both at the strategic and tactical level up to and on 10/03/93. Clearly, the Clinton Administration at one point was going to pull out of Somalia and then made the decision to stay. The goals - to help establish a stable goverment, to counter the effects of the drought, etc. were well intentioned, but after reading some of the material "after the fact", Clinton did not seem to take advantage of people's expertise who had extensive experience in Somalia.
From a tactical perspective, those involved on 10/03/93 lamented not taking NVD's with them on the afternoon mission and there appeared to be a serious problem with the 5.56mm round not being able to knock down and keep down Somalis who were shot. One also got the impression that the QRF was not at a readiness state that would have offered quicker rescue of pinned down soldiers. Additionally, there was a breakdown in communication between the Delta Force and Rangers elements, with at one point the Army Rangerelement leader refusing to even talk with the Delta Force element leader. As a result, there were in effect two force elements that night. Consolidation may have helped both out.