while holding an effigy of
President Gen. Pervez Musharraf in Quetta, Pakistan.
Posted on 10/27/2001 6:09:56 PM PDT by Sabertooth
``WON'T ALL of Afghanistan's problems be solved if it becomes a part of Pakistan?'' The question was posed by a Pakistani journalist to the Afghan Ambassador in Islamabad in the early 1990s. ``You have your history all mixed up,'' came the prompt reply. ``Afghanistan was never a part of Pakistan but Pakistan in times past has been a part of Afghanistan.'' The Ambassador in question represented the regime of Najibullah and his anger towards a Pakistan that was supporting the mujahideen groups was understandable. (At the time Najibullah was trying to negotiate a deal with the mujahideen, though still fighting them, and his envoy's presence was tolerated in the Pakistan capital). But there was something more than the hostility between the regimes that made the Ambassador give such a caustic and undiplomatic response. His Pashtun pride - the pride of the Durranis - would not let him accept that the men of the Salt Ranges (people who have always been conquered by invaders from the east and the west) should now entertain thoughts of ruling the Afghans.
Fast forward to another scene a few months later by which time Najibullah was gone and Pakistan's protege Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was jostling for power in Kabul. Professor Sibghatullah Mojadedi was nominally the President but all Afghanistan-watchers were waiting to see how the conflict between Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Masood would pan out. Masood everyone agreed was the far more able commander and from all indications the far more pleasant person. But Hekmatyar had Pakistan's backing and the odds seemed to be in his favour. It was in this setting that the second scene unfolded. The Pashtun leader of a small opposition party buttonholed an Indian journalist in the near-empty cafeteria of the Pakistan National Assembly.
India had made a big mistake, he said, by failing to militarily pressure Pakistan when it was fully engaged in the mujahideen war. By failing to apply such pressure India had harmed Afghanistan's cause, was his contention. ``Why can't India understand that what the Afghans are facing is Punjabi colonial aggression,'' he said in parting. A decade since then the circle seems about to close. Pakistan's hold over Afghanistan, courtesy the Taliban, seems destined to come to an end within a few days time. While the western media appears fascinated by the Taliban's ``indefatigable'' warriors and the masses from the madrassas that are flowing out into the streets of Peshawar and Quetta, only the newcomers among these journalists probably see any merit in these stories. The activists of the two wings of the Jamaat Ulema-e- Islam who are parading in the streets and burning the U.S. President, Mr. George W. Bush's effigy are doing so only because their leaders, Fazlur Rehman and Samiul Haq, have been given the nod by the ISI. These demonstrations make Gen. Pervez Musharraf look good and bolster his claims that he made a very bold decision to join the U.S. coalition despite the threat from the fundamentalists.
Former Talib (students) from the madrassas run by the two wings of the JUI and other religious parties form one element in the core group of the Taliban while the Arab-Afghans form the other. The rest of the support is more diffuse. Local, district and provincial clan leaders who led the mujahideen bands against the Soviets make up this more ephemeral group of supporters. They were either bought over (probably with funds provided by the two West Asian states that joined Pakistan in recognising Mullah Omar's regime once it was installed in Kabul) or bowed to the inevitable when confronted with the combination of the Talibs and the Arabs that had been welded into an effective force under the supervision and with the assistance of the ISI.
Tensions between the core Taliban elements and the more ephemeral groups was in evidence right at the outset when a clan of Pashtuns forced Mullah Omar's regime to hand over the body of Dr. Najibullah which had been battered and left to hang in a Kabul street. But Mullar Omar, or more probably the ISI, appear to have handled the contradictions rather well till the aftermath of the September 11 bombings in the U.S. Recently there has been a flood of reports that Pashtun clans and local chieftains have been deserting Mullah Omar's regime in province after province of south-eastern Afghanistan. If the Pashtun clans continue to desert the Taliban this development could form the fulcrum on which the whole situation in Afghanistan turns around. It is highly probable that Pakistan has had to close down its close support for the Taliban now that western intelligence and special forces are present in large numbers in the territories.
Without the active support and guidance of Pakistan the two core elements of the Taliban constitute a force that has been considerably reduced in effectiveness. The Pashtun clans that are now reportedly asserting their independence of Mullah Omar's regime are the real people of the land led by their traditional elite. In contrast, those recruited from the madrassas and the Arab-Afghans are artificial entities with no roots. Neither the madrassa recruits nor the Arabs will have any sanctuaries in Afghanistan once the local people have turned against them. Earlier the core of the Taliban could coerce the local people because they had external support but now they can only do so if they concentrate their forces against particular clans at a time. If they do so concentrate they will provide relatively easy pickings for the U.S. air armada that is just looking for juicy enough targets to take out.
Mullah Omar's regime has probably been the first in Afghan history in which the under-class, as represented by the gleanings from the madrassas, has ruled the country. From most accounts neither the madrassa recruits nor the Arab-Afghans have treated the traditional elite with any respect, especially in the cities. The desire for revenge would be very strong and it is not inconceivable that the tribesmen will turn on the madrassa recruits and the Arabs even if they (the tribesmen that is) are not able to forge unity among themselves whether through a Zahir Shah- convened Loya Jirga or otherwise. The situation is fraught with a host of negative prospects for Pakistan. In turning their backs on the Taliban, Pakistan has succeeded in serially betraying every single faction and group in Afghanistan.
Pakistan is now apparently trying to get on the right side of the designated ``good guys'' by cozying up to the Zahir Shah option, but are the Afghans going to forget or forgive what Pakistan has done to their country? Minority groups bundled together under the Northern Alliance have never considered the Taliban as anything but a force of Pakistani colonialism. Will the now-emerging Pashtun elite forgive Pakistan for subjecting it to the rule of the under-class and foreigners for five years and more? It is too early for anyone to predict whether Afghanistan will slip into even greater chaos than before or whether, miraculously, this war-torn country will achieve a measure of stability. But it does look like Pakistan's great Afghan enterprise has come to an end. There was a time when Pakistan entertained visions of using a subordinate Afghanistan as the launching pad for extending its influence into Central Asia.
At the very least, Pakistan thought, a subordinate Afghanistan would provide it with ``strategic depth'' against India. These hopes are a shambles now. There could be worse to come. There are already reports that Baluch and Pashtun nationalists in western Pakistan are be- stirring themselves for a new struggle for extensive autonomy. If rage inside Afghanistan against Islamabad's interventionist policies runs out of control Pakistan could be left with a western border land that is as turbulent and rebellious as it was till the Soviet invasion gave them and the Afghans a common purpose.
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Mullah Omar's regime has probably been the first in Afghan history in which the under-class, as represented by the gleanings from the madrassas, has ruled the country. From most accounts neither the madrassa recruits nor the Arab-Afghans have treated the traditional elite with any respect, especially in the cities. The desire for revenge would be very strong and it is not inconceivable that the tribesmen will turn on the madrassa recruits and the Arabs even if they (the tribesmen that is) are not able to forge unity among themselves whether through a Zahir Shah- convened Loya Jirga or otherwise.
Thanks for the article. It doesn't sound good for Pakistan.
Thanks.
And they've got the Islamic nukes...
We might have to go get them.
Omaid Weekly -- Afghan News -- Afg Foreign Ministry Statement at Tufts University - 2 October 2000
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October 2, 2000
In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Compassionate
Professor Richard Shultz,
Distinguished Scholars,
Respected Students and Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
At the outset, I would like to seize the moment and thank Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, particularly Professor Richard H. Shultz, Director of the International Security Studies Program, and his collaborators for providing the opportunity to discuss the current political development in Afghanistan and its impact on regional and international peace and security. I wish to also express our gratitude to Mr. Theodore Eliot, the former and revered Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, previously also an Ambassador to Afghanistan and a staunch supporter of our anti-Soviet resistance.
As I address you now, Afghanistan is in its 22nd year of turmoil, first as the last battleground of the Cold War and now as the trouble spot of Pakistani-sponsored extremism, with no peace in sight, at least not yet.
Ladies and Gentlemen, In the 19th Century, Afghanistan had served as the Great Game's "buffer State" between the Czarist Russia and British Empires, yet was never colonized. In 1936, it joined the League of Nations. During the Second World War, the traditional Loya Jirga or Grand Assembly declared Afghanistan's neutrality, subsequently joining the United Nations as early as 1946.
Between 1933 and 1978, Afghanistan enjoyed relatively exceptional peace and stability in Asia with peaceful coexistence of its ethnic mosaic. That delicate balance-which had managed social complexities of Afghanistan-was disturbed first, by the Soviet invasion and destroyed subsequently by the Pakistani-backed proxies, including the Taliban militia.
After having halted Soviet expansion, Afghanistan was thrust in a whirlwind of foreign intrigue, deception and Great Gamesmanship. Afghanistan's continuing conflict is not so much a civil war-as depicted in world media-as a proxy war imposed by Pakistan's military intelligence services known as the ISI, a body never accountable to civilian authority.
In fact, the Soviet invasion-by placing Afghanistan in the sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union-provided General Zia with an opportunity to craft the 'Strategic Depth Doctrine' in facing India. In addition to offering it the most substantial military assistance in the history of its relations with the United States, the Soviet invasion also provided Pakistan the hegemonic fancy of establishing an 'Islamic belt' by dominating Central Asia. Between 1992 and 1994, Pakistan discretely patronized Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of extremist Hezb-e-Islami (Islamic Party), and since then, the reclusive and defiant Taliban mercenaries, for the following reasons: --In line with Saudi policy at the time, to pull the rug from under Iran's feet, by supporting an alliance of Pakistani Sunni extremists and Pashtun Sunni radical Islamists against both Shi'a Hazaras and other ethnic groups, including Tajiks-who are all Sunnis; --To install a subservient regime in Kabul with its strings attached to Islamabad; --To expand its influence in Central Asia and throughout the region.
According to a report by the Pakistan-based NNI news agency, General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's chief of military junta emphatically proclaimed his country's pro-Taliban policy on May 25, 2000, "in accordance with Pakistan national interest…a national security interest, both demographic and geographic." (May 25, 2000)
Pakistan's expansionist policy in the region has continuously relied on religious extremist organizations. When needed, however Islamabad has not fallen short of directly involving its armed forces on either side of its borders. In fact, Foreign Affairs puts the total number of armed Pakistani nationals, participating just in Afghan wars since 1994, exceeding 80,000. (November/December 1999)
A question comes to mind: now that religious extremist groups-unchecked by the military junta-regulate Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies, what would the regional impact of such a state be? So far, at the least in the occupied parts of Afghanistan, it has been an unaccountable theocracy of misguided, largely illiterate mullahs engaged in social engineering.
A key plank in Taliban domestic policy involves confining Afghan women and girls to their homes-depriving them of their basic rights such as access to health care and the opportunity to study and work. This bizarre Pakistan-inspired parody of much more tolerant Afghan tradition threatens the real basis of freedom in our society: the family. Ironically, even in Pakistan such oppression of women is not permitted-although Pakistan's Deoband-inspired religious militants have certainly inspired such practices among their Taliban protégés.
The Taliban has so systematically flouted international norms of behavior on such a wide variety of issues that its record remains unmatched in modern history.
Narcotics, by far remains the Taliban's leading source of domestic revenue used for their war machine. The militia's takeover and regulation of narcotics trade-despite empty promises of countering production and trafficking-has made Afghanistan the world's foremost source of illicit drugs; and ISI extracts great profit from drug-trafficking too. Now the mullahs look the other way, while their product destroys millions of lives in Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, and other Asian, European and American backstreets.
Talibanism in the occupied parts of Afghanistan and evident signs of limited Talibanization in the region have already sounded alarm bells throughout the region.
Finally, the Taliban have provided safe haven to some of the world's most dangerous terrorists from Xinjiang to Central, South and East Asia to Middle East and Africa. So international troublemakers with enough financial backing to rent a refuge are always welcome by the Taliban. In fact, the ISI-led coalition of Pakistani religious organizations, the Taliban and extremist cliques and figures such as the renowned Osama bin Laden have contributed to this result. So, terrorism, by far, remains the leading source of concern for the regional countries.
Recent terrorist activities in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan emanated from the Taliban-occupied parts of Afghanistan. In fact, a kind of Taliban 'internationalism' has replaced the famous Cold War-era leftist motto of 'Proletarian Internationalism'. However, this time, the motherland of this motto is Islamabad and the occupied Kabul City, Afghanistan.
Pakistan's hegemonic adventurism, and the international community's ineffective response to it, set a horrible example for petty despots and terrorists around the world.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
There needs to be an informed and effective policy towards Afghanistan promoting democracy, political pluralism, human rights-especially including women's and girls' rights-and advocacy of moderation and tolerance.
However, first and foremost, foreign intervention must end. Pakistan must break the coalition of religious extremists, terrorist organizations and the Taliban, for reasons of economics, its own security and ultimately self-preservation.
The politics and economics of southern and western Asia after the collapse of the former Soviet Union demanded comprehensive multilateral economic cooperation among its various nations. The region's vast natural and energy resources, and their links to both the Middle East and South Asia, highlight a potential role for Afghanistan to provide a convenient transit route. The feasibility of establishing a regional economic organization, a prototype of the European Union to include Central and South Asian States, was embodied to some extent in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).
However, such undertaking requires the necessary environment. Political stability and moderate systems, based on democracy and human rights-as prerequisites for the environment of social and economic developments-needed to attract foreign investment, are essential.
On the other hand, by overlooking these issues, the dangers of Talibanization, the spread of extremism and possible fragmentation in the long run pose threats to integrity of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian Republics (CARs).
Also the danger of nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan and the initiation of serious immediate measures to prevent fall of nuclear arms in the hands of extremist religious elements in Pakistan is ever more pertinent. The dire necessity by the United States and European states to convince Pakistan to put a halt to its backing of extremist religious elements in the region and intervention in Afghanistan, would help regional stability. Good relations between Pakistan and the entire Afghan nation and an independent Afghanistan will surely be highly beneficial to Pakistan.
In sum, Afghans-being multi-ethnic-want to gain their right to self- determination through a democratic mechanism acceptable to our people. No one group, party or individual has the right to dictate its will by force or proxy on others. But first, the obstacles have to be overcome, the war has to end, a just peace established and a transitional administration set up to move us toward a broad-based representative government. Afghanistan can indeed become a factor of peace, regional economic cooperation and democracy in the heart of Asia.
Thank You.
[ Latest News ] [ News Archive ] [ Current Issue ] [ Back Issues ] [ In the Press ]
[ Subscribe ] [ Books on Sale ] [ Directory ]
[ Home ] [ English Section ] [ Feedback ]
Omaid Weekly -- Afghan News -- Afg Foreign Ministry Statement at Tufts University - 2 October 2000
|
[ Home ] [ English Section ] [ Feedback ] |
October 2, 2000
In the Name of God, Most Gracious, Most Compassionate
Professor Richard Shultz,
Distinguished Scholars,
Respected Students and Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
At the outset, I would like to seize the moment and thank Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, particularly Professor Richard H. Shultz, Director of the International Security Studies Program, and his collaborators for providing the opportunity to discuss the current political development in Afghanistan and its impact on regional and international peace and security. I wish to also express our gratitude to Mr. Theodore Eliot, the former and revered Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, previously also an Ambassador to Afghanistan and a staunch supporter of our anti-Soviet resistance.
As I address you now, Afghanistan is in its 22nd year of turmoil, first as the last battleground of the Cold War and now as the trouble spot of Pakistani-sponsored extremism, with no peace in sight, at least not yet.
Ladies and Gentlemen, In the 19th Century, Afghanistan had served as the Great Game's "buffer State" between the Czarist Russia and British Empires, yet was never colonized. In 1936, it joined the League of Nations. During the Second World War, the traditional Loya Jirga or Grand Assembly declared Afghanistan's neutrality, subsequently joining the United Nations as early as 1946.
Between 1933 and 1978, Afghanistan enjoyed relatively exceptional peace and stability in Asia with peaceful coexistence of its ethnic mosaic. That delicate balance-which had managed social complexities of Afghanistan-was disturbed first, by the Soviet invasion and destroyed subsequently by the Pakistani-backed proxies, including the Taliban militia.
After having halted Soviet expansion, Afghanistan was thrust in a whirlwind of foreign intrigue, deception and Great Gamesmanship. Afghanistan's continuing conflict is not so much a civil war-as depicted in world media-as a proxy war imposed by Pakistan's military intelligence services known as the ISI, a body never accountable to civilian authority.
In fact, the Soviet invasion-by placing Afghanistan in the sphere of influence of the former Soviet Union-provided General Zia with an opportunity to craft the 'Strategic Depth Doctrine' in facing India. In addition to offering it the most substantial military assistance in the history of its relations with the United States, the Soviet invasion also provided Pakistan the hegemonic fancy of establishing an 'Islamic belt' by dominating Central Asia. Between 1992 and 1994, Pakistan discretely patronized Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of extremist Hezb-e-Islami (Islamic Party), and since then, the reclusive and defiant Taliban mercenaries, for the following reasons: --In line with Saudi policy at the time, to pull the rug from under Iran's feet, by supporting an alliance of Pakistani Sunni extremists and Pashtun Sunni radical Islamists against both Shi'a Hazaras and other ethnic groups, including Tajiks-who are all Sunnis; --To install a subservient regime in Kabul with its strings attached to Islamabad; --To expand its influence in Central Asia and throughout the region.
According to a report by the Pakistan-based NNI news agency, General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's chief of military junta emphatically proclaimed his country's pro-Taliban policy on May 25, 2000, "in accordance with Pakistan national interest…a national security interest, both demographic and geographic." (May 25, 2000)
Pakistan's expansionist policy in the region has continuously relied on religious extremist organizations. When needed, however Islamabad has not fallen short of directly involving its armed forces on either side of its borders. In fact, Foreign Affairs puts the total number of armed Pakistani nationals, participating just in Afghan wars since 1994, exceeding 80,000. (November/December 1999)
A question comes to mind: now that religious extremist groups-unchecked by the military junta-regulate Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies, what would the regional impact of such a state be? So far, at the least in the occupied parts of Afghanistan, it has been an unaccountable theocracy of misguided, largely illiterate mullahs engaged in social engineering.
A key plank in Taliban domestic policy involves confining Afghan women and girls to their homes-depriving them of their basic rights such as access to health care and the opportunity to study and work. This bizarre Pakistan-inspired parody of much more tolerant Afghan tradition threatens the real basis of freedom in our society: the family. Ironically, even in Pakistan such oppression of women is not permitted-although Pakistan's Deoband-inspired religious militants have certainly inspired such practices among their Taliban protégés.
The Taliban has so systematically flouted international norms of behavior on such a wide variety of issues that its record remains unmatched in modern history.
Narcotics, by far remains the Taliban's leading source of domestic revenue used for their war machine. The militia's takeover and regulation of narcotics trade-despite empty promises of countering production and trafficking-has made Afghanistan the world's foremost source of illicit drugs; and ISI extracts great profit from drug-trafficking too. Now the mullahs look the other way, while their product destroys millions of lives in Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, and other Asian, European and American backstreets.
Talibanism in the occupied parts of Afghanistan and evident signs of limited Talibanization in the region have already sounded alarm bells throughout the region.
Finally, the Taliban have provided safe haven to some of the world's most dangerous terrorists from Xinjiang to Central, South and East Asia to Middle East and Africa. So international troublemakers with enough financial backing to rent a refuge are always welcome by the Taliban. In fact, the ISI-led coalition of Pakistani religious organizations, the Taliban and extremist cliques and figures such as the renowned Osama bin Laden have contributed to this result. So, terrorism, by far, remains the leading source of concern for the regional countries.
Recent terrorist activities in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan emanated from the Taliban-occupied parts of Afghanistan. In fact, a kind of Taliban 'internationalism' has replaced the famous Cold War-era leftist motto of 'Proletarian Internationalism'. However, this time, the motherland of this motto is Islamabad and the occupied Kabul City, Afghanistan.
Pakistan's hegemonic adventurism, and the international community's ineffective response to it, set a horrible example for petty despots and terrorists around the world.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
There needs to be an informed and effective policy towards Afghanistan promoting democracy, political pluralism, human rights-especially including women's and girls' rights-and advocacy of moderation and tolerance.
However, first and foremost, foreign intervention must end. Pakistan must break the coalition of religious extremists, terrorist organizations and the Taliban, for reasons of economics, its own security and ultimately self-preservation.
The politics and economics of southern and western Asia after the collapse of the former Soviet Union demanded comprehensive multilateral economic cooperation among its various nations. The region's vast natural and energy resources, and their links to both the Middle East and South Asia, highlight a potential role for Afghanistan to provide a convenient transit route. The feasibility of establishing a regional economic organization, a prototype of the European Union to include Central and South Asian States, was embodied to some extent in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).
However, such undertaking requires the necessary environment. Political stability and moderate systems, based on democracy and human rights-as prerequisites for the environment of social and economic developments-needed to attract foreign investment, are essential.
On the other hand, by overlooking these issues, the dangers of Talibanization, the spread of extremism and possible fragmentation in the long run pose threats to integrity of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian Republics (CARs).
Also the danger of nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan and the initiation of serious immediate measures to prevent fall of nuclear arms in the hands of extremist religious elements in Pakistan is ever more pertinent. The dire necessity by the United States and European states to convince Pakistan to put a halt to its backing of extremist religious elements in the region and intervention in Afghanistan, would help regional stability. Good relations between Pakistan and the entire Afghan nation and an independent Afghanistan will surely be highly beneficial to Pakistan.
In sum, Afghans-being multi-ethnic-want to gain their right to self- determination through a democratic mechanism acceptable to our people. No one group, party or individual has the right to dictate its will by force or proxy on others. But first, the obstacles have to be overcome, the war has to end, a just peace established and a transitional administration set up to move us toward a broad-based representative government. Afghanistan can indeed become a factor of peace, regional economic cooperation and democracy in the heart of Asia.
Thank You.
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