Posted on 05/05/2025 2:58:09 PM PDT by bitt
"For decades, policies overseeing gain-of-function research on pathogens, toxins, and potential pathogens have lacked adequate enforcement, transparency, and top-down oversight," the White House said in a fact sheet. "Researchers have not acknowledged the legitimate potential for societal harms that this kind of research poses."
President Donald Trump on Monday kept a promise he made last year by signing an executive order that bans federal funding for gain-of-function research in countries like China and Iran, which is believed to be at the heart of the COVID-19 lab leak in Wuhan.
Trump outlined his plan to deal with gain-of-function research to Just The News' John Solomon on his podcast last October.
"For decades, policies overseeing gain-of-function research on pathogens, toxins, and potential pathogens have lacked adequate enforcement, transparency, and top-down oversight," the White House said in a fact sheet obtained by Fox News. "Researchers have not acknowledged the legitimate potential for societal harms that this kind of research poses."
The executive order also allows U.S. research agencies to identify and end federal funding of other biological research that could cause a future pandemic, or pose a threat to American health and safety.
P
Gain of function research is biological warfare and should be banned. It has nothing to do with protecting us from threats. It is CREATING the threats.
“which is believed to be at the heart of the COVID-19 lab leak in Wuhan.”
There was no leak. It was deliberately released SARS to give the Chinese an excuse to lockdown their entire country to stop the rapidly spreading fall of 2018 protests in Wuhan and Hong Kong that had already escalated to gunfire. Derailing the US economy was the secondary goal to stop Trump’s reelection. The US Fauci people, the CIA, and the DC party were thrilled to use it to help get rid of Trump.
They tried to convince everyone it was natural, zoonotic, bat soup, etc. They held that position until it was simply impossible. Their FALL BACK position is that it was accidental. What were they gonna say, “it was deliberate and you caught us?”.
Deliberate, not a leak.
BlackRock will just fund it themselves. Just another business investment. And then they will write it off their taxes as a business expense.
Good news, well stated.
But they’re investing in mRNA bird flu jabs and have done nothing to repeal the PREP Act or expose the killer incentives and protocols imposed to create the Covid hoax.
All they need to do is apply federal law fairly, and all the right malefactors ought to be severely punished.
In several cases, possibly Fauci and the virologists involved, the death penalty should be applied.
All large nations are signatories, including the USA and China.
Furthermore, US Code has laws enacted about the same time. They have similar language.
Like so many things wrong in our world today, it isn't that there are no laws, it is that they are not enforced.
I hope the President gets the ball rolling with this order.
SARS-CoV-2 is a bioweapon.
It was designed to be a bioweapon.
It was released to be a bioweapon.
Oh, that is so true. Next, they will call it gummy bears on thyroids and do the same stuff. Just put these quacks in jail.
bullshit headline ...
there’s absolutely NOTHING in this EO that BANS Federal funding of gain-of-function:
Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research
May 5, 2025
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:
Section 1. Purpose.
Dangerous gain-of-function research on biological agents and pathogens has the potential to significantly endanger the lives of American citizens. If left unrestricted, its effects can include widespread mortality, an impaired public health system, disrupted American livelihoods, and diminished economic and national security.
The Biden Administration allowed dangerous gain-of-function research within the United States with insufficient levels of oversight. It also actively approved, through the National Institutes of Health, Federal life-science research funding in China and other countries where there is limited United States oversight or reasonable expectation of biosafety enforcement.
This recklessness, if unaddressed, may lead to the proliferation of research on pathogens (and potential pathogens) in settings without adequate safeguards, even after COVID-19 revealed the risk of such practices.
Sec. 2. Policy.
It is the policy of the United States to ensure that United States federally funded research benefits American citizens without jeopardizing our Nation’s security, strength, or prosperity. My Administration will balance the prevention of catastrophic consequences with maintaining readiness against biological threats and driving global leadership in biotechnology, biological countermeasures, biosecurity, and health research.
Sec. 3. Stop Dangerous Gain-of-Function Research.
(a) The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), and in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies (agencies) identified by the Director of OSTP, shall establish guidance for the heads of relevant agencies, to the extent consistent with the terms and conditions of the funding, to immediately:
(i) end Federal funding of dangerous gain-of-function research conducted by foreign entities in countries of concern (e.g., China) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6627(c), or in other countries where there is not adequate oversight to ensure that the countries are compliant with United States oversight standards and policies; and
(ii) end Federal funding of other life-science research that is occurring in countries of concern or foreign countries where there is not adequate oversight to ensure that the countries are compliant with United States oversight standards and policies and that could reasonably pose a threat to public health, public safety, and economic or national security, as determined by the heads of relevant agencies.
(b) The Director of OSTP, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the APNSA, and in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall establish guidance for the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the heads of other relevant agencies with respect to suspension of federally funded dangerous gain-of-function research, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the relevant research funding, at least until the completion of the policy called for in section 4(a) of this order. Heads of agencies shall report any exception to a suspension to the Director of OSTP for review in consultation with the APNSA and the heads of relevant agencies.
Sec. 4. Secure Future Research Through Commonsense Frameworks.
(a) Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Director of OSTP, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6627 and in coordination with the APNSA and the heads of relevant agencies, shall revise or replace the 2024 “United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential” to:
(i) strengthen top-down independent oversight; increase accountability through enforcement, audits, and improved public transparency; and clearly define the scope of covered research while ensuring the United States remains the global leader in biotechnology, biological countermeasures, and health research;
(ii) incorporate enforcement mechanisms, including those described in section 7 of this order, into Federal funding agreements to ensure compliance with all Federal policies governing dangerous gain-of-function research; and
(iii) provide for review and revision at least every 4 years, or as appropriate.
(b) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Director of OSTP, in coordination with the APNSA and the heads of relevant agencies, shall revise or replace the 2024 “Framework for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening” (Framework) to ensure it takes a commonsense approach and effectively encourages providers of synthetic nucleic acid sequences to implement comprehensive, scalable, and verifiable synthetic nucleic acid procurement screening mechanisms to minimize the risk of misuse. The heads of all agencies that fund life-science research shall ensure that synthetic nucleic acid procurement is conducted through providers or manufacturers that adhere to the updated Framework.
To ensure compliance, the updated Framework shall incorporate the enforcement mechanisms described in section 7 of this order. The Framework shall be reviewed and revised at least every 4 years, or as appropriate
Sec. 5. Manage Risks Associated with Non-federally Funded Research.
Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Director of OSTP, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the APNSA, the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, and the heads of other relevant agencies, shall develop and implement a strategy to govern, limit, and track dangerous gain-of-function research across the United States that occurs without Federal funding and other life-science research that could cause significant societal consequences.
This strategy shall include actions to achieve comprehensive, scalable, and verifiable nucleic acid synthesis screening in non-federally funded settings. Any gaps in authorities necessary to achieve the goals of this strategy shall be addressed in a legislative proposal to be sent to the President, through the Director of OSTP and the APNSA, within 180 days of the date of this order.
Sec. 6. Increase Accountability and Public Transparency of Dangerous Gain-of-Function Research.
The Director of OSTP, in coordination with the APNSA and the heads of relevant agencies, shall ensure that the revised policy called for in section 4(a) of this order includes a mechanism whereby research institutions that receive Federal funding must report dangerous gain-of-function research, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, include research that is supported by non-Federal funding mechanisms.
The reporting mechanism shall provide a publicly available source of information about research programs and awards identified pursuant to this section, including, where permitted by law, those that have been stopped or suspended pursuant to sections 3(a) and 3(b) of this order, and all future programs and awards that are covered by the updated policy developed in section 4(a) of this order. This reporting shall be conducted in a way that does not compromise national security or legitimate intellectual property interests of subject institutions.
Sec. 7. Future Enforcement Terms.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services and the heads of other relevant agencies shall, consistent with existing laws and regulations, include in every life-science research contract or grant award:
(a) a term requiring the contractual counterparty or grant recipient to agree that its compliance in all respects with the terms of this order and any applicable regulations promulgated by the contracting or grant-offering agency is material to the Government’s payment decisions for purposes of 31 U.S.C. 3729(b)(4);
(b) a term requiring such counterparty or recipient to certify that it does not operate, participate in, or fund any dangerous gain-of-function research or other life-science research in foreign countries that could cause significant societal consequences or generate unnecessary national security risks, and that does not comply with this order and the policies ordered herein;
(c) a term stating that a violation of the terms of this order or any applicable regulations promulgated by the contracting or grant-offering agency by any grant recipient may be considered a violation of such term by the recipient’s employer or institution; and
(d) a term stating that any grant recipient, employer, or institution found to be in violation of the terms of this order or any applicable regulations promulgated by the contracting or grant-making agency may be subject to immediate revocation of ongoing Federal funding, and up to a 5-year period of ineligibility for Federal life-sciences grant funds offered by the Department of Health and Human Services and other relevant agencies.
Sec. 8. Definitions.
For the purposes of this order,
“dangerous gain-of-function research” means scientific research on an infectious agent or toxin with the potential to cause disease by enhancing its pathogenicity or increasing its transmissibility. Covered research activities are those that could result in significant societal consequences and that seek or achieve one or more of the following outcomes:
(a) enhancing the harmful consequences of the agent or toxin;
(b) disrupting beneficial immunological response or the effectiveness of an immunization against the agent or toxin;
(c) conferring to the agent or toxin resistance to clinically or agriculturally useful prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that agent or toxin or facilitating their ability to evade detection methodologies;
(d) increasing the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate the agent or toxin;
(e) altering the host range or tropism of the agent or toxin;
(f) enhancing the susceptibility of a human host population to the agent or toxin; or
(g) generating or reconstituting an eradicated or extinct agent or toxin.
Sec. 9. General Provisions.
(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
(d) The Department of Health and Human Services shall provide funding for this order’s publication in the Federal Register.
DONALD J. TRUMP
THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 5, 2025.
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