You're not serious. LOL! Thanx and what does allegiance mean, not able to be the citizen of another country I suppose. I started my posts with the qualification we need a USSC decision defining NBC and addressing the foreign parents issue. Everything else is non-binding opinion
Why? Determining jurisdiction of federal courts is the function of Congress, save for certain areas that grant original jurisdiction solely to the Supreme Court (such as in court disputes between states, cases involving ambassadors or diplomats, controversies wherein the United States itself is a party, etc.). Defining who is and is not a citizen is strictly within the purview of the legislative branch; the only point wherein the judiciary would get involved is if there is a conflict between certain legislation and what the Constitution itself prescribes (and at this junction, there is no legislative/judicial conflict involving the meaning of "natural-born citizen".
Everything else is non-binding opinion
There is an overwhelming body of SCOTUS case law validating the position that the children of illegal aliens are considered natural-born citizens, to the point where we'd need either massive legislative updates to legal statutes and/or a constitutional amendment to change that classification.
It's hardly "non-binding opinion".
You're not serious. LOL! Thanx and what does allegiance mean, not able to be the citizen of another country I suppose. I started my posts with the qualification we need a USSC decision defining NBC and addressing the foreign parents issue. Everything else is non-binding opinion.
Your ignorant, non-binding opinion is taken under advisement. Your incessant citing of your ignorant, non-binding opinion in preference to that of azny recognized legal authority is noted.
Your comment that we need a USSC decision means there is no U.S. law on anything until the USSC says so. The People issue the Constitution as the Supreme law and only empower the Court to interpret what is already law.
Wong Kim Ark at 169 U.S. 662-63:
In United States v. Rhodes (1866), Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said: "All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. . . . We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution."
Lynch v. Clark, 1 Sandf. 583 (1844), as published in New York Legal Observer, Volume III, 1845
It is an indisputable proposition, that by the rule of the common law of England, if applied to these facts, Julia Lynch was a natural born citizen of the United States. And this rule was established and inflexible in the common law, long anterior to the first settlement of the United States, and, indeed, before the discovery of America by Columbus. By the common law, all persons born within the ligeance of the crown of England, were natural born subjects, without reference to the status or condition of their parents.[...]
And the constitution itself contains a direct recognition of the subsisting common law principle, in the section which defines the qualification of the President. "No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President," &c. The only standard which then existed, of a natural born citizen, was the rule of the common law, and no different standard has been adopted since. Suppose a person should be elected President who was native born, but of alien parents, could there be any reasonable doubt that he was eligible under the constitution? I think not. The position would be decisive in his favor that by the rule of the common law, in force when the constitution was adopted, he is a citizen.
In re Look Tin Sing, Fed. Rep. 905, 906 (1884), Justice Field
The first section of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution declares that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the state wherein they reside." This language would seem to be sufficiently broad to cover the case of the petitioner. He is a person born in the United States. Any doubt on the subject, if there can be any, must arise out of the words "subject to the jurisdiction thereof." They alone are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who are within their dominions and under the protection of their laws, and with the consequent obligation to obey them when obedience can be rendered; and only those thus subject by their birth or naturalization are within the terms of the amendment. The jurisdiction over these latter must, at the time, be both actual and exclusive. The words mentioned except from citizenship children born in the United States of persons engaged in the diplomatic service of foreign governments, such as ministers and ambassadors, whose residence, by a fiction of public law, is regarded as part of their own country. This ex-territoriality of their residence secures to their children born here all the rights and privileges which would inure to them had they been born in the country of their parents. Persons born on a public vessel of a foreign country, while within the waters of the United States, and consequently within their territorial jurisdiction, are also excepted. They are considered as born in the country to which the vessel belongs. In the sense of public law, they are not born within the jurisdiction of the United States.
In re Wong Kim Ark, 71 Fed. Rep. 382, 386 (1896)
The fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States must be controlling upon the question presented for decision in this matter, irrespective of what the common-law or international doctrine is. But the interpretation thereof is undoubtedly confused and complicated by the existence of these two doctrines, in view of the ambiguous and uncertain meaning of the qualifying phrase, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” which renders it a debatable question as to which rule the provision was intended to declare. Whatever of doubt there may be is with respect to the interpretation of that phrase. Does it mean “subject to the laws of the United States,” comprehending, in this expression, the allegiance that aliens owe in a foreign country to obey its laws; or does it signify, “to be subject to the political jurisdiction of the United States,” in the sense that is contended for on the part of the government? This question was ably and thoroughly considered in Re Look Tin Sing, supra, where it was held that it meant subject to the laws of the United States.