Posted on 03/28/2022 7:43:56 PM PDT by delta7
Screw YOU, you walking piece of excrement.
I hope we can all feel the love on this thread! It's amazing!
meanwhile our country is being destroyed by communists...
When you're right, you're right! I admit to having had a few insults thrown at me in the past, because I tend to interpret the Constitution literally (and you'd be surprised how many 'conservatives' that offends ;>). Lately it's gotten a lot worse, because I don't think the US has either treaty obligations or vital interests in Ukraine, and therefore think risking nuclear war over Ukrainian security is unjustified. But getting insulted constantly, many dozens of times by a single poster, as happened on THIS thread, is definitely a new experience!
No wonder the forum has a hard time raising funds and staying in operation...
ESAD.
Yep...every soldier on the ground first of all wants to survive it all regardless which side they’re representing. And frankly will do what they have to do to stay alive. And that envolves a host of mental and physical manuvers as well as sustaining ammo and armament etc. etc. etc.
That said - Ukraine is full of all sorts of foreign fighters and off handed people on the ground. Just trying to keep track of which is an enemy and or friend is rough to say the least.
I’ve lost family members in war - my dad and an Uncle so I do know the cost as well.
“Barry Kellman, a professor of law and director of the International Weapons Control Center at DePaul Universityâs College of Law, told Radio Free Europe in 2014 that, âIt is binding in international law, but that doesnât mean it has any means of enforcement.â
He added that there are numerous other treaties that oblige Russia to respect Ukraineâs territorial integrity, including the U.N. Charter and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) treaty.
Evil Putin mocked international law when Harvard University Research Associate Mariana Budjeryn when Russia âgliblyâ violated the agreement, and did not even attend a meeting of the signatories held in Paris after Russiaâs annexation of Crimea in 2014.
She added that some Ukrainians did express regret for giving up their nuclear weapons:
There certainly is a good measure of regret, and some of it is poorly informed. It would have cost Ukraine quite a bit, both economically and in terms of international political repercussions, to hold on to these arms. So it would not have been an easy decision.
But in the public sphere these more simple narratives take hold. The narrative in Ukraine, publicly is: We had the worldâs third-largest nuclear arsenal, we gave it up for this signed piece of paper, and look what happened.
And it really doesnât look good for the international non-proliferation regime. Because if you have a country that disarms and then becomes a target of such a threat and a victim of such a threat at the hands of a nuclear-armed country, it just sends a really wrong signal to other countries that might want to pursue nuclear weapons.
It is indeed correct that Ukraine held nuclear arms after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and then gave them up in exchange for security assurances â assurances that were violated later.”
LOL!
Yeah, it gets pretty heated. Sometimes downright nasty.
My litmus test for US involvement is using the Powell Doctrine to evaluate:
1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?
3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
4. Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted?
5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
7. Is the action supported by the American people?
One poster a couple? of days ago would not even consider the questions because he considered Powell a âfailureâ. Thatâs an easy way to evade answering the questions but thatâs the way some folks are.
Both are evil. Only one of them invaded the other’s country. That tips the scales.
DILLIGAS đ
cool.
âweaselâ, âappeasersâ, âpantywaist panzie appeasersâ, âpantywaistâ, âtrollâ, âpantywaist appeaserâ, âpukes like youâ, âputinista$$kissingâ, â@$$#0lic trollâ, âtrolling bullshiiteâ, âpantywaist puttzesâ, âp^ssy-level pantywaist appeasementâ, âtrollingâ, âRussian Trollâ, âreal @$$#0/eâ, âpantywaist appeasing pansiesâ, âcockroachâ, âgeniusâ, âdog-vomitâ, âdespicable trollâ
With regards to Ukraine, I concluded that the situation failed to justify US intervention because 1) the US was not obligated by treaty to come to Ukraine's defense, and 2) the US has no vital interests in Ukraine (not at all surprising, since the area formed a large part of our primary Cold War adversary until fairly recently).
I have noticed that large numbers of people are giving greater priority to a third factor; specifically 3) do I personally feel that it's right to send the US military into combat and risk nuclear war? An amazing number seem to answer "yes", apparently because they have not actually thought about the matter, and are reacting primarily to emotional/non-rational input: for example, the perceived public popularity of the pro-war position, or unrealistic expectations based on other recent conflicts, or misplaced confidence in the ability to predict future events.
The Powell Doctrine looks like a great approach that could help some people make the transition from gut-level, emotion-based decision making, to a thoughtful process that produces more rational and more realistic (smarter & wiser ;>) results.
(Thank you! ;>)
And another Soros troll.
I had a long thread conversation with the Brazilian on utube, and he talked about how much Brazil would lose if Biden would be president. He said the Green Deal would ruin Brazil’s exports, and have them “go into the arms of the Chinese’.
He also talked about the same sort of welfare system ruining them like the U.S.
[Kevmo #64] The Budapest Agreement provides âassurancesâ of borders and sovereignty. The Ukes HONORED the agreement by giving up their nukes; the Rukes VIOLATED it by invading, twice; and due to pantywaist panzie appeasers like you, the US is busy looking for ways to ABROGATE their responsibility.
The Budepest Memorandum only promises consideration at the United Nations Security Council. You ignore the Minsk I Protocol and Minsk II agreement.
Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraineâs accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Budapest, 5 December 1994.
Certificate of registration of the Memorandum on security assurances with the United Nations Secretariat, 2 October 2014. (by Ukraine)
The Budapest Memorandum on security assurances never provided a promise of military assistance. It is clear from the actual text and parties have acted accordingly.
No. 52241
____Ukraine, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America
Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraineâs accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Budapest, 5 December 1994.
Entry into force: 5 December 1994 by signature
Authentic texts: English, Russian and Ukranian
Registration with the Secretariat of the United Nations: Ukraine, 2 October 2014
Pursuant to the Budapest Memorandum on security assurances, they had a commitment that their situation would be brought before the UN Security Council.
4. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the NonÂProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
They are entitled to UN Security Council consideration. There is no obligation for anybody to send troops and start WW3 to save them.
Volodymyr Vasylenko, Ukraineâs former representative at NATO, who took part in drawing up the conceptual principles and specific provisions of the Budapest memorandum:
âthe form and content of the Memorandum ... show that, unfortunately, the Budapest talks on giving Ukraine security guarantees did not eventually result in a comprehensive international agreement that creates an adequate special international mechanism to protect our national security.â
According to V. Vasylenko, âUkraine had to give up nuclear weapons for it to become sovereign state and its independent status to be recognized all over the world.â
Ukraine's forgotten security guarantee: The Budapest Memorandum
DW News [German]
Date 05.12.2014
[Excerpts]
Twenty years ago, the Budapest Memorandum marked the end of many years of negotiations between the successor states of the Soviet Union and leading Western nuclear powers. Ukraine had a special place in the talks.After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the eastern European country inherited 176 strategic and more than 2,500 tactical nuclear missiles. Ukraine at that point had the third-largest arsenal of nuclear weapons in the world after the United States and Russia.
But Leonid Kravchuk, then the president of Ukraine, told DW that was only formally the case. De facto, Kyiv was powerless.
"All the control systems were in Russia. The so-called black suitcase with the start button, that was with Russian president Boris Yeltsin."
Western pressure
Ukraine could have kept the nuclear weapons, but the price would have been enormous, Kravchuk says. Though the carrier rockets were manufactured in the southern Ukrainian city of Dnipropetrovsk, the nuclear warheads were not. It would have been too expensive for Ukraine to manufacture and maintain them on its own.
"It would have cost us $65 billion (53 billion euros), and the state coffers were empty," Kravchuk said.
Additionally, the West threatened Ukraine with isolation since the missiles were supposedly aimed at the United States. Therefore, "the only possible decision" was to give up the weapons, according to Kravchuk.
[...]
"Nowhere does it say that if a country violates this memorandum, that the others will attack militarily," said Gerhard Simon, Eastern Europe expert at the University of Cologne.
German journalist and Ukraine expert Winfried Schneider-Deters agrees, telling DW, "The agreement is not worth the paper on which it was written."
Cyber-Security: The Threats from Russia and the Middle East, Ferry de Kerckove, CGAI Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, (2019), at 2-3: (footnotes omitted)
On the latter point, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances (not âguaranteesâ), although considered an important landmark, had a single purpose: to convince Ukraine to abandon its nuclear weapons in exchange for a commitment by the signatories to provide it with support: â1. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE [Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Final Act, to respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.â The memorandum, although formally signed, is not a treaty. Indeed, âAlthough signatories âreaffirm their commitmentâ to Ukraine in many passages, the memorandum requires them to do almost nothing concrete, in the event that Ukraineâs sovereignty â territorial or political â is violated. There arenât any hard enforcement mechanisms.â Ukraine is the subject of the memorandum, rather than a full participant. Furthermore, according to Volodymyr Vasylenko, Ukraineâs former representative at NATO, who took part in drawing up the conceptual principles and specific provisions of the Budapest memorandum, âthe form and content of the Memorandum ... show that, unfortunately, the Budapest talks on giving Ukraine security guarantees did not eventually result in a comprehensive international agreement that creates an adequate special international mechanism to protect our national security.â
Why care about Ukraine and the Budapest Memorandum
Steven Pifer Thursday, December 5, 2019
Brookings.edu
[excerpt]
Some have argued that, since the United States did not invade Ukraine, it abided by its Budapest Memorandum commitments. True, in a narrow sense. However, when negotiating the security assurances, U.S. officials told their Ukrainian counterparts that, were Russia to violate them, the United States would take a strong interest and respond.Washington did not promise unlimited support. The Budapest Memorandum contains security âassurances,â not âguarantees.â Guarantees would have implied a commitment of American military force, which NATO members have. U.S. officials made clear that was not on offer. Hence, assurances.
Beyond that, U.S. and Ukrainian officials did not discuss in detail how Washington might respond in the event of a Russian violation.
https://comw.org/pda/fulltext/UNSC-Res-2202-Minsk.pdf
The Minsk Agreement of 12 February 2015 (MINSK II) followed the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014 (MINSK I)
MINSK II AGREEMENT, 12 February 2015 (as endorsed at UN Security Council, 17 Feb 2015)
ANNEX IPackage of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements
Minsk, 12 February 2015
1. Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine and its strict implementation as of 15 February 2015, 12 a.m. local time.
2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides by equal distances in order to create a security zone of at least 50 km wide from each other for the artillery systems of calibre of 100 and more, a security zone of 70 km wide for MLRS and 140 km wide for MLRS âTornado-Sâ, Uragan, Smerch and Tactical Missile Systems (Tochka, Tochka U):
â for the Ukrainian troops: from the de facto line of contact;
â for the armed formations from certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine : from the line of contact according to the Minsk Memorandum of Sept. 19th, 2014;
The withdrawal of the heavy weapons as specified above is to start on day 2 of the ceasefire at the latest and be completed within 14 days.
The process shall be facilitated by the OSCE and supported by the Trilateral Contact Group.
3. Ensure effective monitoring and verification of the ceasefire regime and the withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE from day 1 of the withdrawal, using all technical equipment necessary, including satellites, drones, radar equipment, etc.
4. Launch a dialogue, on day 1 of the withdrawal, on modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine âOn interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regionsâ as well as on the future regime of these areas based on this law.
Adopt promptly, by no later than 30 days after the date of signing of this document a Resolution of the Parliament of Ukraine specifying the area enjoying a special regime, under the Law of Ukraine âOn interim self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regionsâ, based on the line of the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.
5. Ensure pardon and amnesty by enacting the law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.
6. Ensure release and exchange of all hostages and unlawfully detained persons, based on the principle âall for allâ. This process is to be finished on the day 5 after the withdrawal at the latest.
7. Ensure safe access, delivery, storage, and distribution of humanitarian assistance to those in need, on the basis of an international mechanism.
8. Definition of modalities of full resumption of socioeconomic ties, including social transfers such as pension payments and other payments (incomes and revenues, timely payments of all utility bills, reinstating taxation within the legal framework of Ukraine).
To this end, Ukraine shall reinstate control of the segment of its banking system in the conflict-affected areas and possibly an international mechanism to facilitate such transfers shall be established.
9. Reinstatement of full control of the state border by the government of Ukraine throughout the conflict area, starting on day 1 after the local elections and ending after the comprehensive political settlement (local elections in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions on the basis of the Law of Ukraine and constitutional reform) to be finalized by the end of 2015, provided that paragraph 11 has been implemented in consultation with and upon agreement by representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group.
10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under monitoring of the OSCE. Disarmament of all illegal groups.
11. Carrying out constitutional reform in Ukraine with a new constitution entering into force by the end of 2015 providing for decentralization as a key element (including a reference to the specificities of certain areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, agreed with the representatives of these areas), as well as adopting permanent legislation on the special status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in line with measures as set out in the footnote until the end of 2015. [Note]
12. Based on the Law of Ukraine âOn interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regionsâ, questions related to local elections will be discussed and agreed upon with representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group. Elections will be held in accordance with relevant OSCE standards and monitored by OSCE/ODIHR.
13. Intensify the work of the Trilateral Contact Group including through the establishment of working groups on the implementation of relevant aspects of the Minsk agreements. They will reflect the composition of the Trilateral Contact Group.
Note
Such measures are, according to the Law on the special order for local selfÂgovernment in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions:
â Exemption from punishment, prosecution and discrimination for persons involved in the events that have taken place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
â Right to linguistic self-determination;
â Participation of organs of local self-government in the appointment of heads of public prosecution offices and courts in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
â Possibility for central governmental authorities to initiate agreements with organs of local self-government regarding the economic, social and cultural development of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
â State supports the social and economic development of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
â Support by central government authorities of cross-border cooperation in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions with districts of the Russian Federation;
â Creation of the people's police units by decision of local councils for the maintenance of public order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions;
â The powers of deputies of local councils and officials, elected at early elections, appointed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by this law, cannot be early terminated.
Participants of the Trilateral Contact Group:
Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini
Second President of Ukraine, L. D. Kuchma
Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine, M. Yu. Zurabov
A.W. Zakharchenko
I.W. Plotnitski
- - - - - - - - - -
ANNEX IIDeclaration of the President of the Russian Federation, the President of Ukraine, the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in support of the âPackage of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreementsâ, adopted on 12 February 2015 in Minsk
The President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, the President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, the President of the French Republic, François Hollande, and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Angela Merkel, reaffirm their full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. They firmly believe that there is no alternative to an exclusively peaceful settlement. They are fully committed to undertake all possible individual and joint measures to this end.
Against this background, leaders endorse the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements adopted and signed on February 12, 2015 by all signatories who also signed Minsk Protocol of September 5, 2014 and Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014. Leaders will contribute to this process and will use their influence on relevant parties to facilitate the implementation of that Package of Measures.
Germany and France will provide technical expertise for the restoration of the segment of the banking system in the conflict affected areas, possibly through the establishment of an international mechanism to facilitate social transfers.
Leaders share the conviction that improved cooperation between the EU, Ukraine and Russia will be conducive to the crisis settlement. To this end, they endorse the continuation of trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine and Russia on energy issues in order to achieve follow-up stages to the gas winter package.
They also support trilateral talks between the EU, Ukraine and Russia in order to achieve practical solutions to concerns raised by Russia with regards to the implementation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and the EU.
Leaders remain committed to the vision of a joint humanitarian and economic space from the Atlantic to the Pacific based upon full respect for international law and the OSCE principles.
Leaders will remain committed to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. To this end, they agree to establish an oversight mechanism in the Normandy format which will convene at regular intervals, in principle on the level of senior officials from the foreign ministries.
MINSK I PROTOCOL (1 September 2014)
The Minsk I Protocol is basically a cease-fire agreement. The conflict was within the territory of Ukraine and was essentially a civil war against the separatist element in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_140905_MinskCeasfire_en.pdf
Original official document in Russian only.
Annex I to the letter dated 24 February 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council[Original: Russian]
Protocol on the outcome of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group on joint steps aimed at the implementation of the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine, P. Poroshenko, and the initiatives of the President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin
Upon consideration and discussion of the proposals put forward by the participants of the consultations in Minsk on 1 September 2014, the Trilateral Contact Group, consisting of representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), reached an understanding with respect to the need to implement the following steps:
1. Ensure the immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons.
2. Ensure monitoring and verification by OSCE of the regime of non-use of weapons.
3. Implement decentralization of power, including by enacting the Law of Ukraine on the interim status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Law on Special Status).
4. Ensure permanent monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian State border and verification by OSCE, along with the establishment of a security area in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
5. Immediately release all hostages and unlawfully detained persons.
6. Enact a law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.
7. Continue an inclusive national dialogue.
8. Adopt measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Donbass.
9. Ensure the holding of early local elections in accordance with the Law of Ukraine on the interim status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Law on Special Status).
10. Remove unlawful military formations and military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries, from the territory of Ukraine.
11. Adopt a programme for the economic revival of Donbass and the resumption of vital activity in the region.
12. Provide personal security guarantees for the participants of the consultations.
Participants of the Trilateral Contact Group:
(Signed) Heidi Tagliavini,
Ambassador(Signed) L. D. Kuchma,
Second President of Ukraine(Signed) M. Y. Zurabov,
Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Ukraine(Signed) A. W. Zakharchenko
(Signed) I. W. Plotnitski
Ahh, isn’t that cute? 2 trolls joining together. Like a troll marriage.
;>)
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