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Ukraine ping

Very ahistorical analogy that asserts the Mongol invasions were human wave attacks where hordes of attackers overwhelmed the defenders with wave after wave of disposable troops. In reality, the Mongols were always greatly outnumbered and near the end of their tether, supply-wise. They relied on combined arms maneuver, superior training and deception to achieve their war aims. Subotai, the winningest commander in Mongol history, is probably one of a handful of men comparable to Alexander in his military exploits:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subutai#Legacy
[”No Mongol general played a greater role than Subotei Ba’atur in establishing and maintaining the early Mongol Empire. Trusted commander and retainer of Chinggis, later highly respected servant of Ogodei and Guyuk, Subotei served with great distinction in every phase of Mongolian national development during the first four decades of empire. When he first entered the service of Temujin, the later Cinggis Qan, the realm of that minor Mongol chieftain comprised only a few families. In his old age, Subotei saw a mighty dominion stretching from the borders of Hungary to the Sea of Japan, from the outskirts of Novgorod to the Persian Gulf and the Yangtze River. He had no small part in creating it.”
— Paul Buell[56]

In a unique historical anomaly, the strategic and operational innovations of Genghis Khan and Subutai became lost in history, and others were forced to rediscover them 600 and 700 years later. Even though Subutai had devastated the armies of Russia, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Latin Constantinople in a series of one-sided campaigns, Western military leaders, historians, and theorists completely ignored him until the 20th century.[57] The Mongols did not operate as one distinct mass, but instead moved along 3–5 axes of approach, often 500–1000 km apart, and threatened numerous objectives simultaneously. Like Napoleon, Subutai (and Genghis Khan) would disperse their forces along a wide frontage and rapidly coalesce at decisive points to defeat the enemy in detail. Their methods were aligned to completely crush the enemy state’s will to fight.[58] Subutai has been credited as the first general to operate campaigns using the modern organizational methods of command and control.[59]

Though unknown to the west for many centuries, Subutai’s exploits were featured by the British military theorist B. H. Liddell Hart in his book Great Captains Unveiled after World War I. Liddell Hart used the example of the Mongols under Genghis and Subutai to demonstrate how a mechanized army could fight using the principles of mobility, dispersion and surprise. Due to his innovative battle tactics and novelty in strategy he is a source of inspiration for later generals. In particular, Erwin Rommel and George Patton were avid students of Mongol campaigns.[60]
‘Deep Battle’ theory
Main article: Deep Battle

Russia derived the most use out of a careful study of the Mongol campaigns. Their closer proximity to the steppe gave them greater interest and access to the Mongolian campaigns, first analyzed by the Russian General Mikhail Ivanin in the 19th century, which became a recommended text in the Russian military academies up until the mid 20th century.[61] Ivanin’s work became used in the Deep Battle doctrine developed by Soviet Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Frunze, and G. S. Isserson. Deep Battle doctrine bore a heavy resemblance to Mongol strategic methods, substituting tanks, motorized troop carriers, artillery, and airplanes for Mongol horse archers, lancers, and field artillery. The Red Army even went so far as to copy Subutai’s use of smokescreens on the battlefield to cover troop movements.[62] Later in the 20th century, American military theorist John Boyd and some of his followers used Genghis Khan and Subutai’s campaigns as examples of maneuver warfare.[63] ]

To the extent Ukraine’s situation is comparable to what the Mongols faced - it’s that Ukraine is outnumbered. But Ukraine is also outgunned. For it to expel the Russian expeditionary force from its soil, it will have display in microcosm, some of the ingenuity and resourcefulness that propelled Subotai towards victory after victory. While Ukraine has done very well with the limited resources given, the unanswered question is whether it has that extra left over to finish the job and take back all that was lost in 2014, using the hodgepodge of relative handfuls of Western hand-me-downs to be disbursed in fits and starts throughout 2023.