Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iran Update, September 22, 2024

Hezbollah launched its own strikes into Israel on September 21 and 22. These attacks are consistent with Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah declaring recently that the group would continue its cross-border attacks in support of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[10] Hezbollah launched three barrages of medium-range rockets targeting IDF Ramat David airbase in northern Israel on September 21.[11] The airbase is the northernmost one in Israel. Hezbollah stated that the attack was in response to “repeated Israeli attacks” on Lebanon.[12] The IDF intercepted about 24 rockets.[13] This attack may have been the one that the IDF preempted earlier that day.

Hezbollah fired around another 85 short- and medium-range rockets targeting Rafael Advanced Defense Systems near Haifa on September 22.[14] The Rafael Advanced Defense Systems is an Israeli defense company that develops weapons and military technology, including the Iron Dome air defense system, for the IDF.[15] Hezbollah claimed that it targeted the company’s site in retaliation for Israel detonating Hezbollah pagers and personal radios.[16] Several rockets impacted areas just outside Haifa and injured three people.[17]

It is notable that these latest Hezbollah attacks are slightly smaller in scale than previous retaliatory attacks the group has conducted. Hezbollah fired between 200 and 300 projectiles, including around 20 one-way attack drones, on August 24 in retaliation to Israel killing top Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr.[18]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-22-2024

Iran Update, September 23, 2024

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force unveiled the “Jihad” ballistic missile during an annual military parade in Tehran on September 21.[77] Iranian media claimed that the “Jihad” ballistic missile is an upgraded version of Iran's Qiam-1 missile and has a range of 1,000 kilometers.[78] The IRGC Aerospace Force displayed a total of 23 ballistic missiles during the military parade.[79] The IRGC Aerospace Force also displayed a Shahed-136B drone, which reportedly has a range of over 4,000 kilometers and can carry a payload of up to 200 kilograms.[80]

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, canceled his seminary course on September 22.[81] Mojtaba is considered one of the top contenders to succeed his father as supreme leader. Mojtaba claimed that the decision to cancel his course had “nothing to do with political matters,” although some individuals have speculated that Mojtaba canceled the course in order to assume new political responsibilities.[82] IRGC-affiliated media notably referred to Mojtaba as an “Ayatollah” in its report about the cancellation of Mojtaba’s seminary course.[83] Holding the rank of Ayatollah is a prerequisite to becoming supreme leader in Iran.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-23-2024

Iran Update, September 24, 2024

ran declined a request by Lebanese Hezbollah in recent days to conduct a direct attack targeting Israel, according to two unspecified Israeli officials and an unspecified Western diplomat speaking to Axios on September 24.[21] The Israeli officials stated that Iran told Hezbollah that the “timing isn’t right” for Iran to attack Israel given that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is currently in New York City attending the United Nations General Assembly.[22] A separate Israeli official told Axios that the Israeli security cabinet issued a directive to the IDF to “avoid steps that would give Iran a reason or a pretext to join the fighting.”[23] It is unclear what Israeli action(s) in Lebanon would drive Iran to enter the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah directly. Iran has previously directly intervened in regional conflicts when its principal allies—such as the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria—were at risk of collapsing.[24] Iran could decide to intervene in support of Hezbollah against Israel if Iran assesses that Israel is inflicting severe damage on Hezbollah. Iran’s reluctance to directly intervene to support Hezbollah could generate tension between Hezbollah and Iran as Hezbollah seeks full Iranian support against Israel and Iran attempts to avoid a large-scale war with Israel since the beginning of the October 7 War.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-24-2024

Iran Update, September 26, 2024

The Pezeskhian administration is pursuing former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s neighborhood policy of prioritizing the expansion of bilateral relations with regional states.[51] Pezeshkian announced on X (Twitter) on September 26 that Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref will travel to Pakistan and Armenia in coming days to discuss bilateral ties.[52] Pezeshkian added that Iranian Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Abdol Nasser Hemmati met with other regional officials, including Qatari Finance Minister Ali Ahmed al Kuwari, in Uzbekistan on September 26.[53] The Qatari minister invited Pezeshkian to Doha and called for establishing an Iran-Qatar financial exchange committee.[54] Hemmati also met with Uzbekistani Economy and Finance Minister Jamshid Kuchkarov to discuss bilateral trade and to develop transit routes.[55] Iranian Energy Minister Abbas Ali Abadi separately proposed connecting Iran’s electricity grid with the electricity grids of Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, during a BRICS energy ministerial meeting in Moscow on September 26.[56]

Atomic Energy Organizaton of Iran (AEOI) Director Mohammad Eslami appointed Javad Owji as AEOI deputy director on September 26.[57] Owji is the former Oil minister under the Ebrahim Raisi administration. Owji replaces Pejman Shirmardi, who had held the position since November 2021.[58]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-26-2024

Iran Update, September 27, 2024

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel seeks to defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon and destroy Hamas in Gaza, and the achievement of these objectives would fundamentally change the security landscape in the Middle East.[11] Defeating both groups would also either achieve or create conditions to achieve all of Israel's war aims. These war aims are destroying Hamas as a governing and military force, preventing terrorist attacks in Israel, returning the hostages, protecting Israel's borders, and returning citizens to the north.[12] Iran has historically relied on Hezbollah to implement its Middle Eastern strategy. Hezbollah trainers have trained Iraqi, Syrian, and Houthi fighters to support Iran's regional goals.[13] Hezbollah also supported Iran by deploying forces into Syria to support the Bashar al Assad regime.[14] Both Hamas and Hezbollah have used their large, well-developed non-state military forces to threaten Israel from the north and south in support of Iranian objectives.[15] The defeat or severe degradation of these two groups would significantly alter the current security architecture in the Middle East that has prevailed since at least the mid-2000s.

The IDF is still investigating whether Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah survived the IDF strike that targeted his headquarters in Dahieh, Beirut, on September 27.[1] The IDF reported on September 27 that the IDF targeted Nasrallah in Hezbollah's underground central command headquarters.[2] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari reported that the IDF is still investigating whether Nasrallah survived the airstrike.[3] Israeli officials told the New York Times that Israeli leadership decided to conduct the strike after receiving real-time intelligence indicating that Nasrallah was present for a meeting.[4] Israeli media speculated after reviewing imagery and video that the IDF used multiple large bunker-buster bombs to penetrate and destroy Hezbollah‘s underground command center.[5] An unspecified source close to Hezbollah cited by Agence France-Presse (AFP) claimed that Nasrallah is ”fine.”[6]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-27-2024

It's a bit surprising that they know Italian: “Fine” in Italian means “end” ; i.e. Nasrallah is finished.

Iran Update, September 28, 2024

Iran and its Axis of Resistance have not yet responded in any coherent or clearly coordinated fashion to the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon. The Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which is the seniormost defense and foreign policy body in Iran, held an emergency meeting at the residence of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on September 27 to discuss the Israeli strike targeted Hassan Nasrallah.[14] Khamenei typically attends SNSC meetings only during serious crises, such as immediately following Israel killing Ismail Haniyeh in July 2024 and the United States killing Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.[15] The Axis of Resistance has otherwise sustained its regular operations vis-a-vis Israel, which is discussed in further detail below. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed five drone attacks targeting Israel, for instance, which is largely consistent with its usual activity. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias separately issued generic threats toward the United States and Israel in response to the Israeli killing of Nasrallah.

Some Axis of Resistance leaders have increased their personal security measures, which may impede coordination across the alliance. Khamenei moved to a “secure location” in Iran after Israel killed Nasrallah, according to Reuters, citing two unspecified sources in the Middle East.[16] Saudi-owned outlet al Arabiya reported on September 28 that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar has “ceased his movements” and changed his ”security circle” in response to the killing of Nasrallah.[17] These security measures and others that senior Axis of Resistance officials may be taking will not preclude the Axis of Resistance from coordinating a response to Israel, however. It is furthermore unclear whether the Axis of Resistance yet fully understands the extent to which Israel has disrupted Hezbollah leadership.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-28-2024

Iran Update, September 29, 2024

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is trying to help Lebanese Hezbollah recover from the severe disruption that Israel has imposed upon it. Two anonymous IRGC officials told the New York Times that Tehran is trying to help Hezbollah establish a secure communications network, name a new secretary general, and rebuild its command structure.[1] The sources also said that a senior IRGC Quds Force officer will travel to Beirut to support this recovery.[2] This report comes after CTP-ISW assessed that Israeli military operations have generated internal disarray in Hezbollah and severely disrupted its strategic- and operational-level military leadership. IRGC Quds Force Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani met with the Hezbollah representative to Iran, Abdullah Safi ed Din, in Tehran on September 29, which is consistent with the New York Times article.[3] Abdullah Safi ed Din is the brother of Hashem Safi ed Din, who is speculated to be one of the top contenders to succeed Hassan Nasrallah as Hezbollah secretary general.[4] Iranian state media widely circulated Ghaani’s meeting likely to reaffirm the close coordination between Iran and Hezbollah.[5]

The Iranian security establishment is likely preoccupied managing the crises that it faces over planning an immediate retaliatory strike to avenge Nasrallah. On one hand, Israeli operations have severely degraded and in some cases defeated Hamas units in the Gaza Strip.[6] On the other hand, Hezbollah appears to be suffering from temporary organizational paralysis.[7] Iranian military leadership needs to urgently address the mounting questions about in what form Hezbollah will emerge from the war. Some Iranian officials who are not engaged in managing these military emergencies, such as Massoud Pezeshkian and Saeed Jalili, have meanwhile focused on debate over how to respond to the killing of Nasrallah, according to the New York Times.[8]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-29-2024

Iran Update, September 30, 2024

Iran will likely not be able to intervene in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in a way that meaningfully impacts the outcome of the conflict. The Iranian regime has thus far indicated that it does not seek to intervene directly in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[51] However, the regime could decide to intervene if it assesses that Israel’s objective in Lebanon is to significantly degrade, defeat, or destroy Hezbollah, one of its principal regional allies. The Israeli Security Cabinet altered an earlier directive on September 26 by changing the directive from avoiding a “broad campaign involving Iran” to “reducing the possibility ... [of] an all-out war.”[52] The revision of this directive suggests that Israel has accepted the risk that Iran might directly intervene in the conflict. Iran has few military capabilities that could shape the outcome of the conflict, even if it were to intervene directly.

Iran could take other measures to harm Israeli and US interests in an effort to stop Israeli operations against Hezbollah. These actions would likely also fail to meaningfully disrupt current Israeli operations in Lebanon. Iran could take the following actions:

1) Iran could conduct a large-scale drone and missile attack targeting Israel. The Iranian regime currently appears unwilling to conduct a direct attack targeting Israel, and thus risk a large Israeli retaliatory attack on Iranian territory. Iran recently dismissed a request by Hezbollah to conduct a direct attack on Israel, stating that the “timing [wasn’t] right” for such an attack.[53] The Biden administration recently warned Iran via an unspecified third country that it would likely not be able to “restrain” Israel if Iran conducts a direct attack on Israel, according to an unspecified Western official.[54] The official added that the Biden administration warned Iran that Israel would conduct a “broader and greater” attack on Iran than it did in April 2024 if Iran directly attacks Israel.[55] Israel conducted retaliatory airstrikes targeting an Artesh Air Force base in Esfahan Province, Iran, on April 18 in response to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack targeting Israel.[56] It is also not clear that a major drone and missile attack would impact Israeli calculations, given that the vast majority of Israelis support the war in Lebanon and the Israeli cabinet appears willing to retaliate heavily against Iran in an attempt to deter any hypothetical Iranian attack.

2) Iran could increase assassination attempts targeting senior Israeli officials. The Shin Bet announced on September 30 that Iran has “significantly” increased its efforts to conduct assassinations in Israel.[57] The Shin Bet stated that it recently thwarted several Iranian assassination plots, including some that were in the “advanced stages” of planning.[58] The Shin Bet previously announced on September 19 that unspecified Iranian officials planned an assassination plot targeting the Israeli prime minister, defense minister, or other senior officials.[59] An assassination of a senior Israeli official would have no serious impact on military operations in Lebanon.

3) Iran could order attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria to try to coerce the United States to pressure Israel to halt its operations in Lebanon. The Iranian regime has previously operated under the theory that it can coerce the United States to alter Israel’s behavior if Iran hurts US interests in response to Israeli actions.[60] Israel acts independently of the United States, and therefore Iranian-backed attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East would likely fail to disrupt Israeli operations in Lebanon.

4) Iran could further expand its nuclear program. An Iranian parliamentarian stated on September 29 that Iran should expand its nuclear program, including increasing production of 90% enriched uranium, in response to Israel killing Nasrallah.[61] An Iranian decision to significantly expand its nuclear program, or even pursue weaponization, risks an Israeli or US military or economic response but would likely not cause Israel to suspend its campaign in Lebanon. Expanding the nuclear program also runs contrary to recent Iranian efforts to pursue negotiations.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-30-2024

Iran Update, October 1, 2024

Iran launched a two-wave ballistic missile attack that targeted Israel from Iranian territory on October 1.[1] Iran claimed to launch this attack in response to Israel's killing of senior Axis of Resistance leaders including Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut, and Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.[2] Iran launched approximately 180 ballistic missiles, including Emad and Ghadr ballistic missiles, from Iranian territory.[3] Iran claimed to launch its domestically produced hypersonic medium-range “Fattah-2” ballistic missile for the first time in the October 1 attack.[4] The IRGC claimed it launched Fattah missiles to destroy Israel's Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile interception systems.[5] The IRGC conducted the October 1 operation with the approval of the Supreme National Security Council and “with the knowledge of” the Armed Forces General Staff.[6] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh claimed that Iran targeted Israeli “military, operational and intelligence” centers associated with the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, which occurred in Tehran, Iran in July 2023.[7] Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-affiliated media claimed that Iran targeted the following airbases.[8]

The Nevatim Airbase, which houses Israeli F-35s, located outside of Beersheba, Israel.[9] Most of Israel's F-35s were presumably airborne at the time of the attack, given that most of Israel's aerial refuelers were airborne during the attack. This would have enabled Israel to keep most of its aircraft airborne during the strike both to prevent any damage to the aircraft and to intercept projectiles if needed and possible. Pro-Hezbollah media claimed this base was used in the Israeli killing of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.[10] Geolocated footage showed impacts to the base from missiles.[11]

The Hatzerim Airbase in the Negev Desert.[12]

The Tel Nof Airbase 20 kilometers south of Tel Aviv.[13] Geolocated footage showed missiles impacting at or near the Tel Nof Airbase.[14]

Geolocated footage also showed Iranian ballistic missiles impacting in at least three other locations:

An area south of Herzliya, Israel.[15] The geolocated footage depicts an area located near the IDF Glilot Intelligence Base, which houses IDF Unit 8200, which is the IDF’s signals collection unit, and the Mossad Headquarters.[16] Israel evacuated the Glilot Intelligence base before the attack.[17]

A school in Gedera, Israel, located near the Tel Nof Airbase.[20]

An area near the Ayalon Mall, Ramat Gan, Israel.[18] Ayalon Mall is immediately west of Yarkon Park, where Shin Bet is headquartered.[19]

The Iranian attack killed one Palestinian near Jericho in the West Bank, and shrapnel lightly injured two Israelis in Tel Aviv.[21]

Iran likely intended to inflict significant damage on Israel by oversaturating Israeli air defenses, particularly in central Israel. Iran launched approximately 180 ballistic missiles targeting Israel on October 1, compared to the approximately 120 ballistic missiles it fired at Israel in April 2024.[22] The April attack focused on Israeli positions in northern and southern Israel, with several ballistic missiles striking Nevatim Airbase.[23] This attack focused on at least three possible targets between Rehovot, south of Tel Aviv, and Herzliya, north of Tel Aviv. Rehovot and Tel Aviv are 29km apart. Some portion of the strike package focused on Nevatim and Hatzerim Airbases in southern Israel, but a large number of missiles targeted a very small geographic area in densely populated central Israel. All missiles in this area would presumably need to be intercepted because the IDF will only intercept missiles that fall in populated areas. This is not the case in Nevatim and Hatzerim, which are surrounded by relatively unpopulated deserts. The increase in ballistic missiles may have been designed to overwhelm the Israeli Arrow ballistic missile defense system by saturating it with large numbers of systems in relatively small and densely populated areas. The large quantity of ballistic missiles also represents a significant Iranian investment that Iran is unlikely to willingly forfeit in an attack for show.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-1-2024

Iran Update, October 2, 2024

The Iranian missile attack into Israel on October 1 appears to have been more effective at penetrating Israeli air defenses than the Iranian drone-missile attack in April 2024. This may indicate that Iran is learning how to optimize its strike packages against Western and Israeli air defenses. Though Israel intercepted most of the missiles that Iran launched on October 1, some of the missiles managed to impact. These missiles caused minor damage to dozens of homes north of Tel Aviv, a major road near the Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv, a school in central Israel, and the IDF Nevatim airbase in the Negev Desert.[24] In contrast, the United States, Israel, and their regional partners intercepted almost all of the drones and missiles that Iran launched in April 2024.[25]

Several factors could have led to the increased damage in the most recent Iranian attack. One factor could be that Iran meaningfully increased its volume of fire, launching 180-200 ballistic missiles compared to the 120 that it launched in April 2024.[26] Iran also refrained from launching slower moving cruise missiles and drones in the April 2024 attack.[27] Former Israeli Missile Defense Organization head Uzi Rubin said that the April 2024 attack was “easier to defend [against]” because the cruise missile and drones gave the IDF “plenty of warning.”[28] The ballistic missiles took about 15 minutes to fly from Iran to Israel.[29] Iran separately appeared to concentrate much of its fire around densely populated central Israel in the most recent attack, whereas Iran exclusively attacked remote areas in April 2024. Israeli air defenses are designed to avoid intercepting projectiles that will land in open areas. But the concentration of fire on central Israel, where there is a high risk of collateral damage, may have been designed to overwhelm Israeli air defenses by saturating the airspace with a large number of projectiles over relatively small and densely populated areas.

Outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) reported that Iran used a combination of missiles to achieve different effects in the attack.[30] The outlet stated that the liquid-fueled Emad missiles were meant to engage Israeli interceptors, while the more advanced Fattah and Kheybar Shekan missiles were meant to strike precision targets.

Reuters reported on how deeply Israel has infiltrated the Iranian security establishment and Hezbollah, citing anonymous Iranian sources.[41] The report stated that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei offered to relocate Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah to Iran in response to concerns of Israeli infiltration and the possibility that Israel would try to kill Nasrallah. Nasrallah declined the offer, according to the report, and Khamenei sent IRGC Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan to Beirut to persuade Nasrallah. Nilforoushan died in the Israeli airstrike that killed Nasrallah in Beirut. The airstrike follows several other Israeli operations killing high-profile officials in the Axis of Resistance, such as Mohammad Reza Zahedi, Fuad Shukr, and Ismail Haniyeh. Reuters reported that the killings—coupled with Israel detonating thousands of Hezbollah pagers and personal radios—has stoked mistrust and paranoia among Iranian and Hezbollah leaders, including Khamenei. Iran, according to Reuters, launched investigating possible Israeli agents in the Iranian security apparatus, focusing on individuals traveling or with family abroad. Reuters also reported that Iran has arrested several individuals on suspicion that they helped Israel kill Nasrallah.

more + maps https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-2-2024

Iran Update, October 3, 2024

A senior aide to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei traveled to Beirut and met with Lebanese officials on October 3.[32] Mohsen Ghomi, who is the international relations deputy in the Office of the Supreme Leader, met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, among others, to discuss the war against Israel.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will lead Friday prayers in Tehran on October 4, during which he will speak publicly on the war against Israel.[33] Khamenei is expected to honor Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan, both of whom died in the Israeli airstrike targeting the Hezbollah central military headquarters in Beirut on September 27. Khamenei will also commemorate the coming anniversary of Hamas’ brutal attack into Israel on October 7, 2023. Khamenei very rarely leads Friday prayers and typically reserves this right for especially sensitive times for the Islamic Republic. The last time that Khamenei did so was shortly after the United States killed Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.[34] CTP-ISW will report on this event further in future updates.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-3-2024

Iran Update, October 4, 2024

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led Friday prayers in Tehran on October 4 for the first time since January 2020. Khamenei used the speech to signal his steadfastness in the war against Israel.[41] Khamenei defended Hamas‘ October 7, 2023, attack into Israel and the recent Iranian missile attack on Israel, calling them justified responses to “aggression” and warning of severe retaliation for any future Israeli actions against the Axis of Resistance.[42] Khamenei reaffirmed Iranian commitment to the Axis of Resistance and praised Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, urging Muslims to stand firm in their fight against Israel. Khamenei delivered a part of the sermon in Arabic, addressing the Palestinian and Lebanese people directly. Khamenei in Arabic urged continued resistance against “Israeli occupation.”[43] Key Iranian and Axis of Resistance figures, including the Hezbollah representative to Tehran, Abdollah Safi ed Din, attended Khamenei‘s speech.[44] Abdollah is the brother of Hashem Saffi ed Din, who is Nasrallah’s presumed successor and was recently targeted in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut on October 3. Notably, few senior IRGC officers attended the Friday prayers.[45]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-4-2024

It was a rich target area.

Iran Update, October 6, 2024

Iran appears to be preparing for an Israeli retaliation amid reports that Israel may strike sensitive Iranian sites, such as energy and nuclear infrastructure.

The Iranian State Civil Aviation Organization canceled all civilian flights in Iran from 2100 local time on October 6 to 0600 local time on October 7.[15] These times equate to 1400-2300 ET on October 6.

The Iranian National Tanker Company has vacated empty oil tankers from the main Iranian oil export terminal on Kharg Island.[16] Many vessels that had been docked at Bandar Abbas have left as well.[17]

Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad met with IRGC Navy officers in Bushehr City to discuss the security of the South Pars gas field, which is the largest Iranian gas field.[18] Paknejad also visited Kharg Island.[19]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-6-2024

Iran Update, October 7, 2024

Senior Iranian officials have continued insisting that Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani is alive but have not yet provided evidence.[18] Western and Middle Eastern outlets have suggested that Israel killed or injured Ghaani in an airstrike on Beirut on October 4. IRGC Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Eraj Masjedi said on October 4 that Ghaani is “in good health.”[19] The host of a Palestinian conference in Tehran similarly read a message that was purportedly written by Ghaani on October 7.[20] Anonymous Israeli military sources told Israeli media that Ghaani was not the target of the IDF airstrike on Beirut and that the IDF was unaware of whether Ghaani was at the location of the airstrike.[21]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei awarded the Fath (victory) medal to IRGC Aerospace Commander Brigadier General Ali Hajji Zadeh on October 6.[99] Khamenei gave Hajji Zadeh the medal for his role in the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1.[100] Notable attendees of the ceremony included Artesh Commander Major General Abol Rahim Mousavi and IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami.[101] IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani was notably absent.[102]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-7-2024

Iran Update, October 9, 2024

Some Iranian hardliners are indirectly lobbying Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revoke his fatwa that prohibits the production and use of nuclear weapons. Thirty-nine parliamentarians wrote a letter to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) calling for the revision of Iranian “defense doctrine” and for the SNSC to “issue permission and provide facilities for the production of nuclear weapons.”[14] The SNSC lacks the authority to unilaterally override Khamenei’s fatwa, which the parliamentarians almost certainly realize. But the SNSC can recommend to Khamenei that he revoke his fatwa, which is likely the effect that the parliamentarians are trying to generate. One of the signatories is Mohammad Reza Sabaghian Bafghi, who has previously supported Iran producing a nuclear weapon.[15] Another signatory is Hassan Ali Akhlaghi Amiri, who is affiliated with ultraconservative the Paydari Front.[16] One of the most prominent leaders of the Paydari Front is Saeed Jalili, who is one of Khamenei’s representatives to the SNSC. Amiri told Iranian media that the names of the other signatories will be disclosed when the letter is published.[17] This letter is consistent with reports that senior Iranian officials have been debating in recent months whether to build a nuclear weapon.[18] That the parliamentarians who drafted and signed the letter felt comfortable doing so reflects the extent to which suggesting that Khamenei should revoke his fatwa has become normalized in regime discourse. These parliamentarians would have jeopardized their political careers if the drafting and signing of the letter angered Khamenei. That these parliamentarians did so suggests that they did not perceive this risk and that Khamenei may be receptive to their lobbying.

An Iranian outlet affiliated with former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei claimed on October 8 that Russia provided Iran with an S-400 air defense system and a squadron of Su-35 fighter jets but provided no evidence for this claim.[19] No other Iranian or Western media outlet has reported this news at the time of this writing, and CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. Iran has long sought to acquire advanced air defense systems and Su-35s from Russia, and CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia could supply Iran with advanced military equipment in return for Iran's ongoing support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[20]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-9-2024

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