SOURCE Tactical insights from the trial
Posted the Tuesday, August 07 2001 @ 12:14:14 MEST
HEADLINE: Tactical insights from the trial
BYLINE: Stefan Leader and Aaron Danis
BODY: The operational cycle
Former Al-Qaeda member L'Houssaine Kherchtou testified that according to his Afghan training, there are four groups involved in attacking a target. The surveillance group collects information on targets and sends it to the bosses who decide which target to attack. The bosses send a logistical group to provide the weapons and explosives needed to attack the target. A fourth group carries out the attack.
Odeh said that terrorist operations were divided between two cells. One cell conducts all the logistics and planning, including surveillance and building the bomb. The second cell carries out the attack. Al Owhali said that the cell has four sections: intelligence, administration (logistics), planning and preparation, and execution.
Despite minor discrepancies, the basic functions of the cell and the operational procedures taught in the training camps generally correlate with the attack on the embassies. From the trial transcripts, it appears that initial surveillance was done in 1994- 95, three to four years before the attack was carried out.
Target selection
Analysts believe religiously motivated terrorists are more willing to carry out mass casualty attacks than politically motivated terrorists because they feel they are doing God's will. Despite some security around the US embassies, (guards, walls, gates and access controls), the facilities apparently were considered easy targets, perhaps because of a lack of stand-off distance and the fact that host-nation guards were unarmed.
An FBI agent testified that Al Owhali told him that the Nairobi embassy was chosen as a target because it was occupied by many US citizens, including press and military attaches and intelligence officers; it was easy to hit; and it had a female ambassador whose death would result in more publicity.
Al Owhali said that during his Afghan training he was told that Al- Qaeda target priorities were US military bases, US diplomatic missions and posts, and kidnapping ambassadors. FBI agent Abigail Perkins testified that defendant Khalfan Khamis Mohammad said that terrorists prefer to target embassies and civilians because the military is too difficult to hit. Al Owhali said that the organiser of the embassy bombing claimed that attacks on US facilities abroad would pave the way for attacks inside the USA. The time of the attack (Friday, between 1030 and 1100) was chosen because most Muslims would be in mosques at prayer or on their way to mosques.
Ali Mohammad was the first person to link Bin Laden directly to the attacks in Africa. He said Bin Laden once asked him to scout out the embassy in Kenya. "I took pictures, drew diagrams and wrote a report," Mohammad said when he entered his guilty plea in October 2000. "Bin Laden looked at the picture of the American embassy and pointed to where a truck could go as a suicide bomber."
Surveillance techniques
Kherchtou described a reconnaissance mission of the US Embassy in Nairobi in 1994-95. He said he often saw three Al-Qaeda members developing photographs in his apartment and once saw one of them near the embassy with a camera. Kherchtou said that one of the men who visited his home was Al-Qaeda operative Ali Mohammad.
Kherchtou testified that in the 1980s he took a two-week surveillance seminar taught by Mohammad in a military training camp in Pakistan. He was trained to use different cameras, develop the pictures, and to take pictures holding the camera so that the surveillant is not looking through it. The surveillant would then write a report that would include a target description, diagrams, maps, and photos.
Target descriptions included rooms; wall size, location and height; location of lights and doors, and number of people present. The reports could be put on computer disks, making them easier to carry and conceal. Odeh told the FBI that in difficult circumstances, the surveillant would set up a food stand or buy a nearby shop in order to observe the target and look for weaknesses. Another technique was to send a person (a 'walk-in') inside the target to take get a first-hand look, and to ask questions to assess the quality of the security. Al Owhali also said that the leader of the cell was trained to do target site surveys and still and video photography.
The descriptions given are consistent with long-standing terrorist surveillance practices. By using former US Army Sergeant Ali Mohammad to conduct the initial surveillance, the cell was able to exploit his knowledge of US approaches to security.
Training, weapons and explosives
At least seven types of training took place in the Sudanese and Afghan camps, including Islamic law and jihad; explosives and advanced explosives training; small arms training; assassination training (including the use of chemicals, poisons and toxins); hand- to-hand combat; physical fitness; operational principles, including collecting target intelligence and communications. Some individuals were sent to specialist schools for training in electronics and flying aircraft.
Details are incomplete, but explosives training appeared to involve the identification, making and handling of various types of explosives (TNT, C3, C4, etc.), including the mixing of chemicals; modifying dynamite by grinding it into a powder; and familiarisation with various military explosive devices such as grenades, mines (anti-personnel, anti-tank, anti-truck), and rockets. According to one witness, this was a 15-day course. Advanced and more advanced explosives courses were said to run for 45 and 60 days respectively.
Al-Qaeda also trained people in electronics, such as the use of off- the-shelf components (encoders, radios, watches) to make remote and other types of detonators. One defendant stated that he knew how to build a directed charge by putting metal around the TNT to direct the blast. This sounds similar to public descriptions of the bomb used in the USS Cole attack in Yemen in October 2000.
Some Al-Qaeda members trained with Hizbullah in Lebanon in using explosives to destroy large buildings. Direct explosives training appears to be supplemented by a detailed 1,000-page Encyclopedia of Jihad contained on a computer disk made available to recruits. Another training manual, Military Studies in the Jihad Against Tyrants, introduced into evidence at the trial, points out that explosives are believed to be the safest weapon because they allow warriors to 'get away from enemy personnel and to avoid being arrested', and they 'strike the enemy with sheer terror and fright'.
Small arms training included the use of standard assault rifles such as the AK-47, M-16, Uzi, pistols, and the use and firing of rocket- propelled grenades. Assassination training was described as "learning to kill people quietly'. One chapter of the Encyclopedia of Jihad deals extensively with poisons suitable for use in assassinations. Training in operational principles is believed to include target surveillance (of both people and buildings, using various types of cameras), communications (writing reports and use of computers), use of forged documents, and cell organisation and security.
Tactics
Odeh said that the Nairobi attack was a "blunder'' because so many civilians were killed, according to FBI agent John Anticev. Odeh felt his colleagues made a mistake by putting the bomb in the back of a pickup truck. "He said the truck should have backed into the building closely.'' Instead the truck came in "nose first"' and the force of the explosion ricocheted off the cab of the truck, causing many deaths in the vicinity. Odeh stated that, as a general rule, the best place to put explosives is inside the target building, but the best alternative is to get as close as possible.
Al Owhali's attack mission as a passenger in the bomb vehicle was to fire a gun and toss stun grenades to force guards to lift gates at the embassy so the truck could get close to the embassy walls. Al Owhali said the bomb consisted of TNT, aluminum nitrate, and aluminum powder packed in the back of the truck in wooden crates. There was a contingency plan: if the electrical detonator failed to work, it was Al Owhali's job to toss a grenade into the back of the truck to ensure that the bomb went off.
At the embassy the suicide driver Azzam drove the truck to a parking lot in back. Al Owhali jumped out, ready to force the guard to lift the gate, but he suddenly realised that he had left his pistol in the truck. The guard refused to open the gate, so Al Owhali tossed a grenade at the guard and people began to run, including Al Owhali. The gate was not raised so Azzam apparently pulled the truck forward as much as possible and detonated the bomb.
Al Owhali claimed he originally had asked Kenya cell leader Saleh about trying to get the bomb into the underground parking garage at the embassy, where it could cause more damage. Saleh said it would be too difficult to get past the second drop gate at the entrance to the parking garage ramp.
One cell planned and carried out both bombings. Saleh bragged to Al Owhali that he was able to get the second, Tanzanian, vehicle bomb ready in only 10 days. That bomb also consisted of TNT, according to Al Owhali, but a number of oxygen tanks and gas canisters were added to increase fragmentation. The suicide driver for that attack, reportedly named Ahmad Abdallah, carried a cell phone in case Saleh needed to change the mission. Khalfan Khamis Mohammad stated that the vehicle bomb was built in a refrigeration truck. The gas cylinders were placed in the frame and then 20 boxes of TNT were loaded among the tanks so that gas cylinders and boxes of TNT alternated until the interior of the frame was full. Several bags of fertiliser and some sandbags were added to fill the gaps and stabilise the load. A partition of wood and metal was placed in the very rear of the truck so that the bomb would be concealed from anyone opening the truck's doors.
While the Kenya cell had a plan to get through the first embassy gate with the vehicle bomb, the plan apparently was not rehearsed. The subsequent poor execution of the plan prevented the bombers from getting the bomb inside the compound. Meanwhile, at the US embassy in Tanzania, the driver prematurely detonated the vehicle bomb while waiting in line behind a large water truck at the gate, approximately 35-50 feet from the embassy wall. The water truck probably absorbed some of the blast, also reducing damage to the building.
Stefan Leader is a senior security analyst and terrorism specialist with Eagle Research Group, Inc, a consultancy, in Germantown, Maryland, USA. Aaron Danis is an intelligence analyst with the US government.
Hate Club
How deep runs the terror network in Europe?
BY JAMES GRAFF/Brussels
AP
European terrorist cells use videos to recruit and train future fighters
Lased Ben Heni craved a glorious death. On a visit to the seedy apartment of a Tunisian friend, Essid Sami Ben Khemais, in a Milan suburb last March, the intense 32-year-old Libyan chafed at the strictures imposed on martyrdom by al-Qaeda.
Any dramatic action against "the enemies of God," he complained, required authorization of "Sheik Ali Abdullah" — an alias, according to the Italian antiterrorism officials bugging the conversation, for bin Laden himself.
"There’s too much planning. I’m only asking to be allowed to fight them, so I won’t have to respond to anybody here or there," Ben Heni griped. "The day that they choose me or I am killed, I want to respond only to God." He has a few other authorities to answer to first. On Oct. 10 Bavarian police arrested Ben Heni on an Italian warrant at the decrepit Munich rooming house that city welfare authorities had allocated to him in July. His conditions there could hardly have been less glorious: his Yugoslav roommate was battling advanced cancer, and Ben Heni himself, who had been granted political asylum in Germany in 1994, has been diagnosed with Crohn’s disease, a painful inflammation of the intestinal tract. Now he awaits extradition to Italy to face a charge of being part of a group suspected of planning an attack last January on the U.S. embassy in Rome. Last week his earthly belongings — some clothes, leather motorcycle gloves, a Koran and 60 pages of Arabic texts printed off the Internet — were still in a box in a dank Munich basement.
Ben Heni’s tantalizing reference to al-Qaeda’s heavy-handed superstructure is just a fragment in a vexing puzzle investigators are piecing together with painstaking effort and at a frantic pace. Particularly for European investigators, the ongoing probe into the Sept. 11 attacks feeds directly into the pressing effort to prevent future terrorist cataclysms. And they may well come in Europe. In the last year alone, security officials have found evidence of plans for at least five attacks on European soil. No one is in a position even to guess at how many more are being conjured up.
But there is no question that for years Europe has harbored the al-Qaeda plotters and their predecessors as they hatched terrorist attacks going back at least to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. They may have come from Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt or the Gulf states, but they chose to work out their schemes on the Continent. Their spiritual home may have been Saudi Arabia, their training ground Afghanistan and their hated target America, but the terrorists chose to live in Germany, Spain, Italy, England and Belgium. And many still do.
The F.B.I.’s prime effort in Europe remains to illuminate the background of the attacks on New York and Washington — the crucial spadework for which, as U.S. and German ministers acknowledged last week, was done in Hamburg by the cell around Mohamed Atta, the presumed organizer of the Sept. 11 assaults. He and two of the other hijackers and three alleged accomplices lived in or frequented the same appartment at various times and many of them attended the same mosque.
No evidence has yet surfaced definitively linking the Atta cell with any of the others identified in the past year in Europe, hardening suspicions that the Hamburg unit worked on its own. A few gaps, though, were filled last week. The trail of the three fugitive members of the cell — Zakariya Essabar, Said Bahaji and Ramzi Binalshibh — was found to have led to the $15-a-night Embassy Hotel in downtown Karachi. After arriving in the early morning of Sept. 4 on a Turkish Airlines flight, Bahaji checked in using his own name, and two men thought to be Essabar and Binalshibh registered as "Abdullah Husaini," a Belgian national, and "Amar Moula" from France. The three made a series of phone calls from a nearby payphone, slept in Room 318 and left the next morning on a PIA flight to Quetta near the Afghan border. From there, presumably, the trio could find easy passage to Afghanistan with days to spare before the attacks on the U.S. Also last week, Czech Interior Minister Stanislav Gross confirmed that Atta himself made "contact" last spring — well after he moved to the U.S. — with Ahmed Kh. I. Samir Al-Ani, whom Gross described as "an officer of the Iraqi intelligence service." He offered no details on what they discussed.
While some Europeans may assume that America’s high profile will continue to make it the terrorists’ prime target, investigators from Spain to Russia insist that such presumption is unwarranted. Across the Continent, more than 30 key suspects have been arrested since Sept. 11 for alleged links to Islamic terrorism. That may represent a mere fraction of the criminal potential: Europe is a key destination for many of the 11,000 men, according to FBI estimates, who have passed through al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. The bulk of them, presumably, aren’t there anymore.
Some of them no doubt left wearied by the physical hardship, numb to the bellicose rhetoric and determined to pursue a peaceful life. But the rest? "They are scattered around the world," said Mohammed al-Massari, a dissident Saudi physicist who moves in London’s militant Muslim circles. "Even if they have nothing to do with al-Qaeda, they take the model of al-Qaeda and do it on their own." The European arrests suggest what a varied group remains committed and underground, set on jihad. There are computer engineers and transient workers, some garbed in piety and others disguised as hedonists. Some have direct ties to bin Laden’s lieutenants. Others appear pulled along by a tide of fraternal allegiance to the cause of jihad, determined to even the score in a battle first joined not only in Afghanistan, but also in Bosnia, Chechnya and an Islamic world they view as controlled by repressive and apostate regimes.
Al-Qaeda, as we now know it, has been under the noses of European security services for years, but it was perceived by some as just one threat among many. "In Europe we were too preoccupied with our own terrorist problems — E.T.A. in Spain, the I.R.A. in the U.K., the Corsicans in France and so on — and we devoted our resources to these threats," admits a Spanish security official. "Even after the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Islamic threat seemed distant. Everything changed after Sept. 11. Before then we looked on bin Laden as someone from another planet, like a Martian."
In the Encyclopedia of jihad, a how-to guide to holy war that French terrorism expert Roland Jacquard believes was commissioned by bin Laden’s inner circle, the instructions are precisely of the sort Ben Heni allegedly quailed at: lie low, blend in, bide your time. "The mujahed should be young, so he can start the mission 10 years before the start of the jihad," states the manual. In fact, according to European terrorism experts, several of those arrested in recent weeks have been at their posts for many years, though usually without the lucrative business cover the manual recommends.
Not all of them set their wills on war in Afghanistan. In December 1999 and again earlier this year, Western intelligence services have met to explore the striking preponderance in bin Laden’s network of Algerian radicals, whose long experience fighting against the Algerian army has made them operationally savvy. "The real problem in Europe before 1998 was Algerian nationals, who were involved in mostly single episodes that weren’t coordinated," says Stefano Dambruoso, the Milan prosecutor handling the case against the Milan cell. "After that, bin Laden began to connect and coordinate all these cells that already existed, rendering the phenomenon much more radicalized and potent."
The French are acutely aware of the potency of Algerian terrorism and see it reflected in al-Qaeda. In 1994 — in what was a grim precursor of attacks to come — guerrillas of Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group (G.I.A.) hijacked an Air France plane in Algiers, intending to crash it in the middle of Paris; they were killed by French commandos while refueling in Marseilles. In the G.I.A.’s subsequent brutal bombing campaign in Paris, terrorists tried to blow up the St. Michel metro station, tucked below a national monument, Notre Dame Cathedral — just as al-Qaeda tried twice to take out the World Trade Center. "The history of fundamentalist Islamist terrorism isn’t exactly a huge book — you only need to go back 10 to 15 years to get the entire story," notes investigating magistrate Jean-François Ricard, who along with Jean-Louis Bruguière leads the French antiterrorist effort. "You learn a lot about their capacity to strike and the kinds of targets that interest them, by reviewing the past and factoring in the potential for adaptation."
The old fights feed the new ones — or as Ricard puts it, "while cells and even entire networks may have different origins, they all look to al-Qaeda and bin Laden as the great leader, the umbrella under which all these groups fall." Several suspected terrorists identified in Bosnia in recent weeks have been linked to both the G.I.A. and al-Qaeda. Another case in point: in late September Spanish police arrested six Algerians on suspicion of being part of the al-Qaeda network and planning attacks against U.S. interests in Europe. The six are all members of a G.I.A. splinter organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which according to several European antiterrorist officials has largely melded into al-Qaeda. In the northern Spanish town of Cascante, police secured 32 videotapes in the apartment of one of those arrested, Mohammed Belaziz. Among them were shaky handheld videos of four Algerian soldiers dying in a burning jeep, their throats slit; in the same cache were images of Chechen rebels exhorting a crowd to kill and another of Palestinian suicide bombers dressed in white as they prepare to go to their deaths.
Similar agitprop was frequent viewing for the Milan cell. Neighbors figured the constant explosions they heard through the walls indicated the men’s predilection for action films; in fact they were watching some of the estimated 150 videos of combat in Chechnya and Afghanistan secured by police. Italian investigators say that in six months of eavesdropping on the group, they heard not a word spoken about women.
The close coordination between the Germans and the Italians in rounding up the Milan cell — with a series of arrests in both countries first in April and then in October — represents the way things are supposed to work. There have been other successful international busts in Europe: when police used a French tip and moved in on the so-called Meliani cell in Frankfurt last Dec. 26, they arrested two Iraqis, an Algerian and a French Muslim, but they didn’t get "Meliani" himself — Algerian Mohammed Bensakhria.
The Spanish police did, acting on German information, on June 22, by which time the formerly sleek 40-year-old had grown a scruffy beard and melded into the transient worker milieu of Alicante. He now awaits trial with his "brothers" in France, accused of planning an attack on the marketplace in front of Strasbourg’s cathedral. German police have seized a video shot from a moving car, laying out the approach and escape route and lingering on the cathedral. The soundtrack is jihad battle songs from the car’s cassette deck and occasional curses from the occupants about "Christian dogs."
Ranged against those successes in cross-border teamwork, however, are some fairly spectacular instances of how the European Union’s vaunted freedom of movement has far outpaced judicial cooperation. After the first arrests in Milan last April, Italian prosecutor Dambruoso issued a warrant for another figure associated with the cell, Tarek Maaroufi, referred to in Italian court papers as one of the "spiritual heads of the Salafist Group with a basic function of indoctrinating recruits." But Maaroufi lives in Belgium as a Belgian citizen, and no European Union country extradites its own citizens. The Belgian authorities contend that the Italians have not provided sufficient grounds for his arrest, nor have they seen fit to hand over his dossier to a Belgian prosecutor. A Belgian court found Maaroufi guilty in 1998 of criminal association connected to an earlier G.I.A. terrorist action, but the sentence was suspended and he never served time.
So it is, then, that Maaroufi, a hotly pursued terrorist in Italy, lives freely but under surveillance in Brussels. He heads a nonprofit organization of his own design, "the Institute for the Research and Study of Civilization." He says he researches Islam with funds solicited from Muslims in local mosques. "I am a Belgian citizen, and I respect the Belgian law," he insists. Maaroufi has acknowledged that he has visited the apartment of the arrested Tunisians in Milan, and he told Time he had traveled to Afghanistan last November, "but that doesn’t mean I know bin Laden."
There is a volcano of frustration among European antiterrorist officials who feel their neighbors don’t share their own commitment to knocking out al-Qaeda. Among investigators, the need for a European arrest warrant, which government leaders have vowed to adopt in early December, has become blazingly obvious. E.U. officials say the measure would radically streamline cross-border investigations. "We actually had better cooperation with German officials six or seven years ago," complains a French official, though he, like many of his Continental colleagues, reserves his deepest concern for Britain. The basic gumshoe logic of parsing al-Qaeda’s European network, investigators say, is to watch operatives in one cell make contact with another. The problem, says a French investigator, is that many groups that seem to work independently of one another actually coordinate their activities in London. "Since radical Islamist groups function openly and in total freedom in Britain," gripes the investigator, "how can you monitor who makes connections with whom, and who acts as the go-between?"
Mustafa Alani, Middle East security expert for the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, is convinced that the U.K. has never played host to a formal al-Qaeda network — a judgment privately shared by the FBI. But London is clearly a center of coordination and direction. It appears well-established that suspected al-Qaeda operatives like Zacarias Moussaoui (detained in New York) and Djamel Beghal (detained in Paris) have imbibed the heady hatred of Sheik Abu Qatada, the Palestinian-born cleric who preaches in London and whose bank account has been frozen after appearing on a U.S. Treasury list of terrorist suspects. And like many others, Moussaoui and Beghal used London as a point of transit to and from Afghan camps.
For their part, British authorities have started to move; the Home Office says two dozen persons are under active investigation for links to al-Qaeda, of whom Lotfi Raissi, Algerian pilot accused of teaching four of the suicide pilots, has been arrested. On Tuesday, antiterrorist police arrested Yasser al-Siri, 38, an Egyptian suspected of being involved in the "commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism." A self-proclaimed advocate of human rights for the world’s Muslims, al-Siri’s Islamic Observation Center recently publicized the warning from bin Laden military chief Mohammed Atef that Aghans would drag slain U.S. troops through the streets, "like they were in Somalia." A letter of recommendation from al-Siri is alleged to have helped ease the way for two suicide bombers posing as journalists to see Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Northern League commander fatally wounded by them just two days before the World Trade Center attack.
Investigators keen to gain insight into active cells aren’t terribly interested in the activities of publicists like Qatada and al-Siri, though. They want to hear details from the far less loquacious detainees, and so far they’re not hearing much of immediate value. According to a Belgian official, when police asked Nizar Trabelsi — the ex-footballer arrested on Sept. 13 for his alleged role in a planned attack on the U.S. embassy in Paris — why he had a Uzi submachine pistol in his Brussels apartment, he cited "sentimental reasons." Key prisoners like Bensakhria and the once talkative Beghal, alleged leader of the Paris plot, aren’t yielding up much either.
Antiterrorist officials say the typical inducements to sing don’t work with fundamentalists well-versed in their rights under Western legal systems. "With the Mafia, it was usually enough to offer them a lighter sentence or a bit of money," says an Italian judge. "This is a different phenomenon. But it’s still early. We have to give it time. You have to isolate them from their network." Others remain less optimistic. "Unfortunately, I’ve never seen a turncoat among Islamist militants," says an experienced European interrogator. "A change of heart could be transitory. People we’ve considered ‘defectors’ from the jihad have been re-recruited — some actually felt guilty about having given up the fight. A lot of Islamists who seem to be confessing may actually be thinking, ‘I’ll tell them what they want to hear, but I’ll never change.’"
And even as the detainees deny involvement in eventual attacks on designated targets, some are "talking about very important figures in the al-Qaeda structure — right up into bin Laden’s inner circle," a European justice official told TIME. Such information involves "names, responsibilities, and functions. People we weren’t even aware of before." One name officials were familiar with was bin Laden’s top terror strategist, Abu Zubaydah — who Beghal at one point said sent him to set up a European network for al-Qaeda.
That information can come none too soon. There have been reports that Zubaydah left Afghanistan on Sept. 15, bound, according to some sources, for Europe and likely set on sowing mayhem. But the lesson of the Atta group has to be a sobering one for Europe’s harried antiterrorist officials. Nobody heard them playing war videos, and nobody taped them boasting of their abiding desire to die a holy warrior’s death.
Europe’s terrorist hunters know all too well that today’s militants have shucked off many of the attributes that earmarked their precursors. Ziad Jarrah, for one, suspected by the FBI of being among the hijackers of the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania, exhibited none of the alienation or obsessiveness that characterized other suspects. His cousin Salim Jarrah, 26, who owns a trattoria, catering service and dry-cleaning establishment in the town of Greifswald on Germany’s Baltic Sea coast, says Ziad preferred discos to "veiled women." He recalls him sneaking shots from a bottle of whisky hidden in the refrigerator at a cousin’s wedding. "He had everything going for him: he came from a good family, he knew a good job was waiting for him at home, he had a girlfriend — there was no reason whatsoever for him to do a thing like that," says Jarrah, who came to Greifswald five years ago together with Ziad. He just doesn’t buy the circumstantial evidence pointing to Ziad’s involvement — flight lessons in Florida, a passport conveniently lost at the same time as those of members of the Hamburg cell, his inexplicable presence on the doomed plane.
Jarrah is beyond confessing, but investigators say they’ve interviewed other suspects who appear perfectly able to lead a Europeanized lifestyle while harboring deadly intentions against the West. One example: Djamel Beghal, purported leader of the cell alleged to have planned an attack on the U.S. embassy in Paris. According to a French police source, Beghal issues from the al-Qaeda-allied group Takfir wal Hijra (Anathema and Exile), whose members make a point of concealing their strict fundamentalism behind a Western façade. "The goal of Takfir is to blend in to corrupt enemy societies in order to plot attacks against them better," said the French official. "Members live together, form businesses together, will drink alcohol, eat during Ramadan, become smart dressers and ladies’ men in order to show just how integrated they are," says an investigator. Suspects like Beghal, he says, "are well-spoken, affable, very intelligent, ready with a laugh, good-looking guys. You can’t believe they’d be involved in this kind of terror. Which is one reason you’ve got to force yourself to think twice when they say they’ve turned their back on it."
Certainly Europe’s intelligence antennae are tuned to al-Qaeda terror as never before. But as long as its superstructure is in place, the network can change the frequency. Now that European intelligence services have homed in on Arab men as potential terrorists, the organizers could shift to Asian Muslims — Filipinos, Malaysians, Indonesians. Security officials in Europe and Asia profess concerns about al-Qaeda links to the Philippines’ Abu Sayyaf group. Philippine officials acknowledge that bin Laden’s brother-in-law Mohamad Jamal Khalifa served as a financial backer for Abu Sayyaf up to 1994. Two months ago the government rejected his offer to help crush the movement.
Any mutation of al-Qaeda’s approach in Europe wouldn’t have to happen fast. In fact, security experts in Europe and Israel have suggested that, given the military pressure in Afghanistan and the police surveillance in the West, al-Qaeda might well want to bide its time for the next couple of months before launching another dramatic attack. Quiescence is no cause for relief. The history of Islamic terrorism may be short, but it has already established a pace of deadening patience.
Reports by BRUCE CRUMLEY/Paris, HELEN GIBSON and JFO McALLISTER/ London, GHULAM HASNAIN/Karachi, JEFF ISRAELY/Milan, URSULA SAUTTER/Greifswald, NELLY SINDAYEN/Manila, JAN STOJASPAL/Prague, JANE WALKER/Madrid, CHARLES P WALLACE/Berlin, STEVE ZWICK/Munich