This goes beyond force ratio results. Something or perhaps several things have managed to reduce incentive to win, the value of cohesiveness and teamwork, the importance of communication between all levels of their military.
The ongoing need to maintain, update or replace certain equipment within a reasonable time period.
All very large national military forces have much the same basic needs. A big annual budget does not mean the money will go everywhere it’s most needed. Cronyism, competitive attitudes against other departments, grudge holding and plain old stubborness are always part of the picture.
And in the russian case, have you seen the fuel, docking fees, maintenance and crew payroll bills for a 120-meter yacht lately?!? That money has to come from somewhere...
Will.
Adventurism beyond your borders vs. defending the homeland. Russians are good at homeland defense, not so good projecting power outside their borders.
Add another critical factor which most analysts omit: theft
Theft is the standard way Orc society and, in this case, its military operates and has operated for over 500 years.
Orcs were assumed to have 13-14,000 working tanks, when in reality they could only scrape together ~2,500. The rest are rusting hulks with parts missing, including engines and are not repairable. Maintenance funds, upgrade funds and troop mess were stolen by the command staffs. Paper work was submitted attesting to work or equipment installation that was never done.
Orc vast supply of precision missiles existed only on paper, and are now reduced to using very expensive anti-ship missile on stationary targets.
You get the idea.
Force ratio doctrine includes the use of force multiplier. 3 to 1 is straight up engagement. There are other considerations for multipliers. Defending home turf is one, restricted maneuverability is another, along with limited supply lines. These three worked in Ukraine’s favor.
Further, Russia counted on air superiority but did not archive that multiplier. Same is true for “shock and awe”.
In short, Russia believed it’s own propaganda. Also the doctrine remains viable, but you have to count all factors in your evaluation.
From the time Russia started its invasion, I knew they were in trouble.
Russia had about 170,000 soldiers on the border at the start. That was not nearly enough. Their big problem was you need about nine support troops for every combat arms soldier.
There is an old, but correct maxim is, “Combat arms win battles, but logistical win wars.”
That was the downfall of Napoleon when he invaded Russia, and when Hitler invaded Russia. The logistical trains just could not keep.. the front lines supplied.