Look at the video. Those are supply trucks, which are currently being bombed all over Ukraine screwing up Russian logistics. Those are not "guarding" the nuclear power plant. They are being guarded BY the plant.
Look at the video. Those are supply trucks, which are currently being bombed all over Ukraine screwing up Russian logistics. Those are not "guarding" the nuclear power plant. They are being guarded BY the plant.
Your post cited "Russian military vehicles parked right inside one of the reactor buildings." The video was not posted on FR but I went to HotAir and viewed the associated video of military trucks inside one of the reactor buildings, a turbine hall.
In the name of Chernobyl, we should all hope that not even Ukraine is insane enough to shell a reactor building, or an ancilliary site building, in the hopes of blowing up one or more military trucks parked inside.
I am unsure what point you are attempting to make by alleging they are supply trucks. The people guarding the site surely did not hump it all the way with just a rucksack. They came with supplies, or supplies necessarily followed. The enclosed trucks could carry men, supplies, or men and supplies.
There is no indication that the trucks carried supplies for the nuclear facility. Equally, there is no indication that the trucks carried artillery shells. The plant blowing up or melting down redounds to the advantage of Ukraine. It would stop that whole Russian front in its tracks. They would be too busy containing another Chernobyl to continue their devastation of the Ukraine forces. Also, troop deployment is difficult when the environment glows in the dark. Clearly, miles and miles of nuclear Ukraine would not serve a Russian purpose.
There is no rifle that is going to shoot and reach the lines of battle. Any fire for offensive effect leaving the plant would have to come from artillery to reach the Ukraine lines. A video of Russian artillery at the nuclear site would be significant. A video of trucks parked inside is not.
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750071
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces
Article 56 -- Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
2. The special protection against attack provided by paragraph 1 shall cease:
(a) for a dam or a dyke only if it is used for other than its normal function and in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support;
(b) for a nuclear electrical generating station only if it provides electric power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support;
(c) for other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations only if they are used in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support.
3. In all cases, the civilian population and individual civilians shall remain entitled to all the protection accorded them by international law, including the protection of the precautionary measures provided for in Article 57. If the protection ceases and any of the works, installations or military objectives mentioned in paragraph 1 is attacked, all practical precautions shall be taken to avoid the release of the dangerous forces.
4. It is prohibited to make any of the works, installations or military objectives mentioned in paragraph 1 the object of reprisals.
5. The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to avoid locating any military objectives in the vicinity of the works or installations mentioned in paragraph 1. Nevertheless, installations erected for the sole purpose of defending the protected works or installations from attack are permissible and shall not themselves be made the object of attack, provided that they are not used in hostilities except for defensive actions necessary to respond to attacks against the protected works or installations and that their armament is limited to weapons capable only of repelling hostile action against the protected works or installations.
6. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict are urged to conclude further agreements among themselves to provide additional protection for objects containing dangerous forces.
7. In order to facilitate the identification of the objects protected by this article, the Parties to the conflict may mark them with a special sign consisting of a group of three bright orange circles placed on the same axis, as specified in Article 16 of Annex I to this Protocol [Article 17 of Amended Annex]. The absence of such marking in no way relieves any Party to the conflict of its obligations under this Article.
If the Russians are using an ancillary building for the purposes of defending the site from intruders, be they Ukraine military or just a curious local public, parked trucks do not make it a legitimate military object for an artillery attack.