Yes, It is going to be very dangerous for Russia. They should of thought of that first.
If a NATO country decided to send troops into Ukraine, for whatever reason, they would be subject to the rules of modern warfare. However, if France, for example, were to send troops into Ukraine, they would not trigger an Article 5 response if they were attacked.
Getting missiles to France would require shooting over other NATO countries which would trigger a response.
That would put a damper on the Paris Olympics.
Germany announced on the 7th it will send 35,000 troops to ukraine.
Sending troops is an act of war.
I may be pushing against the tide with this comment but
I believe it would behoove the Biden administration and its puppets like NATO etcetera to start listening to Russia’s warnings about our increasing military and militarization in and of Ukraine
OK now, here comes the pushback memos. Understood and expected.
Send 50,000 French Surrender Monkeys First.
Russia will use battlefield nukes on NATO forces in Ukraine.
Russia said on Wednesday that sending NATO troops into Ukraine would potentially be extremely dangerous, and Moscow was closely watching a Ukrainian petition that called for such an intervention.The petition, posted on the Ukrainian president's website, says Ukraine should ask the United States, Britain and other countries to send troops to help it repel Russia's invasion.
Such troops may, or may not, be lawful combatants, depending on whether the sending nation is considered a party to the conflict. So far, the NATO nations have made believe they are not parties to the conflict. Russia has gone along with the joke as it does not want a war with 32 more nations. If France were to send 50 troops, and not consider itself a party to the conflict, its troops may not have protected status. If Russia were to consider France to be a party to the conflict, the French homeland would be a legitimate target. This would get into red-line territory and nations may not want to go there. The nations between Russia and France might not be too keen on the idea.
The Russians have stated they would consider the insertion of NATO troops to be an existential threat. Translating that from diplomatic language, Russia said it would interpret it as authorizing the use of nuclear weapons pursuant to the Law of Armed Conflict. No nation, when facing an existential threat, is prohibited from using nuclear weapons. Russia indicated it would consider such an action to make the offending nation a party to the war. NATO, the United States, the UK, Germany and France have said they have no plans to send troops to Ukraine.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68417223 >p>
Nato allies reject Emmanuel Macron idea of troops to Ukraine27 February 2024
By Lipika Pelham & Lou Newton,
BBC NewsSeveral Nato countries, including the US, Germany and the UK, have ruled out deploying ground troops to Ukraine, after French President Emmanuel Macron said "nothing should be excluded".
Mr Macron said there was "no consensus" on sending Western soldiers to Ukraine.
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has warned of direct conflict if Nato troops deploy there.
[...]
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/france-denies-having-sent-troops-to-ukraine/ar-BB1lUG4i
Retrieved May 8, 2024
France denies having sent troops to UkraineStory by Iryna Kutielieva, Oleksandr Shumilin • 2d
France formally disputed the deployment of the Foreign Legion's first 100 military personnel in the Ukrainian city of Sloviansk, which had been reported the day before. ...
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
ADVISORY OPINION OF 8 JULY 1996[excerpt at pg 266, pg 44 of pdf]
E. By seven votes to seven, by the President's casting vote, It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake;
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule1
Rule 1.The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants
Rule 1. The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.
Practice
Volume II, Chapter 1, Section A.
SummaryState practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary international law applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts. The three components of this rule are interrelated and the practice pertaining to each of them reinforces the validity of the others. The term combatant in this rule is used in its generic meaning, indicating persons who do not enjoy the protection against attack accorded to civilians, but does not imply a right to combatant status or prisoner-of-war status (see Chapter 33).This rule has to be read in conjunction with the prohibition to attack persons recognized to be hors de combat (see Rule 47) and with the rule that civilians are protected against attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities (see Rule 6). Belligerent reprisals against civilians are discussed in Chapter 41.
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https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule3
Rule 3.Definition of Combatants
Rule 3. All members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict are combatants, except medical and religious personnel.
[...]
International armed conflicts
This rule goes back to the Hague Regulations, according to which “the armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and non-combatants”.[1] It is now set forth in Article 43(2) of Additional Protocol I.[2]
Numerous military manuals contain this definition of combatants.[3] It is supported by official statements and reported practice.[4] This practice includes that of States not, or not at the time, party to Additional Protocol I.[5]
No official contrary practice was found.
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https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-43?activeTab=undefined
Article 43 - Armed forces1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, 'inter alia', shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.
3. Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to the conflict.
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https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-44?activeTab=undefined
Article 44 - Combatants and prisoners of war1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43 , who falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war.
2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, violations of these rules shall not deprive a combatant of his right to be a combatant or, if he falls into the power of an adverse Party, of his right to be a prisoner of war, except as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4.
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate.
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1 (c .
4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while failing to meet the requirements set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention and by this Protocol. This protection includes protections equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention in the case where such a person is tried and punished for any offences he has committed.
5. Any combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while not engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack shall not forfeit his rights to be a combatant and a prisoner of war by virtue of his prior activities.
6. This Article is without prejudice to the right of any person to be a prisoner of war pursuant to Article 4 of the Third Convention.
7. This Article is not intended to change the generally accepted practice of States with respect to the wearing of the uniform by combatants assigned to the regular, uniformed armed units of a Party to the conflict.
8. In addition to the categories of persons mentioned in Article 13 of the First and Second Conventions, all members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as defined in Article 43 of this Protocol, shall be entitled to protection under those Conventions if they are wounded or sick or, in the case of the Second Convention, shipwrecked at sea or in other waters.
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https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-47?activeTab=undefined
Article 47 - Mercenaries1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.
2. A mercenary is any person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.