The Unraveling of Scientific Materialism

In a retrospective essay on Carl Sagan in the January 9, 1997 New York Review of Books, Harvard Genetics Professor Richard Lewontin tells how he first met Sagan at a public debate in Arkansas in 1964. The two young scientists had been coaxed by senior colleagues to go to Little Rock to debate the affirmative side of the question: "RESOLVED, that the theory of evolution is as proved as is the fact that the earth goes around the sun." Their main opponent was a biology professor from a fundamentalist college, with a Ph.D. from the University of Texas in Zoology. Lewontin reports no details from the debate, except to say that "despite our absolutely compelling arguments, the audience unaccountably voted for the opposition."

Of course, Lewontin and Sagan attributed the vote to the audience’s prejudice in favor of creationism. The resolution was framed in such a way, however, that the affirmative side should have lost even if the jury had been composed of Ivy League philosophy professors. How could the theory of evolution even conceivably be "proved" to the same degree as "the fact that the earth goes around the sun"? The latter is an observable feature of present-day reality, whereas the former deals primarily with non-repeatable events of the very distant past. The appropriate comparison would be between the theory of evolution and the accepted theory of the origin of the solar system.

If "evolution" referred only to currently observable phenomena like domestic animal breeding or finch-beak variation, then winning the debate should have been no problem for Lewontin and Sagan even with a fundamentalist jury. The statement "We breed a great variety of dogs," which rests on direct observation, is much easier to prove than the statement that the earth goes around the sun, which requires sophisticated reasoning. Not even the strictest biblical literalists deny the bred varieties of dogs, the variation of finch beaks, and similar instances within types. The more controversial claims of large-scale evolution are what arouse skepticism. Scientists may think they have good reasons for believing that living organisms evolved naturally from nonliving chemicals, or that complex organs evolved by the accumulation of micromutations through natural selection, but having reasons is not the same as having proof. I have seen people, previously inclined to believe whatever "science says," become skeptical when they realize that the scientists actually do seem to think that variations in finch beaks or peppered moths, or the mere existence of fossils, proves all the vast claims of "evolution." It is as though the scientists, so confident in their answers, simply do not understand the question.

Carl Sagan described the theory of evolution in his final book as the doctrine that "human beings (and all the other species) have slowly evolved by natural processes from a succession of more ancient beings with no divine intervention needed along the way." It is the alleged absence of divine intervention throughout the history of life—the strict materialism of the orthodox theory—that explains why a great many people, only some of whom are biblical fundamentalists, think that Darwinian evolution (beyond the micro level) is basically materialistic philosophy disguised as scientific fact. Sagan himself worried about opinion polls showing that only about 10 percent of Americans believe in a strictly materialistic evolutionary process, and, as Lewontin’s anecdote concedes, some of the doubters have advanced degrees in the relevant sciences. Dissent as widespread as that must rest on something less easily remedied than mere ignorance of facts.

Lewontin eventually parted company with Sagan over how to explain why the theory of evolution seems so obviously true to mainstream scientists and so doubtful to much of the public. Sagan attributed the persistence of unbelief to ignorance and hucksterism and set out to cure the problem with popular books, magazine articles, and television programs promoting the virtues of mainstream science over its fringe rivals. Lewontin, a Marxist whose philosophical sophistication exceeds that of Sagan by several orders of magnitude, came to see the issue as essentially one of basic intellectual commitment rather than factual knowledge.

The reason for opposition to scientific accounts of our origins, according to Lewontin, is not that people are ignorant of facts, but that they have not learned to think from the right starting point. In his words, "The primary problem is not to provide the public with the knowledge of how far it is to the nearest star and what genes are made of. . . . Rather, the problem is to get them to reject irrational and supernatural explanations of the world, the demons that exist only in their imaginations, and to accept a social and intellectual apparatus, Science, as the only begetter of truth." What the public needs to learn is that, like it or not, "We exist as material beings in a material world, all of whose phenomena are the consequences of material relations among material entities." In a word, the public needs to accept materialism, which means that they must put God (whom Lewontin calls the "Supreme Extraterrestrial") in the trash can of history where such myths belong.

Although Lewontin wants the public to accept science as the only source of truth, he freely admits that mainstream science itself is not free of the hokum that Sagan so often found in fringe science. As examples he cites three influential scientists who are particularly successful at writing for the public: E. O. Wilson, Richard Dawkins, and Lewis Thomas,

Lewontin laments that even scientists frequently cannot judge the reliability of scientific claims outside their fields of speciality, and have to take the word of recognized authorities on faith. "Who am I to believe about quantum physics if not Steven Weinberg, or about the solar system if not Carl Sagan? What worries me is that they may believe what Dawkins and Wilson tell them about evolution."

One major living scientific popularizer whom Lewontin does not trash is his Harvard colleague and political ally Stephen Jay Gould. Just to fill out the picture, however, it seems that admirers of Dawkins have as low an opinion of Gould as Lewontin has of Dawkins or Wilson. According to a 1994 essay in the New York Review of Books by John Maynard Smith, the dean of British neo-Darwinists, "the evolutionary biologists with whom I have discussed his [Gould’s] work tend to see him as a man whose ideas are so confused as to be hardly worth bothering with, but as one who should not be publicly criticized because he is at least on our side against the creationists. All this would not matter, were it not that he is giving non biologists a largely false picture of the state of evolutionary theory." Lewontin fears that non-biologists will fail to recognize that Dawkins is peddling pseudoscience; Maynard Smith fears exactly the same of Gould.

If eminent experts say that evolution according to Gould is too confused to be worth bothering about, and others equally eminent say that evolution according to Dawkins rests on unsubstantiated assertions and counterfactual claims, the public can hardly be blamed for suspecting that grand-scale evolution may rest on something less impressive than rock-solid, unimpeachable fact. Lewontin confirms this suspicion by explaining why "we" (i.e., the kind of people who read the New York Review) reject out of hand the view of those who think they see the hand of the Creator in the material world:

That paragraph is the most insightful statement of what is at issue in the creation/evolution controversy that I have ever read from a senior figure in the scientific establishment. It explains neatly how the theory of evolution can seem so certain to scientific insiders, and so shaky to the outsiders. For scientific materialists the materialism comes first; the science comes thereafter. We might more accurately term them "materialists employing science." And if materialism is true, then some materialistic theory of evolution has to be true simply as a matter of logical deduction, regardless of the evidence. That theory will necessarily be at least roughly like neo-Darwinism, in that it will have to involve some combination of random changes and law-like processes capable of producing complicated organisms that (in Dawkins’ words) "give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose."

The prior commitment explains why evolutionary scientists are not disturbed when they learn that the fossil record does not provide examples of gradual macroevolutionary transformation, despite decades of determined effort by paleontologists to confirm neo-Darwinian presuppositions. That is also why biological chemists like Stanley Miller continue in confidence even when geochemists tell them that the early earth did not have the oxygen-free atmosphere essential for producing the chemicals required by the theory of the origin of life in a prebiotic soup. They reason that there had to be some source (comets?) capable of providing the needed molecules, because otherwise life would not have evolved. When evidence showed that the period available on the early earth for the evolution of life was extremely brief in comparison to the time previously posited for chemical evolution scenarios, Carl Sagan calmly concluded that the chemical evolution of life must be easier than we had supposed, because it happened so rapidly on the early earth.

That is also why neo-Darwinists like Richard Dawkins are not troubled by the Cambrian Explosion, where all the invertebrate animal groups appear suddenly and without identifiable ancestors. Whatever the fossil record may suggest, those Cambrian animals had to evolve by accepted neo-Darwinian means, which is to say by material processes requiring no intelligent guidance or supernatural input. Materialist philosophy demands no less. That is also why Niles Eldredge, surveying the absence of evidence for macroevolutionary transformations in the rich marine invertebrate fossil record, can observe that "evolution always seems to happen somewhere else," and then describe himself on the very next page as a "knee-jerk neo-Darwinist." Finally, that is why Darwinists do not take critics of materialist evolution seriously, but speculate instead about "hidden agendas" and resort immediately to ridicule. In their minds, to question materialism is to question reality. All these specific points are illustrations of what it means to say that "we" have an a priori commitment to materialism.

The scientific leadership cannot afford to disclose that commitment frankly to the public. Imagine what chance the affirmative side would have if the question for public debate were rephrased candidly as "RESOLVED, that everyone should adopt an a priori commitment to materialism." Everyone would see what many now sense dimly: that a methodological premise useful for limited purposes has been expanded to form a metaphysical absolute. Of course people who define science as the search for materialistic explanations will find it useful to assume that such explanations always exist. To suppose that a philosophical preference can validate a cherished scientific theory is to define "science" as a way of supporting prejudice. Yet that is exactly what the Darwinists seem to be doing, when their evidence is evaluated by critics who are willing to question materialism.

One of those critics, bearing impeccable scientific credentials, is Michael Behe, who argues that complex molecular systems (such as bacterial and protozoan flagella, immune systems, blood clotting, and cellular transport) are "irreducibly complex." This means that the systems incorporate elements that interact with each other in such complex ways that it is impossible to describe detailed, testable Darwinian mechanisms for their evolution. (My review of Behe’s Darwin’s Black Box appeared in FT, October 1996.) Never mind for now whether you think that Behe’s argument can prevail over sustained opposition from the materialists. The primary dispute is not over who is going to win, but about whether the argument can even get started. If we know a priori that materialism is true, then contrary evidence properly belongs under the rug, where it has always duly been swept.

For Lewontin, the public’s determined resistance to scientific materialism constitutes "a deep problem in democratic self-governance." Quoting Jesus’ words from the Gospel of John, he thinks that "the truth that makes us free" is not an accumulation of knowledge, but a metaphysical understanding (i.e., materialism) that sets us free from belief in supernatural entities like God. How is the scientific elite to persuade or bamboozle the public to accept the crucial starting point? Lewontin turns for guidance to the most prestigious of all opponents of democracy, Plato. In his dialogue the Gorgias, Plato reports a debate between the rationalist Socrates and three sophists or teachers of rhetoric. The debaters all agree that the public is incompetent to make reasoned decisions on justice and public policy. The question in dispute is whether the effective decision should be made by experts (Socrates) or by the manipulators of words (the sophists).

In familiar contemporary terms, the question might be stated as whether a court should appoint a panel of impartial authorities to decide whether the defendant’s product caused the plaintiff’s cancer, or whether the jury should be swayed by rival trial lawyers each touting their own experts. Much turns on whether we believe that the authorities are truly impartial, or whether they have interests of their own. When the National Academy of Sciences appoints a committee to advise the public on evolution, it consists of persons picked in part for their scientific outlook, which is to say their a priori acceptance of materialism. Members of such a panel know a lot of facts in their specific areas of research and have a lot to lose if the "fact of evolution" is exposed as a philosophical assumption. Should skeptics accept such persons as impartial fact-finders? Lewontin himself knows too much about cognitive elites to say anything so naive, and so in the end he gives up and concludes that "we" do not know how to get the public to the right starting point.

Lewontin is brilliantly insightful, but too crankily honest to be as good a manipulator as his Harvard colleague Stephen Jay Gould. Gould displays both his talent and his unscrupulousness in an essay in the March 1997 issue of Natural History, entitled "Nonoverlapping Magisteria" and subtitled "Science and religion are not in conflict, for their teachings occupy distinctly different domains." With a subtitle like that, you can be sure that Gould is out to reassure the public that evolution leads to no alarming conclusions. True to form, Gould insists that the only dissenters from evolution are "Protestant fundamentalists who believe that every word of the Bible must be literally true." Gould also insists that evolution (he never defines the word) is "both true and entirely compatible with Christian belief." Gould is familiar with nonliteralist opposition to evolutionary naturalism, but he blandly denies that any such phenomenon exists. He even quotes a letter written to the New York Times in answer to an op-ed essay by Michael Behe, without revealing the context. You can do things like that when you know that the media won’t call you to account.

The centerpiece of Gould’s essay is an analysis of the complete text of Pope John Paul’s statement of October 22, 1996 to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences endorsing evolution as "more than a hypothesis." He fails to quote the Pope’s crucial qualification that "theories of evolution which, in accordance with the philosophies inspiring them, consider the spirit as emerging from the forces of living matter or as a mere epiphenomenon of this matter, are incompatible with the truth about man." Of course, a theory based on materialism assumes by definition that there is no "spirit" active in this world that is independent of matter. Gould knows this perfectly well, and he also knows, just as Richard Lewontin does, that the evidence doesn’t support the claims for the creative power of natural selection made by writers such as Richard Dawkins. That is why the philosophy that really supports the theory has to be protected from critical scrutiny.

Gould’s essay is a tissue of half-truths aimed at putting the religious people to sleep, or luring them into a "dialogue" on terms set by the materialists. Thus Gould graciously allows religion to participate in discussions of morality or the meaning of life, because science does not claim authority over such questions of value, and because "Religion is too important to too many people for any dismissal or denigration of the comfort still sought by many folks from theology." Gould insists, however, that all such discussion must cede to science the power to determine the facts, and one of the facts is an evolutionary process that is every bit as materialistic and purposeless for Gould as it is for Lewontin or Dawkins. If religion wants to accept a dialogue on those terms, that’s fine with Gould—but don’t let those religious people think they get to make an independent judgment about the evidence that supposedly supports the "facts." And if the religious people are gullible enough to accept materialism as one of the facts, they won’t be capable of causing much trouble.

The debate about creation and evolution is not deadlocked. Propagandists like Gould try to give the impression that nothing has changed, but essays like Lewontin’s and books like Behe’s demonstrate that honest thinkers on both sides are near agreement on a redefinition of the conflict. Biblical literalism is not the issue. The issue is whether materialism and rationality are the same thing. Darwinism is based on an a priori commitment to materialism, not on a philosophically neutral assessment of the evidence. Separate the philosophy from the science, and the proud tower collapses. When the public understands this clearly, Lewontin’s Darwinism will start to move out of the science curriculum and into the department of intellectual history, where it can gather dust on the shelf next to Lewontin’s Marxism.

Phillip E. Johnson is Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley and author, most recently, of Defeating Darwinism by Opening Minds (InterVarsity Press).

You just keep repeating yourself, without backing up the why .... If you want to convince me, demonstrate to me where I'm wrong.

First, I have only an intuitive understanding of what your ABc's mean. You need to sharpen it a bit if you'd like a better critique.

Second, your cat turning into a laser pointer (plus some left over mass and/or energy) isn't an inconceivable natural event, simply a very improbable one. Atoms can be transmuted and moved and molecules rearranged by application of outside forces. One can imagine an advanced civilization arriving and demonstrating their superior technology by doing it. Then one simply leaves them out of the equation and supposes the equivalent exquisitely timed forces arriving from distant space and converging on your cat. Again, it's very, very improbable but not inconceivable.

Third, my intuitive understanding of what you mean by B is that it is the limit of what is possible within the system. The system we're discussing is biological life for which the limit is all possible DNA configurations that can be reached from the initial conditions we infer by the mutations, etc. we know occur in nature. A genome entailing a brain is IMO definitely within the system. What is primarily at issue is the probability of this outcome.

So, to summarize without, I hope simply repeating myself, I reject you assertion that the B in this case excludes the human genome.

First, I have only an intuitive understanding of what your ABc's mean. You need to sharpen it a bit if you'd like a better critique.

Sorry about that. My A<=B is a shorthand for the output <= input statement. And A>B is a shorthand for the output >& input statement.

Second, your cat turning into a laser pointer (plus some left over mass and/or energy) isn't an inconceivable natural event, simply a very improbable one. Atoms can be transmuted and moved and molecules rearranged by application of outside forces. One can imagine an advanced civilization arriving and demonstrating their superior technology by doing it. Then one simply leaves them out of the equation and supposes the equivalent exquisitely timed forces arriving from distant space and converging on your cat. Again, it's very, very improbable but not inconceivable.

Actually, it may be inconceivable. Such as some parts of the laser will most likely shift into energy, which may be lost to the end system (once it's shifted into energy, with the dynamics of matter and energy interaction, it may be impossible for the original energies and matter to be shifted over to the cat from the laser. The cat might come from parts of the laser, but the shift would be incomplete). Not everything is possible. For example, a paradox (which is conceptually possible, but not physically possible, as far as we know by applying the primary premise that that logic works.). Time + events is not a catch-all equation for everything (though it can be for alot of things. But these things must be demonstrated to be valid).

Third, my intuitive understanding of what you mean by B is that it is the limit of what is possible within the system. The system we're discussing is biological life for which the limit is all possible DNA configurations that can be reached from the initial conditions we infer by the mutations, etc. we know occur in nature. A genome entailing a brain is IMO definitely within the system. What is primarily at issue is the probability of this outcome.

Actually, the limits, as far as the evolutionary algorithms I've seen, are an inate part of the system. Probability needs to be coupled with how the information shifts. If we map evolutionary changes, Micro changes can be mapped to a horizontal axis. However, Macro changes are mapped to a vertical axis (in an information increase mapping). Yes, it may be possible, but does information theory allow it? If we have to apply "it's possible, therefore it happend", we're not working with a very solid theory here. Just because it's possible doesn't mean it did happen. Also, just because we might be able to figure out a way to do it doesn't mean nature will do it that way (or even allow it done that way).

Personally, I don't like information theory divorced from Evolution theory. Your explaination gives the what, but not the why (and "it's probable" isn't a very valid why. Science doesn't work like that). It basically meets the form "because it did". I don't accept that. There's a couple of observations I make about Evolution. 1) Micro Evolution works on one information scale, and Macro Evolution requires an extra information scale (the 2 dimensional horizontal and vertical mapping up above). (A<=B is the horizontal mapping, or the increase of existing structure/information. A>B would be the vertical mapping, or addition of structure/information). This I get from my current understanding of information theory. 2) The evolution of creatures (both living and virtual) all falls under the Micro Evolution scale. Our direct observations tell us that Evolution happens along a horizontal scale, keeping within the range of A<=B. Math theory tells us that no matter how many iterations of a function that falls squarely under A<=B you give, you won't be able to shift it to an A>B function (vertical scale, Macro Evolution), unless the function is more then an A<=B function, or if there's a conversion function from A<=B to A>B. In either case, it's up to you to show either 1) The function is more then an A<=B function (through observation. But if you have a theory about how, feel free to share it. However, it won't be valid until it's been demonstrated, like any other theory), or 2) There's a conversion function to change the Micro Evolution A<=B function to an A>B function (also through observation. You can share a theory about it if you have one, but again, it won't be valid until it's demonstrated). To put it in simple terms, it's up to the Evolutionists to prove that Macro Evolution can happen (I won't take assumptions as 'fact', as many Evolutionists around here seem to do. If you don't take Historical Evolution as 'fact', then I have no quarrel with you. I'm quite enjoying this chat).

-The Hajman-

If B grows, it still fits into the set A<=B, and you still don't get Macro Evolution (in fact, the constraints become tighter).

Ah, I see my notation doesn't follow yours. The output grows. And, as edsheppa points out, your final output is the current most evolved system, not the primitive protocell.

However, your rigid adherence to information theory and its current state of development as a final model for evolution is limiting. Life as information is a theory under construction. Darwinian theory can be modeled in a GA. But there's more to evolution than Darwinian theory. Following your last response to edsheppa (and I hope I'm not confusing the subject, as he's perfectly capable of explaining this himself) I want to point out that natural selection in real life works at the level of function unlike natural selection in a GA. When I mentioned constraints above, I meant by that constraints on the information that becomes available or accessible to selection. The most obvious constraints are structural and developmental.

As far as modeling these constraints, progress has been made on individual molecules such as RNA. Given a functioning RNA molecule, random mutations will yield a very limited number of RNA molecules with a new structure that could conceivably be functional and therefore selectable. Negative mutations never make it to a selectable endpoint. Most mutations are carried as neutral. They do not change the structure of the molecule and are carried along successive generations without selective influence. New mutations in subsequent generations eventually lead to either a deleterious endpoint, or a complete structural change. One that carries the organism through it's developmental pathway. Whether it is then carried through the population successfully is a matter of natural selection.

Technically put, natural selection (NS) acts on the topology of phenotype. The GA's are performing NS on the genotype. The phenotype determines the fitness landscape (there's your A) and the genotype-phenotype map determines B, not the genotype alone. With each new phenotypic change, the fitness landscape changes into a completely new space and thus A grows.

i>It doesn't. We still have bacteria, for instance. Once an organism breaks through the fitness constraints into the next space, the equation is no longer A<=B but, instead, is A'<=B' or something else.

I would agree with that. However, what I don't agree with currently is that it demonstrates that it'll lead from a dynamic A<=B constraint into an A>&B constraint. Larger spaces do allow for more, and different, information configuration. And shifting spaces (dynamic spaces) do allow for an even broader range of such configurations (a purely dynamic space will allow for a theoretical infinite number of configurations). In other words, an organism has infinite potential in a natural space environment. However, infinite potential doesn't mean it will (or could) take up a different information space then it first started with (recognizing that the environment space and the information space of the organism, though linked, are seperate). This can be seen in good GA programs (such as those that link AI algorithms with AL). It allows for a dynamic space, but the information space never truely grows. However, the 'organism' potential to adapt to that particular space is unlimited (as far as we can make it). The way I understand it, we're not looking at a one dimensional evolutionary shift. It's easily 2 (or more) dimensions. And an infinite shift and growth in one dimension doesn't necessarily mean a shift or growth in another. I think I understand what you're saying. That as the space changes and grows, then the structure will grow. I agree with this. Also, I agree that both A and B will grow as this happens. However, it appears you're saying that the information space will also grow. This I see as a problem independent of our adaptation to the fitness space. Another dimension in the problem; an extra shift it would need to take. The current evolution algorithms don't disallow this shift as you explain it. It simply doesn't require it, need it, and doesn't seem to lead to it on it's own, and it hasn't been demonstrated (it may not be the scientists fault. Nature might require all that time. However, for whatever reason, it hasn't been demonstrated). This is why I don't put much faith in it. When I read a theory that starts from A and gets to B, I need something to explain how it happens. When an Evolutionist says "It just does", that doesn't exactly inspire confidence in their theory. When they say "If you believe in Micro Evolution, you must believe in Macro Evolution", I don't take them very seriously. When the immediate end results of Micro Evolution show a steady state in the information space, and the end results of Macro Evolution show an (obvious) expanded state in the information space, and the Evolutionist claims that the first will lead to the second (with no further explination, and clumping the two together as if there is no difference), my answer is, by necessity, "Prove it". (This is just my rant to show you where I'm comming from. :) At any rate, I think your explaination better explains things then "Micro and Macro Evolution are the same". If you don't mind, I'd like to continue this (for more then one reason. I have an application that I could use a better GA algorithm with). I thank you for this conversation.

There are numerous paralogous and homologous structures in extant species which provide examples.

Liiiikkke...?

You also see, I trust, that this largely explains the discontinuity between species.

It could. But the simplier explination for many is that their not related. This isn't to say they arn't related. It just says it's not required for them to be.

-The Hajman-

I would agree with that. However, what I don't agree with currently is that it demonstrates that it'll lead from a dynamic A<=B constraint into an A>&B constraint. Larger spaces do allow for more, and different, information configuration. And shifting spaces (dynamic spaces) do allow for an even broader range of such configurations (a purely dynamic space will allow for a theoretical infinite number of configurations). In other words, an organism has infinite potential in a natural space environment. However, infinite potential doesn't mean it will (or could) take up a different information space then it first started with (recognizing that the environment space and the information space of the organism, though linked, are seperate).

If it’s physically possible, what prevents it from happening? What is the barrier to the transfer of information?

Information is conserved in a global sense.

This can be seen in good GA programs (such as those that link AI algorithms with AL). It allows for a dynamic space, but the information space never truely grows.

This is true for a closed system. In life, organisms don’t function as closed systems.

However, the 'organism' potential to adapt to that particular space is unlimited (as far as we can make it). The way I understand it, we're not looking at a one dimensional evolutionary shift. It's easily 2 (or more) dimensions. And an infinite shift and growth in one dimension doesn't necessarily mean a shift or growth in another. I think I understand what you're saying. That as the space changes and grows, then the structure will grow. I agree with this. Also, I agree that both A and B will grow as this happens. However, it appears you're saying that the information space will also grow. This I see as a problem independent of our adaptation to the fitness space. Another dimension in the problem; an extra shift it would need to take. The current evolution algorithms don't disallow this shift as you explain it. It simply doesn't require it, need it, and doesn't seem to lead to it on it's own, and it hasn't been demonstrated (it may not be the scientists fault. Nature might require all that time. However, for whatever reason, it hasn't been demonstrated).

GA’s are rather limited. Interesting things begin to happen when they can interact with each other. A bit like cellular automata. GA’s are designed to vary the description of solutions to a particular problem. It’s easy to see that evolution doesn’t work this way. And just because GA’s don’t generate novel information, this doesn’t mean that life can’t. Artificial intelligence, for instance doesn’t duplicate the human brain. This doesn’t mean that theories about human cognition are wrong. It rather means they are incomplete. Or that the capability to implement all theories simultaneously don’t yet exist.

When the immediate end results of Micro Evolution show a steady state in the information space, and the end results of Macro Evolution show an (obvious) expanded state in the information space, and the Evolutionist claims that the first will lead to the second (with no further explination, and clumping the two together as if there is no difference), my answer is, by necessity, "Prove it". (This is just my rant to show you where I'm comming from. :) At any rate, I think your explaination better explains things then "Micro and Macro Evolution are the same".

In a very trivial sense, they are the same. The biological processes, such as natural selection, play a role at each level. And micro changes lead to macro changes. I usually object to the claim that micro + time=macro. I use the example of an ant colony, which exhibits an ordered behavior when viewed from a macro perspective. And, like CA’s the individual ants are simply using preprogrammed responses to their environment for their seemingly collective behavior. Yet, the difference between an organized colony and a disorganized group of ants is not one of time. It’s ant density. And it’s probably related to the concentration of olfactory stimuli in the local environment.

There are some obvious fundamentally different processes which work at the species or population level which don’t work at the genetic level. Some pecies extinctions, for example, can be traced to catastrophic climactic events. On the other hand, some micro changes can lead to instant macro events. Small mutations in switch and control genes, like the homeobox genes, lead to massive body plan changes. Speciation in some fruit flies, for instance, can be traced to single point mutations in gamete recognition proteins. There’s your proof – however, when speaking of macro, I suspect you aren’t speaking of speciation events but of the invention of novel function. And, of course, this can also be traced to changes at the micro level. In fact, this is done in the laboratory in the generation of peptides and RNAs with novel functional features.

I’m curious as to where you draw the line of distinction between possible micro evolution and impossible macro evolution. Aside from my assumptions above, what is your definition of macroevolution? As to the relatedness between organisms, why does genetic and morphological similarity imply a relationship within a species but not between species?

The problem is, "God did it" doesn't explain anything. It doesn't lead to knowledge. When the obvious next question, "how did God do it?" comes along, the only answer religion can offer is "God works in mysterious ways."

Science can't accept religious "mystery" as an answer. At most and best, such mystery describes a state of non-knowledge. It really means "I don't know," but the religionist is too proud to make that admission.

Certainly that is one problem. There is another, probably worse. From the tone of your reply, I suspect that you have made the same choice that Lewontin did: "...we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door..." Here is the problem: suppose that there is a God and that He did create the world (not necessarily in six days, etc.) In this case what can we say about any scientific theory based in part on the axiom "No god was involved in the origin of the universe or of life"? We can say this: That scientific theory will probably never get close to the truth about origins.

But most scientists are too proud to make that admission.

To anyone who understands science, it is obvious that science does not have all the answers. It is only about coming up with better answers. Newton's physics was better than Aristotle's, and Einstein's better than Newton's.

Apples and oranges. The physics you are writing of here speaks only of the laws governing the interactions of physical objects. The theories are mathematical in formulation and are of necessity only approximations of what will usually happen in the physical universe. A theory that gives closer approximations in all cases is clearly "better" than the theory to which it is being compared.

And even if God performs a miracle that contradicts the "laws" of physics, such as causing the Earth to stop revolving for a time, this would not weaken the "laws" of physics. We would expect them to continue working except when overridden...

Parts of biology are like this, giving close approximations to what will usually happen in the physical universe. However, when a person claims that "event X occurred 100 million years ago" this is a different situation. We cannot directly know whether X did occur or not. All we can do is to try to interpret the evidence that remains 100 million years later, and judge our interpretations according to whether or not they are consistent with (and not too improbable under) the "laws" of physics, chemistry, molecular biology, etc.

However, if event X were actually a "divine intervention," or if there were at least one "divine intervention" occurring between event X and the present, not only would it be possible for all these interpretations to be wrong, it would be possible that any system consistent with "God does not intervene" would never be able to approach the truth about event X. Such a system might give "answers" better than other systems for natural present-day events, but might be completely unable to approach the truth about the past.

Darwin's biology is better than that of Moses. Darwin went in search of knowledge, while Moses got lost for 40 years. Is it such a problem to admit that Moses really didn't know what he was talking about when he said plants appeared before the sun did? It was three thousand years ago, and he had all that politicking to do with his Hebrews and that Pharoah guy. Biology wasn't his strong point. Maybe Moses didn't write it. Whoever did, got it wrong. Now we know better.

Straw man. You apparently believe that without the sun, plants could not live. As far as I know, most plants require only soil, water, atmosphere, proper temperature range, and enough light. In the present time we see the sun providing the warmth and light. If the sun were removed, we would naturally expect the plants to die.

However, if an omnipotent God is at work, all that is required is His will that the plants live. If He commanded them to live, they would live: without light, without heat, without air, without water. God could cause plants to grow and flourish on a neutron star. Of course, according to Moses, there was already soil (firmament), water, and light. In fact, there was light before there were stars. Not enough light for plants? Why not? And since neither the air nor heat were mentioned specifically in creation, it is unclear why we must assume that anything necessary for plants was lacking...

But if we assume the nonexistence or the nonintervention of God, I guess we may "know better"...

Except those who insist, "God did it through mysterious ways." That is their answer: their single, useless, tired, incompetent answer to every question. It isn't that science has a prior commitment to "materialism" so much as it has a prior commitment to knowledge. Religion's mystery answer just does not provide any knowledge.

Straw man again. If God ever directly causes anything to happen, you won't know how unless He reveals it to you. I believe you have already made the assumption that this never happens. (Interesting, because if that were true, then science could never prove it!) Actually a weaker axiom would suffice: "God has never yet intervened in a way that would produce scientifically misleading evidence." However, I belive that most Evolutionists take the stronger "God never intervenes" or the strongest "There is no God." This is the prior commitment to materialism. Lewontin was more honest than you have been in this conversation.

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