Posted on 10/12/2022 7:30:24 AM PDT by Salohcin
Translated from Russian via Google Translate:
The Russian-Ukrainian war once again demonstrated that, despite new-fashioned concepts and modern weapons, the old military truths are still true. In particular, the size of the army remains important. This truth should be understood correctly. This does not mean that whoever has more army won - it would be too easy. This means that to perform a task you need to have enough quantity for such a task, not just quality. Marshal Jacques d'Etamp' saying "God is always on the side of large battalions" does not cancel the proverb "Hope in God, but don't do it yourself." And Suvorov's saying "To fight not by number, but by skill" also does not mean that the number is not important - it means that the number still needs to be able to be used.
The number of forces and means required to perform a specific combat task is calculated according to the standards adopted in each army, but in general it depends on two parameters: the number of the enemy and the size of the territory. And according to both of these parameters, the Russian army did not use enough forces in this war. At the same time, it was clear in the spring that the Ukrainian armed forces in total (AFU, Teroporona and all others) exceeded the in number of the invasion group of the Russian army. That's why all Russian problems in this war occur. They faced such a big opponent that they stalled purely physically.
As you know, initially the operation was planned not as a purely military, but as a political intelligence and propaganda operation: they say, after the first blow and the creation of "shock and awe" the centralized command of the Ukrainian army and the state will collapse, and it will only remain to suppress the focal defense and occupy territories with the help of the fifth column. That is, it was expected that it would not be necessary to really fight this entire large Ukrainian army as an army. And when it had to, it turned out that there was not enough strength.
Historically, the main advantage, the advantage of the Russian and Soviet army was the opportunity to throw huge masses of people and equipment at the front. All other problems are always inherent in the Russian army - logistics, communication, intelligence, interaction. They were, are and most likely to be, because they lie in the character of the military machine itself. But at least they had a plus. Now they still have these disadvantages, and they cannot use this plus, because they cannot mobilize the huge masses historically familiar to the Russian army. There are no pros - there are cons. The equation doesn't converge.
When the Russian army stalled after the first throw, it became clear that without mass mobilization it simply did not have enough reserves to somehow decisively change the situation in its favor. But for political reasons, mobilization was delayed to the last.
Mobilization as improvisation
According to available estimates, now Russians use a maximum of 170 thousand people in Ukraine - both the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and all other participating structures. For a front about 1300 km long and for a quantitatively superior enemy, this is an impossible equation, and we see the results. The Ukrainian leadership is well aware that size matters, so it carried out a mass mobilization and banned the departure of men from the country for the next mobilizations. In general, Ukraine keeps about a million people under arms, about 700 thousand of them in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, some of the forces cover the northern borders, some in the area of Odessa, some are kept in reserve, some are trained, but even those who are directly at the front are numerically superior to Russians, in selected directions several times.
With such a shortage of personnel, the Russian army relied on superiority in firepower and aviation, and it carried out its slow progress in the period of April-July 2022, focusing large groups of cannon and rocket artillery in a narrow area, after the powerful fire impact of which infantry and mechanized units slowly moved forward and occupied territory. But this method has developed itself, including due to Ukrainian strikes on ammunition depots, and since the beginning of July, at the end of the operation in Severodonetsk and Lisichansk, there have been almost no progress, except for 2-3 km here and there in the area of Bakhmut and Peskov.
Nevertheless, there was still no mobilization, the political leadership of Russia continued to abandon it as an extremely unpopular step. A special military operation is something distant and limited, only professionals and volunteers participate there, ordinary people should support it from the sofa by the TV, it does not directly concern them. The announcement of mobilization is a breakdown and reformatting of the entire political and propaganda approach to the war (including Putin's promise on March 8 that there would be no conscription of reservists from the reserve), and they fled from it like fire.
Until the fire finally caught up. If the non-promotion of their troops could still be tolerated, the successful offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine raised the issue on the edge. The Balakley-Izyum operation showed what the Ukrainian army has the strength to do and what it is capable of not theoretically, but practically: practice is a criterion of truth. Apparently, the military leadership brought to Putin that in this situation either mobilization or curtailment of war - it is impossible to fight like this. Therefore, mobilization was announced. All the political disadvantages of such a decision had to be swallowed.
The Soviet system of deploying a huge reserve army in case of a big war has long been broken, because the Russian Armed Forces did not prepare for such a war, unlike the Soviet Army. Acceptance of assigned personnel from the reserve, framed divisions, mobilization deployment of the army as such - this either does not exist at all, or there are pathetic remnants of former luxury. The Soviet system does not need to be idealized in terms of quality, but at least in quantity it met the tasks, but the current system did not. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation relied on parts of constant readiness and on short operations. Therefore, the ongoing mobilization is, in fact, improvisation. Neither the creation of a mobilization human reserve in 2015 in addition to the total human resource, nor the creation of the country's combat army reserve (BARS) in 2021 had time to be deployed into something really massive, BARS is even a few tens of thousands of people on paper. And now we are talking about hundreds of thousands, in the future - about millions.
What are Russia's mobilization needs?
As mentioned above, the calculation of forces and means is dictated by the standards adopted in each army. First of all, there is a difference between the standards for defense and the standards for the offensive.
According to Russian standards, the motorized rifle battalion defends a section of 3-5 km at the front and 3 km deep. In mobile defense, it is possible to have up to 10 km at the front, but the Russian Armed Forces did not show mobile defense skills, so we will remain with the traditional standard of 5 km. Based on the length of the 1300 km of the front, 260 battalions are required for defense. Of course, this is not a real comprehensive calculation, not all kilometers are the same, there are more or less threatened directions, flat, wooded and built-up areas, rivers, etc., but we do not replace the Main Operational Directorate of the General Directorate of the General Assembly of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with detailed maps and tables - we demonstrate the order of values Battalion tactical groups of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation usually have 600-800 personnel; since we are talking about the desirable, let's take 800. A total of 260 battalions is 208,000 people. The norms imply that the battalion in defense for 5 km is not only people, but also all the firepower, armored vehicles, etc. due to the battalion, but we will return to this later, here so far only about the personnel.
In order for these 208 thousand people to rotate rather than sit on the first line continuously, it takes at least another quarter for rotation, that is, another 52 thousand people. In addition, operational reserves are needed for counterattacks, second echelons, artillery and other units of army and front-line subordination, etc. That's at least 100,000 people. All these are only combat units; in addition to them, numerous units and parts of support are needed: logistics, engineering, medical support, communications, military police, commandant's offices, headquarters, rear security, checkpoints, etc., etc., for such a group it is also at least 100,000 people.
In total, we counted 460 thousand people. This does not take into account pre-allocated reserves to compensate for losses. In a good way, such reserves should be immediately laid at least 40 thousand only for the next stage. That is, only 500 thousand. With such a total number of personnel, it is possible to dramatically increase operational densities at the front and reduce or eliminate weak areas, which caused the breakthrough of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kharkiv direction. That is, more forces will be needed for the next offensives of the Ukrainian army in such conditions.
If we are not talking about defense, but about the offensive, the Russian standard for a battalion on the offensive is 2 km at the front, and at the breakthrough site - 1 km. These forces can theoretically conduct an offensive: for example, only rotating 52 thousand people are already 65 battalion tactical groups of 800 people each. With the means of strengthening army and front-line subordination, this is a very significant force, about half of the number of BTG concentrated near the borders of Ukraine by the beginning of the war. Of course, they should be introduced into a breakthrough in narrow areas, and not scattered in several operational directions, as then. But this is theoretical, and the feasibility depends on two factors: an effective offensive requires a higher level of training and combat coordination than for defense, and it is more difficult for mobilized to achieve it; in addition, these offensive groups should be fully equipped with equipment and weapons, not just personnel, and now this is a much more difficult task than at the beginning of the war.
In general, these 260 thousand people on the first line and on rotation, which we conditionally counted, with sufficient match, are 325 BTG, despite the fact that in the Russian Armed Forces as a whole as of August 2021 there were only 168 BTG of constant readiness, of which about two-thirds were thrown to war at the first stage. That is, the ground forces of the Russian Armed Forces originally had to be twice as large in forces and means to wage war as it should, and then perhaps the results would be different. And now we see what we see.
In total, if 300 thousand people are really mobilized in addition to 170 thousand, then purely in terms of the number of personnel for defense this will be enough - from 470 thousand to 500 thousand the distance is small. Under these additional conditions, this may also be enough for the onset. But the continuation of the war is a continuation of losses, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine are not going to stop either, so it is likely that they will not stop at 300 thousand and will mobilize further.
Ideally, of course, such a front requires not 500 thousand, but a million people, including shock tank armies, in order not to be shy about anything, but if a million soldiers can be technically recruited, then new tank armies are now unrealistic. And half a million has already been laid down now, as we can see.
What to do with mobilized soldiers
There are additional parameters that should be taken into account. We partially touched on them above, here we will explain them in more detail.
First of all, as not all yogurts are equally useful, and not all soldiers. It is clear that the mobilized are inferior in quality to personnel, and their short training does not allow us to hope that they will catch up with personnel. However, this is what it is, and the question is not "good or bad", but "bad or no one." In 1941, the personnel Red Army was mostly destroyed, and the mobilized continued to fight. Yes, all the differences are known: the Great Patriotic War against the invading evil enemy is not like a special military operation in terms of motivation, in addition, now a different political system, a different life, a different ideology, etc. But nevertheless, professionally mobilized can also fight: whoever does not die immediately will become more experienced and skillful. Many mobilized people are also fighting in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine without previous experience, experience for survivors is a profitable business.
If at the first stage the Russian mobilized are used to replenish existing units, in which now the personnel are often half or less, it will be their most correct use, as they learn from more experienced comrades. In new units and units made entirely from mobilized ones, this will be worse. A separate issue is the command staff for new units. This will also be decided according to the methods of the Great Patriotic War: some will be mobilized from the reserve, some will be accelerated graduates of military schools, some will be scraped from the army throughout the country, and there you can get to production from soldiers to officers after short wartime courses or field appointments.
Secondly, even if the personnel are recruited as much as necessary, it needs to be armed and equipped. Problems with uniforms, personal weapons and personal equipment of the mobilized have already manifested themselves so clearly that the State Duma Committee on Defense appointed hearings, despite the fact that this is uncharacteristic for Russian political practice. And Deputy Defense Minister Bulgakov, responsible for all logistics of the army, was removed from office even earlier. Nevertheless, these are the problems of the first stage of mass mobilization, when you need a lot at once, but not a lot. In principle, these problems can be solved. Some will find internal reserves, some of the mobilized will buy everything they need themselves or they will be given volunteers, part will cost like this - the Russian army has always fought like this: many soldiers who do not have a lot of things they need.
However, problems with equipment and heavy weapons are not solved so easily. The continuation of the removal and restoration of equipment from storage, deployment of repair capacities, etc. is likely to create from the mobilized some new parts with more or less sufficient match in terms of automotive and armored vehicles, artillery, etc., even if outdated samples: this war also again showed that the old is better than nothing - both the T-62 and BMP-1 are back in service, and the M113 with minimal upgrades. Yes, it's old, it often fails, and the spare parts are not young either, but it's better than nothing.
But in general, Russia is experiencing big problems in terms of matchmaking for such a big war. If it may be enough for defense with the appropriate amount of personnel, it is much more difficult to create new units for major offensives. We have already seen difficulties in creating the 3rd Army Corps, with the 4th, 5th and the next will be even more difficult. Without enough match, it will just be numerous light infantry regiments that can be thrown forward after the fire suppression of the enemy's positions, that is, it is really cannon fodder not even figuratively, but in the most direct sense - in the style of the First World War. We have already seen reports of such an application of mobilized LDPRs, here it can be repeated on a larger scale. If in defense you can rely more on field and long-term fortifications, minefields and other engineering means, and the equipment may be less, especially since we counted the battalions with a reserve, then in a normal offensive we need masses of armored vehicles and other equipment, you can't jump forward on a concrete bunker. And the equipment is not stored in Soviet quantities now, and the industry does not promise large volumes.
The geography of the front is almost like in World War II, the active army is not yet like in World War II, but with mobilization it will begin to grow, and industry and economy have not been transferred to military rails at all, and even the growth of military production is still within the usual economic framework. Factories have not yet been bombed, but they are under sanctions, primarily in terms of components, equipment, etc. And Lend-Lease not only does not enter Russia, but goes to the enemy. Comrade Stalin would not like this whole scheme of warfare. However, once they came to the mobilization of reservists, which many have long talked about as the only means of continuing the war, they may continue to mobilize other areas - the production of equipment, weapons, ammunition in the first place. The question is what it can really give in the current conditions.
Thirdly, the overall effectiveness of the mobilized army depends not only on the personnel and matchmaking, but also on the context of the war. If mobilization had begun a few months ago, as many have suggested, they could have had time to build up and put more forces into battle in more favorable conditions than today. First of all, it is much more effective to throw reserves for the development of the offensive and consolidate its results than to plug breakthroughs in the retreat. Therefore, when the Russian army was still advancing or at least standing still, the mobilized would be more useful. In addition, at that time the Ukrainian army did not yet have Khaimars, 155 mm artillery and other Western means in such quantities as it is now. That is, in this regard, the effectiveness will now be lower, the enemy has become qualitatively stronger in terms of fire and other means, although he lost many previous artillery in battles. The Russian army, for its part, also suffered heavy losses in the same artillery and in another match, but does not receive qualitatively reinforcing funds in return, except for Iranian UAVs.
The front line has been moving recently - and not in favor of the Russian Armed Forces, and the mobilized by the masses are not yet coming, so it is not known where they will have to stabilize the front, when they will arrive, and how profitable the lines will be. Even in terms of the season, it was more useful to mobilize in summer, then by autumn and winter they would already get used to field life, gradually acquire both winter uniforms and other means, now throwing them to the front in the cold with local medical care, accommodation and nutrition is already a large percentage of patients right at the start, and their fighting capacity is not the best without it
In general, a militarily convenient moment for mobilization has long passed. But, as already mentioned, the Russian leadership avoided mobilization for political reasons to the last moment, so now for them it is no longer a matter of efficiency, but "better than nothing, and better late than never."
Given all of the above, on the one hand, it is not necessary to immediately go to the extreme "Russia will crush the mass again, as always", because there are these objective difficulties with this mass now, but on the other hand, there is no need to dismiss - they say, "all of them will be killed or they will run away." Everyone will not run away, and in order to kill everyone, you need not only to spend a lot of shells, but also to shed a lot of blood - this is not a computer game. Any resource, even the largest, can be wastelessly without any benefit if you use it incorrectly, but you must have this resource first. So far, Russia has not had it, now with the beginning of mobilization, this reservoir has opened, albeit later than any military calculation should have been. Now it's up to its use and use.
Russia should have plenty of Mosin Nagants in storage.
Beans and bullets.
A huge army means little if it’s starving and doesn’t have ammo.
There are many brave soldiers and damned good generals in many of the the armies of the world, but nobody has ever done logistics like the U.S.A.; I think we forget at just how bad everyone else is compared to us.
Intensive, advanced Hands on Ears and Foot Stomping Techniques are being given to the most intelligent of the 2nd Mobilization conscripts. Training time has been increased from 4 minutes to 8 minutes before deployment to the front.
Keep poking.....
It’s about to get ‘full game on’ soon enough.
The Chess pieces are just being moved into place.
Have indicated it before, multiple times, and will say it again:
The next few months - November probably when ground freezes - are going to be very interesting to the outside observer....
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