The shifting sands of the middle east continued to undermine the fragile but promising structure of the peace processes in 1996. After years of negotiation, trust was destroyed at the start of 1996 on January 5 in Palestine, rekindling blood-shed throughout the region. At the end of 1996, the Norwegian-constructed peace framework was under threat once again.
Northern Iraq, where the US thought it could glue together the warring Kurds into a cohesive front against Saddam's regime, came unstuck. The US CIA station in Salahaddin, Iraqi Kurdistan and 4,000 collaborators had to be evacuated after Saddam's forces assisted Massoud Barzani's KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party) to wrest Arbil, Kurdistan's capital, from Jalal Talabani's PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan).
In Turkey the west became alarmed by the emergence of Necmettin Erbakan as prime minister and leader of the Islamist-based Refah Party. Fearful of its implications, US-dominated NATO and the EU began damage-limitation exercises. NATO renegotiated base rights and the EU raised its entry requirements to the EU and denied some funding. Ankara was obligated to publically confirm a military co-operation arrangement with Israel, a deal that was struck secretly ten years ago. If Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdish Turkish Workers Party (PKK), had hoped for a cancellation of this pact by Erbakan and better chances to negotiate with Ankara over the future of Turkish Kurdistan, he was disappointed.
In northern Iraq, the struggle between Jalal Talabani (PUK) and Massoud Barzani reached new proportions in late summer, resulting in 4,000 dead by early autumn. In Baghdad, Saddam Hussein did not take the hoped-for fall, but instead took action to flush Jalal Talabani from his lairs in Arbil and Sulaymaniyya. However, a few weeks later, Jalal Talabani returned with tacit assistance from Iran. Only the threat of further action stopped Jalal Talabani from recapturing Kurdish capital Arbil.
When Saddam's forces were invited to support Barzani and entered Arbil, the US mounted limited air strikes against Iraqi air defence targets in southern Iraq. The question raised by seasoned regional observers was why these targets were below the 34th parallel and against only air defence systems, when columns of Saddam's men took action above the 36th parallel. Some observers wondered whether Washington and London had given tacit approval to Saddam's support of the KDP, to dislodge Talabani and install Barzani as the paramount Kurdish leader.
The US repeatedly had warned that the involvement of Iran in northern Iraq posed a threat to the whole region, and in mid-October the KDP circulated captured PUK documents proving PUK's secret cooperation between its and Iran's intelligence services. Throughout the year the Americans put increasing pressure on Iran, including a Congressional ban on European trade and investments in Iran and Libya.
East of Iran, in Afganistan, all hell broke loose in 1996. The Talaban forces captured the capital Kabul and killed President Najibullah. Talaban forces destroyed the capital and much of the country's infrastructure.
Storm clouds continue to gather in the Middle East
Iran argued that the Talaban movement was supported by Pakistan, the US and Britain. Although this claim was not widely accepted in the west, in late October the International Herald Tribune reported that Pakistan and the US were trying to distance themselves from the Talaban. A senior Iranian official explained his understanding of the situation: "In Afganistan sixteen years ago, at the height of the Cold War, the west pitted the Islamic mujahadeen against Moscow's occupation troops. After the withdrawal of the Soviets and the consequent internal turmoil, the US and Pakistan supported another Islamic political extremist group against the warring mujahadeen, hoping to force the educated, nationalist and middle class to create a middle ground for rational politics." An Iranian conspiracy theory or American machiavellian politics?
At the epicentre of the traditional Middle East another earthquake was brewing. The long-eroded trust in American political and military power, prestige and fairness, crumbled further in 1996 and the election of Benjamin Natanyahu alienated all but a few Arab politicos.
Jordan found itself unable to consummate its marriage to Israel and instead courted Arafat's Palestine. At the end of 1996, the Israel, Jordan and Palestine trio was on the verge of a break up. Even Egypt, the most accommodating of middle eastern states, revealed its ire towards Israel's prime minister. After the regional economic conference in Cairo in November, President Mubarak warned Israel that the peace structure was likely to collapse.
Throughout the year reports from the region stated that Israel's and Syria's military forces were on heightened alert. Undoubtedly this was one of the reasons that Natanyahu called for a personal dialogue with Syria's President Hafiz Assad. Given the president's past record of sullen silence Natanyahu's appeal appeared more pathetic than sincere. Moreover, Natanyahu is not likely to find Assad in a reasonable mood when his Likud government refuses to move out of Hebron, expand settlements in the West Bank and hold on to the Golan Heights and South Lebanon.
In April, Israel's Defence Forces (IDF) launched Operation Grapes of Wrath against Hizbollah guerrilla forces. Although Prime Minister Peres' government was internationally condemned for the IDF's ill-fated attack on a UN post, Israel did gain an important Hizbollah concession; the latter would no longer attack from or near civilian settlements.
American bravado as the region's peace maker was further deflated when France's President Chirac arrived in the area and came to blows with Natanyahu and the US. His public pro-Arab sentiments, his critical stance towards Israel and the insinuation that Europe should replace the US as peace maker in the region caused Washington apoplexy.
In 1996, Morocco and Tunisia continued to plod on in spite of growing Islamist sentiments while in Libya a small Islamist rebellion took place in spring. After 28 years of rule Colonel Qaddafi handled the mutiny with ease. The Sudan has been long forgotten by international politics and is likely to be so long as the present regime is in power. At the other end of the continent, the Algerian government held its own although attacks increased in the second half of the year, especially by the Groupe Islamique Armée. In western Sahara, the Polisario struggle for independence has stalled. It is unlikely the small population will gain independence in this century.
The Middle East experienced several changes in 1996. The focus of attention shifted to the northern tier and the Palestine problems yet again were bogged down in religious politics. This has become a permanent feature of international conflict and the countries involved are worn out. Those who survive and retain their enthusiasm for conflict continue to arm themselves at enormous expense and those who cannot afford expensive weapon systems or who do not produce oil or gas appear not to be interesting to the international community.
[ref: http://www.global-defence.com/99/1998/97/MiddleEast.html ]