Here is a case for you...Minor v. Happersett , 88 U.S. 162 (1875)
The Constitution does not in words say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first.Plural. ParentS.
Minor v. Happersett did not decide any citizenship issue, as no such issue was before the court.
There is no holding of "plural parents" for birthright citizenship per Minor v Happersett.
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167-168 (1875)
The Constitution does not in words say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their88 U. S. 168
parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens. The words "all children" are certainly as comprehensive, when used in this connection, as "all persons," and if females are included in the last, they must be in the first. That they are included in the last is not denied. In fact, the whole argument of the plaintiffs proceeds upon that idea.
Having determined that for the purposes of the case it was not necessary to solve the doubts cited by "some authorities," the Court proceeded to not solve them.
Virginia Minor's citizenship was never in question before the court because it was a stipulated fact, agreed to by both parties before the trial. Minor, Transcript of Record, page 8:
Agreed StatementSTATEMENT
[excerpt]
It is admitted by the pleadings that the plaintiff is a native-born, free white citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri; that the defendant is a registrar, qualified and acting as such; that the plaintiff, in proper time and in proper form, made application to him to be registered and that the defendant refused to register the plaintiff solely for the reason that she is a female, (and that she possesses the qualifications of an elector in all respects, except as to the matter of sex, as before stated.)
Both parties agreed, as a matter of stipulated fact, that Virginia Minor was a native-born, free white citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri, and that she was qualified as an elector in all respects, except as to the matter of sex. The question before the Court was whether a woman, being a native-born, free white citizen, could be barred from voting solely on account of sex.
The answer was yes. Nobody had a constitutional right to vote for President, whether male or female, and restrictions were a matter for the State to decide..
The Nineteenth Amendment, subsequent to Minor, did not give women the right to vote. It declared that where men had been given a right to vote, women must be granted an equal right to vote. The State retains the power to dispense with a popular vote and to elect delegates to the Electoral College via its Legislature.
See the more recent case of Gore v. Bush, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000)
The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral College. U.S. Const., Art. II, §1.
Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971)
The reach of congressional power in this area is readily apparent: p> 1. Over 70 years ago the Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Gray, reviewed and discussed early English statutes relating to rights of inheritance and of citizenship of persons born abroad of parents who were British subjects. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 668 -671 (1898). The Court concluded that "naturalization by descent" was not a common-law concept but was dependent, instead, upon statutory enactment. The statutes examined were 25 Edw. 3, Stat. 2 (1350); 29 Car. 2, c. 6 (1677); 7 Anne, c. 5, 3 (1708); 4 Geo. 2, c. 21 (1731); and 13 Geo. 3, c. 21 (1773). Later Mr. Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a unanimous Court, referred to this "very learned and useful opinion of Mr. Justice Gray" and observed "that birth within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Crown, and of the United States, as the successor of the Crown, fixed nationality, and that there could be no change in this rule of law except by statute...." Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S., at 660 . He referred to the cited English statutes and stated, "These statutes applied to the colonies before the War of Independence."We thus have an acknowledgment that our law in this area follows English concepts with an acceptance of the jus soli, that is, that the place of birth governs citizenship status except as modified by statute.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)
169 U.S. 704The fact, therefore, that acts of Congress or treaties have not permitted Chinese persons born out of this country to become citizens by naturalization, cannot exclude Chinese persons born in this country from the operation of the broad and clear words of the Constitution, "All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States."
VII. Upon the facts agreed in this case, the Ainerican citizenship which Wong Kim Ark acquired by birth within the United States has not been lost or taken away by anything happening since his birth.
[...]
169 U.S. 705
The evident intention, and the necessary effect, of the submission of this case to the decision of the court upon the facts agreed by the parties, were to present for determination the single question, stated at the beginning of this opinion, namely, whether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States. For the reasons above stated, this court is of opinion that the question must be answered in the affirmative.
Everyone born in the United States, subject to its jurisdiction, is born a citizen of the United States. A natural born American citizen, to use the emphasis of John Jay, is a person who acquired American citizenship at birth.
Jay to Washington, 25 July 1787, handwritten.
The Constitution does not say a mumbling word about parents, or their citizenship. The child in the United States of two illegal aliens, both in a detention center awaiting deportation, is born a United States citizen. A child of foreign parentage born on U.S. soil, acquires U.S. citizenship at birth unless he or she is the child of a visiting accredited diplomat or of visiting royalty, and thereby enjoys immunity from United States laws. The prevailing precedent is United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
In Wong Kim Ark the dissenting opinion of Fuller C.J., joined by Harlan J., at 169 U.S. 706, said in reference to the majority opinion of the Court,
The English common-law rule, which it is insisted was in force after the Declaration of Independence, was that “every person born within the dominions of the crown, no matter whether of English or of foreign parents, and, in the latter case, whether the parents were settled or merely temporarily sojourning in the country, was an English subject; save only the children of foreign ambassadors (who were excepted because their fathers carried their own nationality with them), or a child born to a foreigner during the hostile occupation of any part of the territories of England.” Cockb. Nat. 7.
That accurately states the state of English law that was in effect in the colonies when the Declaration of Independence was issued.
Every one of the original thirteen states adopted so much of the English common law as was not inconsistent with the Constitution. They did so explicitly, either in their written state constitution, or in their written state statute law.
As was stated in Won Kim Ark at 169 U.S. 702,
The fourteenth amendment of the constitution, in the declaration that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside,” contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization. Citizenship by naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere fact of birth under the circumstances defined in the constitution. Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization.