Posted on 05/17/2022 1:13:30 PM PDT by SoConPubbie
Can Ukraine Really Defeat Russia? – Over the past few days, a flurry of senior leaders in both Ukraine and Washington have issued defiant claims of not merely resisting Russian aggression, but pushing towards outright victory. While such aspirations are entirely understandable, it is unwise to set policy seeking a preferred outcome if there does not exist a rational path by which Ukraine could accomplish that objective. At present, most indicators, fundamentals of war, and current battlefield trendlines support the prospect of a Ukrainian defeat.
At a speech on Monday on Ukraine’s “Victory Day,” commemorating the World War II defeat of Nazi Germany, President Volodymyr Zelensky categorically declared that just as Ukraine defeated its enemy in 1945, “we have no doubt that we will win” the war against Russia. Zelensky’s foreign minister went a step further, adding that Kyiv wasn’t merely seeking to win the Battle of Donbas, but defined “victory for us in this war will be the liberation of” all Ukrainian territories. There has been no shortage of Western voices supporting this idea – and in one case, escalating the war.
And that’s not all. In an address to the Ukrainian parliament last week, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that Ukraine’s war with Russia was a straightforward case of “good versus evil,” and that “Ukraine will win; Ukraine will be free.” On Saturday, Rep. Seth Moulton said the United States should not merely help Ukraine defend itself, but openly declared the U.S. was “fundamentally at war” with Russia, via proxy, and “its important that we win.” One would think that all these increasingly optimistic statements were borne out of tangible evidence that Russia is losing. Instead, nearly the opposite is happening.
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines believes Putin “is preparing for a prolonged conflict in Ukraine” and still has aspirations beyond the Battle of Donbas. Haines said he thought the Russian leader was “likely” to order some level of a national mobilization to support such goals. Evidence on the ground supports such a likelihood and helps explain why Putin is likely to make that move.
After the well-chronicled disaster of Putin’s opening round of attacks in late February and early March, the Russian military has made a number of effective moves to reorient their efforts, correct tactical and operational deficiencies, and press towards attainable military objectives. Over the past month-plus, Russia has translated those changes into methodical, if slow, battlefield success.
In mid-April, Russia captured the critical transportation hub of Izyum near the northern shoulder of the Donbas lines. Just days ago, after nearly a two-month battle, Putin’s troops captured another key city in northern Donbas that controls several essential road junctions in Popasnaya. Kremlin forces have now pushed deeper into Severdonetsk, putting Ukrainian troops at risk at Lysychansk, just to the southwest of Severdonetsk.
Russia appears to be using tactics that mimic what worked for them in Mariupol: surrounding a city with ground troops, cutting off Ukrainian forces’ ability to get reinforcements (or food, water, and fuel), then relentlessly pounding Ukrainian positions with artillery, rocket fire, and airstrikes, progressively shrinking the ring around the city.
Eventually, Russian troops move in with infantry and armor to strike the defenders when they are at their weakest, capturing the city. The pattern has proven effective and is presently being reprised in numerous Ukrainian strongholds in the Donbas. Russia’s strategy in the Donbas is coming into sharper relief with the capture of each major town, and it doesn’t bode well for Kyiv.
There is a pocket-forming around the Ukrainian troops in the northern shoulder of the Donbas. Russia is seeking to surround the UAF troops in this pocket by saturating key Ukrainian strongholds with heavy bombardment, attempting to peel off more cities on the outside of the pocket, progressively forcing UAF defenders either further west – or trapping them in the pocket and then destroying them by fire and later ground troops.
After taking Izyum, Popasnaya, and moving on Severdonetsk, Russia is now heavily investing Lysychansk, Kramatorsk, and Slaviansk, each a city of 100,000 or more. There are tens of thousands of Ukraine’s best, most experienced troops manning the frontlines in the Donbas. If Russia successfully takes enough cities there, cutting the UAF troops off, they can reprise their bloody tactics used to destroy Mariupol.
Russia will seek to surround the defenders on the northern shoulder of the Donbas and slowly starve them of supplies while mercilessly pounding them with heavy weapons. If the northern shoulder is taken by Russia, the remainder of the UAF positions in the central and southern parts of the Donbas –already under relentless Russian fire – could become untenable.
Whether Putin has enough troops, ammunition, and time to complete the destruction of the UAF positions in the Donbas without mobilizing some portion of its reserve forces is an open question. What is clear, however, is that Russia’s current operations are slowly strangling Ukrainian troops in the Donbas and that despite optimistic rhetoric out of Kyiv and Western capitals, the battle is trending towards a Russian tactical success, possibly within two months.
Militarily speaking, there is very little hope that even all the promised support of heavy weapons and ammunition from the West can be delivered to the front, the Ukrainian troops adequately trained, and firepower brought to bear in time to change the course.
There is always the possibility that Russia may run out of steam before completing the encirclement, that Ukraine is able to drag the battle out beyond two months, and that a stalemate could be won by Kyiv. But that falls more in the category of “hope” and is a poor foundation for basing expectations. By ignoring these battlefield realities, the West is setting the stage for potentially compounding its problems.
Ukraine’s and Western leaders continue making statements that lead their publics to believe that things are getting better, that the war is trending in their favor, and that soon the Western-promised heavy weapons will stop the Russian advance. That remains at best a distant prospect. Basing policy on the expectation of that unlikely (but highly preferred) outcome rather than the realistic possibility that Russia could take the Donbas is unwise and dangerous. Consider the ramifications of this unwillingness to face hard truths.
With @CNN‘s @biannagolodryga & @jillrussia examining latest in #RussiaUkraineWar developments, Mariupol & Azovstal situation + US intel help to Kyiv. @defpriorities https://t.co/SOS13z3R90
— Daniel L. Davis (@DanielLDavis1) May 6, 2022
By continuing to seek a military victory in Ukraine, Ukraine’s troops will continue fighting, no negotiated settlement will be realistically sought, and most likely Russian troops continue making progress. As a result, more Ukrainian civilians and troops will continue to be killed and wounded, more cities destroyed, and the economic and food crises – for both Ukraine and the world – will worsen. The most likely outcome will not change (a negotiated settlement, not a Ukrainian military victory), but the cost to Kyiv will be much, much worse.
For the United States and the West, every day this war continues, the risk continues that through someone’s miscalculation, some accident, or just a foolish act by one side or the other results in a direct clash between Russia and NATO, trigging an Article 5 situation that could drag the United States into a war with a nuclear superpower. However altruistic it may be to want to help Ukraine defend itself from this Russian invasion, there is nothing at stake in Eastern Europe that is worth getting drawn into a potential nuclear war with Russia; a war from which we may not survive.
Service members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces fire a Javelin anti-tank missile during drills at a training ground in an unknown location in Ukraine, in this handout picture released February 18, 2022. Ukrainian Joint Forces Operation Press Service/Handout via REUTERS
Gambling that current battlefield trends don’t hold, hoping that Ukraine can hold on in the Donbas, and believing that UAF will eventually drive Russia back to its country, do the people of Ukraine a disservice. Even if it works out that way – an improbable prospect – it would take years to accomplish and result in such a staggering loss of Ukrainian life that it would be a pyrrhic victory. The better course is to engage in negotiations to do whatever it takes to end the fighting, end the killing of Ukrainian people, and hasten the day when rebuilding can start. However, continuing to base policies on pride and hope will almost certainly cause thousands more preventable deaths in Ukraine.
Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Daniel L. Davis is a Senior Fellow for Defense Priorities and a former Lt. Col. in the U.S. Army who deployed into combat zones four times. He is the author of “The Eleventh Hour in 2020 America.” Follow him @DanielLDavis1.
That’s not fix-a-flat, that’s Baby Formula.
In that case I doubt that very much at this point. They aren’t going to get back Crimea (who really doesn’t want to be apart of Ukraine anyways). It’s gone folks.
Crimea was stolen at the point of a sword. 2 decades after they secure military decision, they will have a referendum & the Ukes will win, all monitored by UN vote fraud monitors.
If the Russians were so secure the Crimeans wanted their help then why didn’t they just organize a referendum? Because the Russians were after the oil/gas/warmports/grain/resources, that’s why. It’s a straightforward war of conquest.
LOL! Guarantee if Ukraine wins, we'll be rebuilding it.
Do you think the Uniparty is going to turn down the opportunities for graft and kickbacks that hundreds of billions of dollars in U.S. government contracts will provide?
Do you deny that Ukraine was simply INVADED?
Do they have a plan to take Moscow?
The Blue Empire and the “Keev” people are high on their own supply.
Yes. It’s not so simple. I know Americans love things black and white, good vs. evil, especially in dealing with countries they know little about. The war in Ukraine did not start in February. It started in 2014, and our hands are very dirty.
Russia kicked back to the borders they signed assurance for in 1994, in exchange for the Ukes not using the opportunity to go severely nuclear.
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelarus agreed to forego nukes, and to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear nations, as a pre-condition of acquiring recognition of sovereign statehood. That was in 1992, two years before the Budapest Memorandum.
https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/27389.pdf
The Lisbon Protocol (1992)
ARTICLE IThe Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the Treaty, shall assume the obligations of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty.
ARTICLE II
The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall make such arrangements among themselves as are required to implement the Treaty's limits and restrictions; to allow functioning of the verification provisions of the Treaty equally and consistently throughout the territory of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine; and to allocate costs.
ARTICLE III
1. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the phrase, "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" shall be interpreted to mean the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.
2. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the phrase, "national territory," when used in the Treaty to refer to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall be interpreted to mean the combined national territories of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.
3. For inspections and continuous monitoring activities on the territory of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine, that state shall provide communications from the inspection site or continuous monitoring site to the Embassy of the United States in the respective capital.
4. For purposes of Treaty implementation, the embassy of the Inspecting Party referred to in Section XVI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms shall be construed to be the embassy of the respective state in Washington or the embassy of the United States of America in the respective capital.
5. The working languages for Treaty activities shall be English and Russian.
ARTICLE IV
Representatives of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine will participate in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on a basis to be worked out consistent with Article I of this Protocol.
ARTICLE V
The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine shall adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 as non-nuclear weapon states Parties in the shortest possible time, and shall begin immediately to take all necessary action to this end in accordance with their constitutional practices.
ARTICLE VI
1. Each Party shall ratify the Treaty together with this Protocol in accordance with its own constitutional procedures. The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall exchange instruments of ratification with the United States of America. The Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the final exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Protocol shall be an integral part of the Treaty and shall remain in force throughout the duration of the Treaty.
Done at Lisbon on May 23, 1992, in five copies, each in the Byelarusian, English, Kazakh, Russian, and Ukrainian languages, all texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF BYELARUS:
P. KravchankaFOR THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN:
T. ZhukeyevFOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
A. KozyrevFOR UKRAINE:
A. ZlenkoFOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
James A. Baker, III
The Breach: Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity and the Budapest Memorandum
In May 1992, the US, Russia, Ukraine, as well as Kazakhstan and Belarus, which also inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, signed a protocol making the latter three countries parties to START I. However, lest the accession to START I be interpreted as a commitment to reduce rather than eliminate nuclear arsenals, Article 5 of what became known as the Lisbon Protocol committed the non-Russian republics to accede to the NPT as nonnuclear weapons states (NNWS) “in the shortest possible time.”1010 Annex to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of July 31, 1991, Signed by the USA, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in Lisbon on May 24, 1992, 1992; reprinted in Victor Batiouk, Ukraine’s Non-Nuclear Option (New York: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 1992)
- - - - - - - - - -
https://www.armscontrol.org/node/3289
Basic Timeline and Provisions:July 31, 1991: The United States and the Soviet Union sign START.
Dec. 31, 1991: The Soviet Union officially dissolves, delaying entry into force of START.
May 23, 1992: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the United States sign the Lisbon Protocol.
• Under the protocol, all five states become parties to START.
• Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine promise to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states “in the shortest possible time.”
July 2, 1992: Kazakhstan ratifies START.
Oct. 1, 1992: The U.S. Senate votes to give its advice and consent to ratification of START.
Nov. 4, 1992: The Russian State Duma refuses to exchange START instruments of ratification until Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan accede to the NPT.
Feb. 4, 1993: Belarus ratifies START.
July 22, 1993: Belarus submits its instrument of accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state.
January 14, 1994: The Trilateral Statement is signed by U.S. President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk. It allows Ukraine to observe the transfer of weapons from its territory to Russia and the dismantlement of certain systems. It also commits Russia to send some of the uranium extracted from the returned warheads back to Ukraine for fuel.
Feb. 3, 1994: Ukraine ratifies START, rescinding conditions for ratification that it had issued in November 1993.
Feb. 14, 1994: Kazakhstan submits its instrument of accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state.
Dec. 5, 1994: Ukraine submits its instrument of accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.
• The five START parties exchange instruments of ratification for START, which enters into force.
April 24, 1995: Kazakhstan transfers its last strategic weapon to Russia.
And until Ukraine surrenders, they will keep losing men they can’t replace.
Ignore: It’s not so simple. I know Americans love things black and white, good vs. evil, especially in dealing with countries they know little about. The war in Ukraine did not start in February. It started in 2014, and our hands are very dirty.
Guarantee if Ukraine wins, we’ll be rebuilding it.
***We should implement my emBASEee strategee.
One of Trump’s expressions that made me think he would be different was when he said stuff like “Bomb the shiite out of them and take their oil to pay for it.”
If we send in American boots on the ground, we damned well better be negotiating American Land as the thing to fight for. Big, sweeping American EmBASEees along the border between Russia and Ukraine. A Lend Lease project. Americans fighting for American land. For generations we could use that land to build airports and fight terrorism in that region. I would call it the BBudapest AAgreement LLend LLease program because it would take BALLs.
from my home page
I have been advocating for several years a policy I call ‘embaseees’. Embassy + AirBase —> EmBASEeees. We go into a terrorist country, clear out their taliban equivalent, then withdraw to very large Embassies, perhaps 3 of them. Have them big enough to encompass a military airbase where we can use it for decades on end to conduct anti-terrorism operations. As long as the ‘host’ country aint killing Americans then we let them have self-sovereignty. Kind of like how we operated in the Phillipines for decades. We could even have an intermediate zone that we patrol but it would be autonomous. Let them have their taste of freedom. A referendum every 10 years to see how large the boundaries of the intermediate autonomous zone should be.
https://freerepublic.com/focus/f-bloggers/4043681/posts
_________________________________________________________
troll on troll interaction
I find it disgusting that your side can just post LOL towards the death & destruction of civilians that this obvious tyrant invader is delivering.
You make me sick.
Educate yourself and stop commenting like a jingoistic neocon d-bag: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/warm-water-port.htm
A 10-mile bridge over the Kerch Strait from Russia to their base on the Crimean peninsula is too vulnerable.
Kevmo, you are getting wrapped around the axle.
You’re were acting like a troll long ago and I have been treating you likewise.
ONCE AGAIN, WHERE DID RUSSIA STATE THAT WAS THEIR MAIN GOAL?
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.