Marked to read.
Some of these reforms are just part of modernizing. Artillery to precison guided rocket artillery for instance.
What I don’t see in the bullets is that the Marines plan to have 3 Marine Littoral Regiments, designed to go in on smaller ships of smaller units of 75-100, and fire anti ship missiles...shoot and then scoot to other areas...The Philippines and other island chains are ripe with areas to do this.
Some of these reductions will be in regard to these new Chinese aimed concepts. Google Marine Littoral Regiments. One is in the development phase now and 2 more are planned.
The problem is that this is being dictated, not debated and staffed. Restructuring an entire service is serious business, you don’t do it until you are damn sure it is doctrinally sound and you have conducted field experiments to validate that.
Loosing cannon artillery for missiles pretty much trades off all close supporting fires for long range fires.
The Army restructured itself for counter-insurgency in 2006 and lost a lot of skills, particularly Artillery, Combat Engineering, and conventional tactical intelligence gathering, which has taking years to re-learn and regain proficiency.
During the New Guinea campaign, General Kenney convinced General MacArthur that his Army Air Force planes could replace the artillery. At Buna, the airplanes couldn’t accurately target Japanese pillboxes that blocked the Army advance. The 32nd Infantry Division smuggled a single howitzer in that was able to effectively hit and destroy the bunkers and broke open the Japanese defense.
This stuff briefs well, but creates big problems that cost Soldiers and Marines lives when it doesn’t work in the field.
They are putting the cart before the horse. Create a single Littoral Regiment, exercise the hell out of it, throw every conceivable Chinese tactic at it and see if this concept works.
Then, after it has been proven, restructure the force.