| A different approach to special forces |  |
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A Marine awaits orders during urban war training exercises last week at Camp Pendleton, California. |
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| By Sue Lackey MSNBC CONTRIBUTOR |
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| Sept. 30 — For the average Marine, it is both amusing and a bit galling to hear all the talk about “special forces” and their capabilities. For while the Army, Navy and Air Force have created Special Operations Commands with a unique structure, the Marine Corps has taken its basic forward deployed unit — the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) — and trained every one in special operations tactics. |
THE FAMED Delta Force is often celebrated as the nation’s most elite special operations team, but its position as a member of the the Army’s Joint Special Operations Command gives it a narrow focus restricted to counterterrorism and hostage rescue. In contrast, each MEU must be qualified in 18 separate mission areas, including counter terrorism. This broad focus in training and qualifications makes the Marine unit more versatile than any other service’s special operations forces.
Gen. Alfred M. Gray, who served as Commandant of the Marine Corps in the early 1980s, helped create the Joint Special Operations Command. But while the command often requests Marines to flesh out its capability, the Corps is the only service which has refused to join the command at an organizational level. “It goes against the reason the Marine Corps was developed,” says a Marine officer who is a special operations specialist. “It would have forced the Corps to focus on one mission, when the nation needed an amphibious force for forcible entry, with much broader capabilities.”
Under a recent reform of the system, traditional special operations forces forces are assigned to specific theater Commanders in Chief — for instance, the Commander in Chief, Europe or the Commander in Chief, Southern Command, which handles Latin America. East of these commands have units with specific specialties, and depend on that regional commander for support. MEU’s, however, an amphibious force that can be deployed at will to any theater. Their floating base of operations gives them the ability to sustain a mission longer than other special operations forces, which are traditionally used for short term insertions, or in the case of the Green Berets, specific insurgency training missions.
The true strength of the MEUs lie in their ability to augment their forces with air and ground combat elements and combat service support. This means any given unit can call in tanks, amphibious assault vehicles, and fixed wing aircraft — all of which are part of standard MEU order of battle. Other special operations forces must rely on conventional service support when additional forces are needed.
A perfect example of this versatility was in the 1983 Grenada invasion, where Army special forces were inserted to extract U.S. Embassy staff. The team was able to reach their target, but were then bottled up inside the embassy and unable to get out through enemy troops. The JSOC team then called for Marine support. An MEU which had been diverted to Grenada broke through with tanks and armored vehicles to extract their colleagues and the embassy personnel they had rescued.
The way in which special operations training has been integrated into the basic structure of the Corps has changed the capabilities of the Corps as a whole. The other military services are large enough to allow their SF units to function in some degree of separation. Because the Marine Corps is so small in numbers, its SOC qualified personnel rotate on duty throughout the Corps, which has enhanced the overall quality of training and identification with special operations forces. Most of these men have now percolated to the top of the command structure. “It’s been in place so long now that a lot of the flag officers grew up with this-they’re Al Gray’s boys,” said one Marine special operations veteran. “That’s what you do not get in the other special forces, because they tend to stay in their own areas. When they do go into other units to further their careers, they have problems integrating within the conventional forces and its military bureaucracy. They don’t do well as staff officers; they want to go back to their unit.”
That lack of experienced special forces officers at high levels to give special forces a voice allows other branches of the conventional forces to marginalize the effectiveness of special operations in budget battles and mission planning — a situation the Marine Corps has managed to avoid.
