Posted on 09/01/2024 5:53:34 AM PDT by tlozo
I’m starting this report with a discussion of the word “strategic” in relation to its use in the Russo-Ukraine War. There seems to be a fundamental misunderstanding of the word, and almost everything the Russians try to take is instantly labelled strategic (which the opposite seems to be the case for Ukraine. Moreover, we have some interesting reports coming in this morning of what might actually qualify as a strategic campaign (though it will get less coverage that a village in the Donbas). A Russian power generation facility on fire, north of Moscow.
There remains a fundamental failure to understand what matters in the course of a war, and this does deserve some thought.
The Abuse of the Word “Strategic”
Pokrovsk is “strategically” important. You should know that as the press has been stressing that point for months. On Friday, the Financial Times published another story clearly stating that. Financial Times, August 30, 2024
What this highlights is the extreme over-use and misunderstanding of the word strategic, which seems to be a shorthand to describe every place the Russian army is aiming at. Indeed, there has arguably been no word misused and misunderstood in this war that the word “strategic”. Strategic doesnt mean important or interesting or even well known, it means something of such importance that it materially changes the long term planning and execution of the war. Something “strategic” is of such importance that if one side takes it from the other, the affect will be so great as to change the course and dynamic of the whole conflict.
You want an example—Kyiv is strategic. It it by far the largest Ukrainian city, the seat of the government, is full of war industry, etc etc. You could also make a case that Kharkiv would be of strategic importance because of its size, its industry, its historical meaning etc.
Strategic also are things other than geographic locations. If something changes how much and in what quantity Ukraine gets military support from its partners, that is strategic. If Ukraine can materially destroy a large percentage of Russia’s oil production, that is strategic. If Russia can destroy the Ukrainian ability to generate power this winter, that is strategic.
Note—see below for reports of a Ukrainian campaign against Russian power generation—that definitely could be strategic.
In other words, a strategic city or target really matters in that it can shift the entire balance of the war.
However when it comes to Russian military advances in the Donbas (in an incredibly small area of no strategic importance) the word strategic has been thrown around like cheap candy in a way that makes no sense—and frankly has been shown to be increasingly ludicrous.
Starting with the attack on Severodonetsk in 2022, the Russians have been said to have attacked and taken all these strategic places (often just glorified towns) that have almost no ability to affect the long-term trajectory of the war.
Since then the cities labelled strategic have grown exponentially to include Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Niu York, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk. These all come from some of the largest, most reputable and most well-known media outlets in the West. NPR, May 2023 Washington Post, February 2024 Reuters August 2024 New York Times: August 2024 Reuters, August 2024 New York Times, May 2024
This borders on the irresponsible. Most of these towns were basically empty of population when fought over, had no working industry, etc. Some of them are so small as to be hardly classified as towns. The idea that Niu York could be called strategic in any way is just a failure of education (and an insult to the readers of the publications who are being told this).
None of these places are anywhere close to being of “strategic” importance. Severodonetsk, Bakhmut and Avdiivka were all taken by the Russians (at enormous cost) and they made little or no impact on Ukraine’s ability to prosecute the war. They did not effect the number of soldiers Ukraine could raise and train, the amount of equipment that Ukraine could make or get from its allies, etc.
However this kind of labelling has impact. It creates the idea of a massive Russian steamroller taking whatever it wants—particularly places of “strategic” importance. Instead what we have are some of the slowest, most destructive advances in modern military history which is doing extraordinary damage to the forces making the advances.
On the other hand—what is rarely labelled as “strategic” (or at least I struggle to find it) is the Ukrainian offensive into Kursk. Its presented as a massive risk, one that is clearly backfiring on Ukraine as Russia presses ahead (painfully slowly) in what is considered an actual strategic area. In other words, the reporting and analysis of the war basically takes two areas of approximately equal size (actually Ukraine has probably seized more land) and said one is definitely of strategic importance and the other is not.
You could say that this is the underlying rationale of war reporting right now.
Now why is this reporting and analysis particularly pernicious? Because it has an inbuilt assumption that Russia can basically take back the land Ukraine has occupied whenever it wants and Ukraine wont be able to liberate the land Russia has taken. That basic assumption has been spouted in a number of different stories. The New York Times headline on the subject was the single most leading I’ve seen—basically assuming that “kicking” Ukraine out of Russia is a simply a matter of Putin deciding when he will do it.
I will talk more about this, but the longer the Ukrainians stay in the parts of Russia they have seized, and build up defenses, the much greater challenge it will be for the Russians to try and drive them back. It would be another mass casualty affair for the Russians—precisely because they have reacted so slowly and are giving the Ukrainians time. And yet, such a situation is being portrayed as a Russian choice. Its bizarre.
In other words, the way all of this is being portrayed is based on a vision of Russian military capabilities and strength over Ukraine that has not been shown anywhere in this war. Indeed what have we seen regularly in this war.
Ukraine has taken far more land from Russian forces since the summer of 2022 than Russia has taken from Ukraine.
Ukraine has the ability to organize and execute operations such as the Kursk offensive at a higher level than the Russians such as during their Kharkiv Offensive (barely visible on the map above).
Ukraine has done this while being severely restricted by its partners in the systems it is given and how they can be used.
Russia has basically been able to use any system it wants in any way that it wants to try and achieve it aims.
This misuse of certain phrases pertaining to war underlines a systemic problem that I would say has existed in the analysis of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries since before the full-scale invasion. Its one of the reasons that Ive been part of a detailed research effort to try and analyze the errors in that analysis. If you want to know more, I can say that Professor Eliot Cohen and I will be having a launch of our public report on the subject on September 24.
Says the professor of “Strategic Studies”.
“ None of these places are anywhere close to being of “strategic” importance. Severodonetsk, Bakhmut and Avdiivka were all taken by the Russians (at enormous cost) and they made little or no impact on Ukraine’s ability to prosecute the war. They did not effect the number of soldiers Ukraine could raise and train, the amount of equipment that Ukraine could make or get from its allies, etc.
However this kind of labelling has impact. It creates the idea of a massive Russian steamroller taking whatever it wants—particularly places of “strategic” importance. Instead what we have are some of the slowest, most destructive advances in modern military history which is doing extraordinary damage to the forces making the advances.”
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When a person is reduced to quibbling over a word some media are using there just may be some things that person is trying to avoid/escape. Had Phillips been paying close attention he’d remember that YEARS ago the Russians said one of their STRATEGIC objectives was to destroy the Ukrainian military. And that is why they’ve taken a meat grinder approach geared to destroying Ukraine’s military personnel while minimizing (to the extent possible) their own casualties. They’ve taken this approach at the expense of not taking huge swaths of land.
Just sayin’.
So in day 919 of the Russian invasion, Russians decided that the best way to destroy the Ukraine military and "minimize their casualties" is to conduct WW1 style warfare with artillery duels and Russian human wave attacks on fortified positions? Okay
Russians simply have no other effective means of advancing.
Russians are unable to accomplish an air-shock and awe campaign, they are unable to perform a large blitzkrieg maneuver, so its back to WW1 style artillery and human wave assaults which do not minimize their casualties.
In his defense, he DID manage to use the words "affect" and "effect" correctly once or twice. He still needs work on the usages, though. 
Kind of a disappointment seeing this kind of lingual and grammatical sloppiness from a tenured professor.
Perfessor Sloppy needs to lose his "human wave" horseplop when referring to the Russians, BTW.
The effect of a single shell doesn't affect the Russian artillery.
“ Russian human wave attacks on fortified positions”
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Oh, this old ZEEPER talking point. NEITHER side is conducting “human wave attacks”. This is NOT World War 1 trench warfare.
LOL, well lets ask Prigozhin re: "Russian human wave":
Wagner chief says 20,000 of its troops killed in Bakhmut battle 25 May 2023
Yevgeny Prigozhin repeats criticism of Russia’s top brass and warns high number of fatalities is a risk to the country.
Yevgeny Prigozhin says 20,000 Wagner troops were killed in the battle for Bakhmut
Some 20,000 troops from Russia’s Wagner mercenary group were killed in the months-long battle for control of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, its founder has said.
Yevgeny Prigozhin said he had recruited about 50,000 prisoners to fight with Wagner in Russia’s war in Ukraine and that about 20 percent of them had been killed.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/25/wagner-chief-says-20000-of-its-troops-killed-in-bakhmut-battle
You have no point.
Her husband had recently gone missing in battle in the Donetsk region.
The picture of the young girl’s decapitated body still sitting on the bench has gone viral in Ukraine, with Ukrainians demanding the right to strike Russian airfields from which the Russian bomb-carrying planes take off.
Ruh-roh.
Here comes the sob-story anecdotes, since Perfessor Sloppy failed to persuade...
I prefer the word
“Strategery”
Why did BoJo the Evil UK Clown want this young girl to die?
Why did the evil mop-headed Brit fool persuade the feckless Ukrainians to decline negotiations?
Perfidious Albion!
Lol, forgot that skit
Dumbest take evah.
The Russian army is in the oblasts of the Russian Federation - Kherson, Zaporozhye, Donetsk, Luhansk, the Russian Republic of Crimea and the Russian federal city of Sevastopol.
Not in the Ukraine.
And those four partially occupied oblasts are recognized to be part of Russian only by North Korea and Syria.
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