Jewel in the crown of northern Afghanistan a difficult prize

AFP ^ | October 21, 2001

[JeepInMazar]

Jewel in the crown of northern Afghanistan a difficult prize

AFP
Oct 21, 2001
JABAL SERAJ, Afghanistan - A priority of Afghanistan's Northern Alliance is to capture the key northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif -- but it is a tough nut to crack.
The capital of Afghanistan's ethnic Uzbek community, captured by the Taliban in August 1998, has never fallen by military assault alone, and opposition attackers are well aware of past bloodshed there.

"The priority is Mazar-i-Sharif," the Northern Alliance's interior minister Younus Qanooni said Saturday, confirming the opposition aim to recover their former bastion before moving on the capital Kabul.

"But the Taliban's defences are strong, and their best fighters are there. It will be difficult to capture, and we have to do it slowly."

After a week of fighting around Mazar-i-Sharif, anti-Taliban commanders were Saturday pushed back to around 10 to 15 kilometers (six to nine miles) east of the city.

Since initial gains and then the setback, the mood in the nerve centre of anti-Taliban operations at Jabal Seraj appeared to be one of patience. There are also signals that words of support alone from Washington are not enough to get the opposition moving on the battlefield.

The opposition, analysts say, are reluctant to attack alone, having learned from the Taliban's experience.

The Taliban first grabbed Mazar-i-Sharif in May 1997, after they paid off Abdul Malik, a rival to the local strongman and current Northern Alliance figure Abdul Rashid Dostam.

Rolling into the city in triumph, the Taliban discovered the deal was worthless. Their 2,000 troops were mowed down by opponents hiding in Mazar-i-Sharif's maze of narrow mud streets.

A further 2,000 captured Taliban fighters were executed in the months that followed, their bodies tossed down desert wells.

This relationship between the Taliban and the opponents, analysts say, effectively rules out the possibility of Islamic militia members being bought off -- a tradition in Afghanistan's civil war.

Now the Taliban are reported to have reinforced the city with their toughest fighters -- including Arab volunteers who can expect no mercy at the hands of the Northern Alliance.

This, analysts say, leaves the Taliban in Mazar-i-Sharif with little choice but to fight to the last.

They are reported to be well dug in and well stocked with ammunition dumps nestled in densely populated residential areas, effectively ruling out the use of air attacks to knock out their supplies.

If the opposition are considering a ground assault, they can also look back to the Taliban's second assault on Mazar-i-Sharif in September 1997.

Despite superior numbers and firepower, the Taliban's all out conventional assault from both sides of the city failed, largely due to a geography that suited the besieged city.

Mazar-i-Sharif sits on a desert plain near the border with Uzbekistan. All roads entering it are flat and exposed, a nightmare for any attacker. In September 1997, opposition forces in the city merely bunkered down during rocket strikes and picked off their attackers.

And even with the United States behind them, the opposition have been launching their attacks on Mazar-i-Sharif from a pocket of territory that can only be resupplied via helicopter.

Since US-led airstrikes began, Taliban supplies have been cut off. But the defenders in the city can rely on better coordination.

The two opposition commanders leading the assault -- Ustad Atta, an ethnic Tajik, and Dostam, an ethnic Uzbek -- show little sign of cooperation, even though they are both in the Northern Alliance.

But the Taliban's successful assault on the city in August 1998 does provide an indication of how the city could fall: the militia attacked from the east, and bought their way into the west.

[JeepInMazar]

Their 2,000 troops were mowed down by opponents hiding in Mazar-i-Sharif's maze of narrow mud streets.

Jeeps couldn't pass through a lot of these "streets".