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Neutron Bomb Maneuverings
Just days before releasing the Draft Report, the Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission, Rajagopala Chidambaram, revealed that India had the capability to build neutron bombs. In an interview with the Press Trust of India, he specifically said India could build "any type or size" of nuclear weapon.
 The remark follows recent comments by Chinese authorities that they have had the capacity to fashion neutron bombs for some time, notwithstanding allegations that they stole neutron bomb technology from the United States.
Meanwhile, a top Pakistani scientist announced that Islamabad also had the capability to build neutron bombs, underlining again the prestige motives involved in these issues. According to the 19 August 1999 Jang publication, Dr. N.M. Butt stated:
The country by the grace of God has such well-trained, specialised and capable nuclear scientists who can design and build a nuclear weapon of any type or size including a neutron bomb.
The neutron bomb, technically known as an Enhanced Radiation (ER) weapon, was first developed by the United States. It is a controlled-effects type of thermonuclear weapon designed to mitigate blast and heat effects while intensifying prompt nuclear radiation. As such, this type of weapon would be used to maximize casualties while minimizing damage to an enemy's urban or battlefield infrastructure.
Indeed, the inventor of the neutron bomb, Dr. Sam Cohen, in a commentary written for the Washington Times on 7 June 1998, less than one month after India exploded five nuclear devices, observed that India may have tested a neutron bomb capability at that time to help implement a security policy to inflict "discriminate battlefield casualties."
400 Indian Warheads?
Separately, a leading Indian defense commentator, Wilson John, reported that the country has "enough fissile material to produce 400 nuclear warheads." His comment was carried in the 18 August 1999 edition of The Pioneer, an independent daily paper with a reputation for strong coverage of domestic issues and thoughtful editorial positions.
According to John,
Nuclear delivery systems will be only one segment of [India's] second strike capability. Two other main components will be early warning systems which will primarily rely on a dedicated military satellite. The other component will be the command and control structure directly under the responsibility of the Prime Minister or "the designated successors."
John also noted that preliminary analysis has shown that there are close to 60 critical targets that India would seek to attack in a nuclear conflict. Experts have stated that four nuclear missiles would be required to ensure a high probability that each target would be damaged or destroyed. India has the requisite amount of fissile material to meet this and other targeting requirements.
Assessment
As with the Asian missile race currently underway, New Delhi, Islamabad, and Beijing are jockeying for power and recognition with their expanding nuclear arsenals. Perceptions are vitally important in this competition and each capital needs to demonstrate at least parity with its main adversary.
Significantly, the prospect of 400 nuclear warheads in the Indian arsenal, coupled with perhaps 1,000+ in China by the time it completes its long-range missile programs in the next decade, will rewrite accepted international strategic norms. As the U.S. and Russia continue to build down their strategic nuclear forces, perhaps to as low as 1,500 warheads each under START III, others are building up. Western policymakers continue to ignore these trendlines at their peril.
On the plus side, India should be supported in its desire to fashion an effective command and control structure, which can help New Delhi exert positive control over its nuclear forces in demanding crisis situations. But caution should remain the watchword.
As Dr. Sam Cohen noted in his 7 June 1998 commentary on Indian nuclear developments:
We have never known very much about foreign nuclear warheads, and in developing threat assessments we have usually concocted them on little more than guesswork, frequently tempered by political considerations, rather than hard facts that have been in extremely short supply. This has been potentially dangerous; the "best" we could do may have been none too good. Regarding the Indian nuclear tests [of 1998], the old saying "What you don't know can't hurt you" may be dangerously wrong. It may be that what we don't know can substantially harm us and other countries as well. |
