During the development and design of the T-72, the chief of the Soviet Defense Ministry in 1976, Dmitriy Ustinov said that the T-72 represented a “step backward in Soviet tank development” and put a cap on production and development of the T-72 in favor of deploying the more modern T-64 and T-80 tanks with improved fire control and protective measures for units facing NATO in Germany. The T-72 would be envisioned for utilization by second line units and for export sales.
The soviets were well aware of the problems with the T-72 after the 1982 Lebanon War. The Syrians provided the Soviets with captured Israeli tanks and M111 APFSDS ammo fired from M48A5 tanks. The shocking test results led them to initiate a crash program to refit the T-72 with applique armor and other defensive innovations as a stop gap measure.
These “improvements,” their success with export sales, along with the cheaper cost of the T-72 caused the Soviets and later the Russian Federation to keep in in place and to elevate it to the status of a main line battle tank, having lulled themselves into a complacent sense of security by dint of these “modernizations.”
The Russkis have never considered ergonomic comfort, nor the survivability of their AFV crews as a prime consideration in their designs until the T-14. They have always seemed to rely on mass and brute force steam roller tactics to overwhelm their enemies.
Thank you. Didn’t Ustinov get over-ruled on the T-64/T-72 decision? Nearly 40 year old memories of GSFG order of battle are of a decision to split the T-64s and T-72s assigned to the Soviet forces, with the 64s going to Soviet units in Czechoslovakia, while the 72s went to 3 of the 4 armies in GSFG. The 4th had 64s. My memory may be a bit off on that though. Except I’m positive that the 8th Guards Tank Army had T-72s as it sat across the IZB from V Corps. And the East German MRD we expected to do the initial attack had a mix of T-55s & T-62s. Prost!