Thanks for tte very well considered breakdown.
One point I’d contest:
“I’ve never denied that Putin is a Russian nationalist, but if revanchism were a high priority for him, it was not in evidence prior to 2014.”
I wouldn’t.
As Zhirinovsky himself said repeatedly - and Dugin also said - Putin was playing a long fame. They both agreed that revanchism was as much a part of Putin’s motives as it was theirs, but thought Putin was being too slow. Despite him having already rolled Chechnya and Georgia over, ensured Belarus’ compliance, and getting access to the Wagner private army so military operations could be performed with plausible deniability.
I think things would’ve been far more obvious butnfor one thing: Euromaidan queered the pitch.
If Ukraine hadn’t protested the abandonment of the European Union FTA, Yanukovych’s deal would’ve gone unchallenged; that deal was designed to crash Ukraine’s economy in six months; and Russia would have flown in to the rescue.
Which would’ve made Ukraine the fourth former Soviet Socialist Republic to end up back inside the Russian polar orbit in less than 20 years. No NATO expansion in that area. Land bridge to Transnistia. Unimpeded access to Ukraine’s mineral, agricultural and coastal assets.
Full leverage.
I agree that the Russians are playing a long game, but in my view that long game is by far more oriented toward economics and multipolarity than any interest in additional territory becoming part of the Russian Federation. My belief is that Russia would like to stop with the Donbass and the south to Transnistria. Those are the largely ethnic Russian areas and are viewed as easy to hold. Absent the West raising the bar of Russian security concerns, they don’t want to be responsible for the rest of Ukraine - the areas that voted heavily for Tymoshenko. The Russians will, however, insist that it is neutral and largely demilitarized. Trying to absorb that part of the Ukraine would be, for the Russians, like swallowing a porcupine. As for the Ukrainian rump state that is likely to emerge, it will be interesting to see what the Poles do. Nobody seems to be paying much attention to Zelensky’s agreement with the Poles that appears to be something on the order of a backdoor merger. My view is that the Poles see what is inevitable in the east and south and are positioning themselves to reclaim Galicia as, perhaps, some sort of protectorate. We shall see.
We disagree on the extent of Russia’s territorial ambitions, but I have acknowledge those could change, especially if Finland and Sweden join NATO. The main thing is to avoid WW III and to set our own houses right. As for the US, as strange as it may seem to you, I think there’s a chance that it will cease to exist in its current geographical form within 20 years. This country is profoundly divided. Our domestic, and especially our fiscal and monetary, policies have been mostly odious since the 60s, and the same can be said for our foreign policy since at least the end of the Gulf War. The consequences of those bad policies are an important, but not the only, driver of the centrifugal forces causing things to unravel here. I have little idea what Europe can do practically to change course, but I hope the healthy, sane part of the people find a way.