You think if NATO or The US gets involved, it will just be a liberation if UKraine war? Or be perceived as such by Russia?
How did that work out with Gulf War I?
Unlike the walking vegetable we have in the White House, Putin actually understands what’s going on around him.
Honestly , the only war worth fighting is to take out Russia, not push them out of UKraine only to go back again in 10 or 20 years, no one is willing to do that but if a hot war is to happen involving nato and/or the US, anything short of removing Russia as a military threat to anyone is wasted blood.
There is little doubt in my mind, Russia would not hesitate to use tactical nuclear weapons, if this war expands. They will still eventually lose, but the cost will be insane.
This idiotic world view presented by some here, that Putin is the stumble bum, rather than a ruthless individual.. and somehow the US, that actually has a stumble bum at the helm and even dumber puppet masters around him, won’t make a bigger mess of things is comical.
If this war expands and the US directly or NATO become active participants, Russia will not perceive that as simply looking to push the out of UKraine abs return to the status quo before the invasion. Putin views just the treat of NATO troops possibly being in UKraine by it being a member enough of an existential threat to Russia that he invaded… but if NATO Troops are actually on the ground in UKraine fighting against him he will not view that as an existential threat ?
Failure to see what your opponent sees, whether correct or not, is the surest way to eff everything to hell.. and it is beyond clear that from Putin’s perspective any direct involvement by an outside player NATO or the US will be perceived as an existential threat by him.
If we are going to get involved we better understand, we have to be committed to making removing the entire Russian ability to be a threat has to be the goal, even if the stated intent of that first action is something less, you better be fully prepared for all our wAr, to remove Russia as a viable threat to anyone… because that is exactly how they will respond to any first action.. and at that point you are in it all the way whether you wanted to be or not.
Russia is not Iraq.. Russia is not Afghanistan… Russia has the capacity and resolve to kill millions. Do not think otherwise. They may lose the war in the end, but if you think they are going to show restraint if backed into a corner, you have bought way too much of the bs the MSM has been selling you.
Russia may stay away from ICBMs, but I have no doubt under right circumstances they will not hesitate to target tactical nukes at military and civilian targets
Who the eff suggested NATO was getting involved?
Not me.
I recall gaming out the “2010” policy, as well as what is discussed here, right after 2010, and later in 2018
🇺🇸 Trump was interested in various counter strategies to CIS tactical nuclear first strike. This was actually hot under Bush 43, due to Putin heavily rearming Kaliningrad, and violating aspects of every treaty signed. Then ignored under the real Putin puppet, and the topic of significant time spent by Trump.
*Yes, Putin has doctrinally “green lighted” first strike tactical nukes, and not triggered by “existential threat”.
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/06/23/putins_new_nuclear_doctrine_115405.html
In June 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued an edict on “On the foundations of state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence.”[1] This is a first because the previous versions of this document were classified[2] and previous unclassified Russian written doctrinal pronouncements on nuclear weapons use at the Presidential level were part of longer documents on military doctrine. Notwithstanding the significance of Putin’s new edict, there are major inconsistencies in the new document. Moreover, Putin is making unprecedented (for a doctrinal document) nuclear first use threats while simultaneously denying Russia’s policy provides for such a course of action.
Putin’s decree represents a major, but incomplete, victory for the hardline faction in the Russian military who support the first use of nuclear weapons and want to talk about it in public. Major General (ret) Vladimir Dvorkin commented that the purpose of the edict was to “…force him [President Trump] to agree to the extension of the 2012 New START treaty.”[3] While there is no logical reason nuclear threats should “force” a U.S. President to extend a seriously flawed arms control treaty, the Russian default mode is if Russia does not like what is going on in the world, it resorts to making nuclear threats. Still, while it is unusual for Russia to combine doctrinal statements and nuclear targeting threats, it is not unprecedented. In July 2014, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made a nuclear threat relating to Crimea by referencing Russia’s nuclear doctrine.[4] Ironically, the unclassified 2010 version of the Russian nuclear doctrine (in effect until Putin’s June 2020 decree) would not apparently apply to Crimea since the loss of Crimea, which was not Russian territory to begin with, would hardly destroy the Russian state, which was supposedly the basis of their announced policy. The reason was that Russia’s 2010 pronouncement on nuclear weapons first use, which was presented as a new limitation on first use, was a deception. Even at the time, it was announced (February 2010), Colonel General Sergei Ivanov, then-Deputy Prime Minister and formerly Defense Minister, said, “In terms of hypothetical use of nuclear weapons by Russia, the new Military Doctrine does not differ from the one that was signed in 2000.”[5] Indeed, in February 2015, Ilya Kramnik, the long-time military correspondent for an official Russian news agency RIA Novosti, wrote that the 2010 revision of Russia’s military doctrine “further lowered” the threshold of “combat use” of nuclear weapons.[6]
According to Olga Oliker, Program Director, Europe and Central Asia, Crisis Group, Brussels, we are supposed to “rejoice” over Putin’s new edict because before this it was necessary to “…piece together Moscow’s positions and intentions from components of other documents (most notably a line or two in the country’s military doctrine statements from officials, exercises, force structure and the writings of Russia’s own specialists and strategists…)”[7] While I see no reason to rejoice over the Putin decree, Ms. Oliker is correct insofar that it was necessary to piece together Russian nuclear strategy from these sources, however, it is rather amazing that she omits statements by senior U.S. civilian and military leaders, intelligence officials, the content of official reports and declassified intelligence reports on nuclear first use from her list of sources. The problem is that for two decades, Minimum Deterrence advocates and their apologists in the “expert” community for Russian nuclear first use policy ignored almost all of these sources. The only good news in Putin’s decree is that it is now more difficult for Russia’s apologists to continue to ignore the fact that Russia plans on nuclear weapons first use in circumstances that no Western leader would even consider using them. However, they will certainly try.