Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
Iran Update, June 26, 2024
Hardline candidate Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi withdrew from the Iranian presidential election on June 26.[1] Hashemi did not appear to have a serious chance at winning and withdrew to avoid splitting votes across too many hardline candidates.[2] It is unclear, however, whether his withdrawal will meaningfully benefit the two hardline frontrunners, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili. An unspecified hardline Iranian source told the Middle East Eye on June 25 that Hashemi supports Jalili and hopes to receive a political appointment if Jalili becomes president.[3] Hashemi’s withdrawal follows repeated calls from senior hardline officials in recent weeks for the hardline faction to coalesce behind a single candidate.[4] These calls are driven by concerns that splitting the hardline vote across numerous candidates could inadvertently advantage the sole reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian.
Iranian presidential candidates reiterated their economic policies during the final debate of the upcoming election.[5] This debate occurred on June 25 and focused on the economy. Below are the key takeaways from what the three presumed frontrunners said.
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (pragmatic hardliner): Ghalibaf again framed his candidacy as a continuation of the Ebrahim Raisi administration.[6] Ghalibaf claimed that he would increase workers’ salaries to match rising inflation and criticized other candidates’ lack of managerial experience.
Saeed Jalili (ultraconservative hardliner): Jalili identified employment rates and inflation as the greatest issues facing the Iranian economy.[7] Jalili notably did not mention the role of international sanctions in this context. Jalili also called for deepening economic ties with China and increasing non-oil exports.
Masoud Pezeshkian (reformist): Pezeshkian vowed to implement the seventh five-year development plan, which is a Raisi-era agenda aimed at increasing economic growth, minimizing government debt, and optimizing the state budget.[8] Pezeshkian also said that he would focus on external economic engagement and secure sanctions relief.
Upon reviewing Iranian polling data, CTP-ISW has concluded that recently published polls cannot accurately or meaningfully predict who will win the upcoming Iranian presidential election. Most of the polls include large percentages of voters who have not yet decided for which candidate they will vote. A June 24 Iranian Students Polling Agency poll, for example, showed that 30.6 percent of respondents had not decided for which candidate they would vote.[9] A June 26 Parliamentary Research Center poll similarly showed that 28.5 percent of respondents had not decided which candidate they will support.[10] The large percentage of undecided voters makes it extremely difficult for these polls to accurately predict the election outcome given that candidates need to win the majority vote to win the race.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-26-2024
Iran Update, June 27, 2024
Iranian hardliners have made only limited progress toward uniting behind a single candidate ahead of the Iranian presidential election on June 28. Remaining divisions among the hardliners by the time of the vote significantly increases the likelihood of a runoff election. Two hardline candidates—Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi and Ali Reza Zakani—have withdrawn from the race since June 26 in order to help unify their faction.[1] Neither candidate was especially popular, however, making it unclear that their exits will meaningfully affect the vote. The two most prominent hardline candidates (Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili) remain in the race and have refused to withdraw in support of the other at the time of this writing. Ghalibaf and Jalili both staying in the election ensures that they will split at least some of the hardliner vote. It will also likely prevent either from reaching the majority needed to win—unless the supreme leader and his inner circle manipulate the vote blatantly to favor either candidate. Iran will hold a runoff election between the two most popular candidates on July 5 if no one wins the majority.[2]
Some hardliners, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, appear concerned that the sole reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, could win the vote outright. Khamenei indirectly criticized Pezeshkian on June 25 for supporting engagement with the West, indicating Khamenei’s opposition to him.[3] The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which is run by hardliners, additionally cancelled one of Pezeshkian‘s rallies at the last minute on June 26, further indicating that some in the regime view him as a serious contender for the presidency.[4] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has separately tried to unite the hardline camp against Pezeshkian, according to unverified social media rumors. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly met with Ghalibaf and Jalili in Mashhad on June 26 to form a consensus between them.[5] Ghaani clearly failed, if this reporting is accurate. But his intervention is nonetheless remarkable and possibly unprecedented, reflecting hardliners’ serious concerns about Pezeshkian.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-27-2024
Iran held its presidential election on June 28.[1] Iran will likely have to hold a runoff election on July 5 given that neither of the two hardline frontrunners—Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili—withdrew from the election before the first round of voting on June 28. Four candidates—pragmatic hardliner Ghalibaf, ultraconservative hardliner Jalili, reformist Masoud Pezeshkian, and hardliner Mostafa Pour Mohammadi—participated in the June 28 election. The Iranian constitution stipulates that a candidate must win over 50 percent of the vote to become president.[2] Senior hardline Iranian officials have repeatedly called on the hardline candidates in recent weeks to coalesce around a single candidate.[3] These calls were driven by concerns that splitting the hardline vote across numerous candidates could inadvertently advantage the sole reformist candidate, Pezeshkian. Two unspecified Iranian officials confirmed to The New York Times on June 28 that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani called on Jalili to withdraw from the race during an emergency meeting with Jalili and Ghalibaf in Mashhad, Iran, on June 26.[4] Ghaani reportedly stated that Ghalibaf is better qualified than Jalili to run the government because of his “military background and pragmatic outlook.”[5] Ghaani’s characterization of Ghalibaf as “pragmatic” is consistent with recent Western reports that some IRGC factions are trying to prevent Jalili from winning the election because they regard him as “too hardline.”[6] Ghaani’s intervention also highlights hardliners’ concerns that Pezeshkian could pose a real threat to Jalili and Ghalibaf in the election. The New York Times later deleted its report about Ghaani’s meeting with Jalili and Ghalibaf without providing an explanation.
Preliminary reports suggest that most Iranians did not participate in the June 28 election. The Iranian Election Headquarters extended the voting deadline twice until 2200 local time, likely to try to increase voter turnout.[7] This action is not unprecedented; the regime has previously extended voting hours during both presidential and parliamentary elections.[8] The decision to extend the voting deadline nevertheless highlights that voter turnout likely did not reach the regime's desired level during the regular voting hours. The Interior Ministry, which runs elections in Iran, reportedly estimated a voter turnout of less than 30 percent by 2000 local time.[9] A Tehran-based researcher similarly claimed that turnout only reached approximately 35 percent by 2115 local time.[10] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify these reports. Opposition media separately circulated videos of poll workers sleeping at empty voting centers and reported that the regime forced prisoners in Kurdistan Province to vote to boost voter turnout statistics.[11]
Reuters, citing an unpublished International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report, reported that Iran installed four new cascades of IR-6 centrifuges in Unit 1 of the Fordow fuel enrichment facility on June 28.[19] Iran has not yet brought the four new cascades online. Iran previously informed the IAEA on June 13 that it planned to add eight total cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow within the next three to four weeks.[20]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-28-2024
DIA Report on Houthi Attacks and Pressure on International Trade
https://freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/4247526/posts
The election this coming Friday will pit reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian against the hard-line former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili.
Mohsen Eslami, an election spokesman, announced the result in a news conference carried by Iranian state television. He said of 24.5 million votes cast, Pezeshkian got 10.4 million while Jalili received 9.4 million.
Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf got 3.3 million. Shiite cleric Mostafa Pourmohammadi had over 206,000 votes.
The IRGC’s Baqiatallah networks —known as the “Middle Ring”—are involved in every stage of elections to manipulate the vote for Khamenei. From indirect vetting of candidates to forming the bulk of official election monitoring & volunteering roles at polling stations
Iran Update, June 29, 2024
No candidate received the majority of votes needed to win the Iranian presidential election on June 28.[1] Iran will hold a runoff election between the two most popular candidates—ultraconservative Saeed Jalili and reformist Masoud Pezeshkian—on July 5.[2] Jalili will likely win the runoff vote and become the next Iranian president. The Iranian regime reported that Pezeshkian received the most votes at around 10.4 million, while Jalili received around 9.5 million.[3] Jalili will likely receive significantly more votes in the runoff election since there will be no other hardline candidates splitting the hardline vote. The second most prominent hardline candidate—Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—received around 3.4 million votes, which was not enough to compete in the runoff election. At least some Ghalibaf voters will presumably back Jalili in the runoff election, giving him a significant advantage over Pezeshkian.
Jalili would run an ultraconservative hardline government similar to late-President Ebrahim Raisi. Such a president would likely exacerbate the economic and socio-cultural issues frustrating large swaths of the Iranian population. Jalili is a deeply ideological regime loyalist who has long supported extreme domestic and foreign policies. Western and Iranian opposition outlets reported that some Iranian hardliners, including senior officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, tried to prevent Jalili from running for president, feeling that his views are too radical.[4] Jalili downplayed the importance of external engagement to improve the Iranian economy during the presidential debates, suggesting that he might instead favor an autarkic agenda.[5] Jalili also voiced support for Iran’s “nuclear rights” and criticized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in the debates.[6] These comments are particularly concerning given that Iran has in recent months expanded its nuclear program significantly and begun running computer simulations that could help build a nuclear weapon.
The presidential election on June 28 saw unprecedently low voter turnout, highlighting widespread disillusionment with the Iranian regime. The Iranian Interior Ministry announced that around 25.5 million votes were cast, which is around 40 percent of the Iranian electorate.[7] Notwithstanding the possibility that the regime inflated these numbers, they reflect a notable drop-off from the roughly 48.5-percent turnout for the Iranian presidential election in 2021.[8]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-29-2024
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