What Comes Next with Russia?

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Welcome to the center of the national interest seminar on Ukraine Russian policies there and what is involved in U.S. relations with Russia Ukraine and of course how China affects this whole situation.

We have three very important and interesting experts: George Bibi, who will talk about Russia, is vice president at the Center for the National Interest.

He was a director of Russian analysis in this year and earlier on worked in the White House poker is a leading expert in China he was national intelligence officer for East Asia and he is a prolific writer and the really major authority on the region.

And last but certainly not least, Colonel Douglas McGregor, who was a senior advisor to the Secretary of Defense in the Trump Administration. He is a Fox contributor and he is again a major writer on strategic issues.

Welcome, George! Why wouldn't we start with you, since clearly Russia is the central player in this whole crisis?

Thanks, Dimitri! Well, what we've been talking about up until earlier this week was whether the Russians intended to invade Ukraine and what if anything could be done to deter that kind of an outcome. I think that chapter in this unfolding saga is now over. Whatever might have been done to prevent this wasn't done, and we now know the answers to whether Vladimir Putin would decide to invade or not and the question that we're facing now is how far might this go and how do we get out of this situation on terms that are acceptable particularly to the people of Ukraine to Europe and to the United States and I think the biggest issue that the United States faces in this context is how do we prevent this situation from escalating into a direct confrontation between Russia and the West - something that the United States government has consistently said it does not want. We've consistently said that we will not use American military forces directly against the Russians in any way. I think it's fair to say that the Russians are not looking for a direct military confrontation with the West either. Unfortunately, in the world of international relations, what people intend doesn't always translate into what actually happens and I think there is a significant danger that we could wind up in an escalation spiral that brings the United States and Russia eyeball to eyeball, to use the term that we used at the Cuban Missile Crisis, in a way that nobody wants, and we have to be very careful under these circumstances to make sure that doesn't happen now. How could this sort of thing happen?

Well, unfortunately, we're in a situation where the United States and Europe are both saying we're going to punish the Russians. We're going to make this as difficult and bloody and hopefully unsuccessful an invasion as possible. That approach contains within it the seeds of potential escalation even though we don't want that.

How?

Well, I want to harken back to what happened with Japan. Imperial Japan and World War II when the United States imposed what you might call draconian sanctions on Japan as a penalty and deterrent to Japanese expansion in Asia. The idea was that we were would cut off Japan and Japan's economy from vitally important access to resources that it needed to survive. The hope was that this would cause the Japanese to think twice about their ambitions in Asia. What in fact happened was that they regarded this as an existential threat to Japan and believed that they had no choice but to retaliate. We all know how that unfolded historically. The danger we're facing with Russia is that if the United States and Europe impose such draconian economic sanctions on Russia that it believes it is being strangled. It is, in my view, quite likely that the Russians would retaliate. Most Americans don't think that the Russian capacity for retaliation is all that serious because we expect that it would be limited to reciprocal economic sanctions on us and the Americans don't fear Russian economic sanctions. The Russians don't have much leverage in that way over trade in the American economy. What I think is more likely is that the Russians could look at our vulnerabilities and say we're going to attack those. If you think you can bring our economy to a grinding halt, well, we can bring your economy to a grinding halt and we won't do that through sanctions, we'll do it because your economy is completely dependent on a digital infrastructure and space-based resources that are entirely defenseless. You can't do a thing to prevent us from threatening those. Our global positioning system satellite constellation is not simply a navigation system. It's a timing system on which our entire economy depends. Our ability to use ATMs, our ability to generate and distribute power, to conduct exchanges at stores: All of this depends on that and it's completely vulnerable. The Russians know that. In fact, early on in this crisis over Ukraine months ago when they were first massing forces near Ukrainian borders, they conducted an anti-satellite missile test that was successful. They actually destroyed one of their own missiles and then sent us a message afterwards and said this shows that we are capable of taking the entire American gps constellation offline.

Now, would they do that? I don't think it's their choice to do that, but that is a card that they could play if they think the United States and Europe are severely threatening Russia's economy. In other words, when states feel that they face existential threats - regardless of whether those perceptions are accurate or not - they can do things that are extraordinarily shockingly risky and I think we're entering into a period where the Russians think that they've got a lot at stake here. We should be careful that they don't do things that we would imagine they would never do in all this situation. So that I think is a very important interest for the United States, something we're going to have to take very seriously moving forward.

Thank you very much! Before we move forward, I want to ask you one question because I think it may color our further conversation: Why do you think Putin did what he did?

Because so many people, especially in Russia among our Russian colleagues, as a matter of fact, they thought that Russia would posture, that Russian forces would move next to the Ukrainian border, but that Putin would stop and would not proceed with an actual intervention. Do you believe that we are dealing with a Russian master plan?

They knew all along when they were making the rather extreme proposals about Ukraine never ever in NATO that they knew all along that they would proceed with that kind of a military operation or there is a lot of, if you wish, ad hoc stuff there on Putin's part and he did not anticipate himself how this crisis would evolve.

Well, I don't think that this is a master plan that was pre-prepared months or years ago. You'll recall in… after the Maidan Revolution and all that ensued from that, Putin faced a choice back then after Lugansk and Donets declared independence, there was a lot of political pressure on him in Russia to recognize the independence of those so-called "people's republics." He did not do it. He took a lot of heat from his political right for electing not to do that, and I think his choice was rooted in a fundamental strategic calculation that what he really wanted in Ukraine was that Ukraine not ever become a member of NATO or not ever host NATO military forces on its territory and the prospect of that is what drove his decision then not to recognize those republics. Because his hope was that they would have autonomy inside Ukraine and that autonomy would effectively allow them to veto a membership in NATO of that the many in Ukraine were advocating. In other words, they were a cat's paw so to speak for the Russians to prevent a geopolitical orientation in Ukraine that Russia found threatening. I think the reason why he launched his invasion today was that he concluded, after an enormous amount of diplomatic negotiation and frankly you know outright, you know blackmail, military compellence, coercion on his part… trying to squeeze Ukraine and the West into giving up this possibility. He had concluded that it failed, that the Minsk Two negotiating deal that the Russians had been insisting be implemented for years would never be implemented, and he also concluded that the West would never agree formally to close the door on Ukrainian military membership in NATO. Now he worked himself into a bit of a corner when, you know, sit down at the table and drop your loaded gun next to you and say "Hey, let's talk!" You either reach a deal or you use the gun and he wasn't able to reach the deal and he I think maneuvered himself I believe unwisely into a situation where he had to follow through and we're seeing what has followed from that.

George, thank you very much!

Paul?

Oh, thank you for the opportunity to participate! Still trying to overcome the fear that George has instilled on what the Russians might do next but, I just want to interject a few thoughts on where China fits into pc equation starting with the idea that China doesn't want to be part of this equation I think this has left Beijing in a very uncomfortable position from their perspective because among other things it's exposed a fault-line… a pre-existing fault-line between Beijing and Moscow that had been latent for the most part but is no longer avoidable for the Chinese and it's really interesting that this comes, you know, literally less than a month after that very dramatic joint sign of Russian communique that Putin and Xi published about there being no limits to their cooperation and their partnership and their friendship.

The Chinese did not want this to happen. I think they've been surprised by the intensity and the speed of it and I think you know they've responded with an effort. It seems, to date, to be aimed at trying to walk a tightrope and have it both ways. They don't wanna alienate Moscow. They don't want to alienate the Europeans. They don't want to alienate us anymore than they already have. So I think they've adopted a really kind of obtuse rhetorical position which they think is, you know, a principal position. In fact, I think it's one that they take some comfort in the expectation that both Washington and Moscow will disregard. But on one side of the equation, the Chinese have essentially aligned with Moscow in terms of criticizing the United States and the Ukrainians for that matter…

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… with respect to NATO expansion having been one of the catalysts for this crisis having developed, and the Chinese have affirmed the notion that Russia had legitimate security interests that it felt was challenged here. Not to say that they've endorsed Putin's response to it entirely, but that's really the dilemma they face. On the other side of the equation, there have been very subtle hints which I think the Chinese believe…

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… won't alienate the Russians but do kind of establish some distance. They've reaffirmed the importance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, all sovereign countries, you know, because this is their one of their mantras which is, you know, relevant to Taiwan and all the other issues. But it's not clear how we're supposed to interpret that's application to Ukraine itself. The Chinese are just trying to trying to avoid that and it's not clear.

Apparently, Xi Jinping spoke to Putin on the phone today and reiterated some of these same issues, so there seems to be some effort to, at least subtly, exert pressure on Putin not to cease and desist but I mean the focus that the Chinese have always adopted in these situations is everyone should exercise restraint and find some way for a peaceful resolution.

I think the problem is that this is a straddling position that is not really convincing and frankly is not going to be sustainable for the Chinese for much longer. They really face a dilemma here, they're invite by leaning toward the Moscow's position on this by not criticizing it more explicitly they're running the risk of greater diplomatic isolation for China itself and inviting more balancing against it and against the China-Russia partnership that we've seen over the last couple years. They're confronting the inconvenient truth that there are some liabilities for Beijing in its relationship with Moscow and, in fact, I've seen some indications that there are certainly people within Beijing who are starting to express discomfort about the situation and what they should do about it.

I think basically nation has some choices to make, and some of them are going to be forced upon it in the very near future. How much is it gonna in its cost-benefit analysis? How does it weigh its relationship with Moscow? The common agenda that they outlined together on the fourth of February and the risk of alienating the Russians against their long-standing positions on sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, other sovereign entities, and the risks to their relationship with the E.U. and the potential for a possible opening opportunity for working with the United States. I think this, in the end, it does provide well not in the end - in the immediate situation, this does provide an opportunity for Washington to leverage and try to influence some of these choices that the Chinese are gonna have to make. You know, not to explicitly drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing, but to highlight for the Chinese some of the broader interests that might motivate it toward distancing itself in some way from what Putin has done and in fact there was a report published in this morning's New York Times that suggested that Washington seized this opportunity over the past several weeks and was even sharing intel with the Chinese in an effort to get them to put more pressure on Moscow.

I think the bottom line frankly is that you know we may be presumptuous about what China's called cost-benefit analysis of this situation is going to be they seem to be hesitant for the time being because frankly from the Chinese perspective they see no incentive or reason to expect that siding with Washington and the Europeans against Moscow is going to have immediate or real benefits in terms of a retreat from what had been a contentious bilateral relationship with Washington kind of coalition against China from its perspective and, unfortunately, I think the Chinese may still believe that their relationship with Moscow on balance is a better bet for them at least for the near term in terms of what's conducive to their interests.

I think that's why and actually I one of the one other thought I mean I think the one of the other constraints on the Chinese distance in themselves at our behest or in our request or at our suggestion is that they really they strongly agree with Moscow on the NATO expansion issue as having been a catalyst for this and I don't think that they want to endorse Washington's superior apparent efforts to minimize that or disregard so that's why I think they're leaning toward Moscow for the time being.

But I'll close with this: I mean I think there are two specific issues that are going to force the issue… force the decision for them, I mean the real "the rubber is going to meet the road" as another colleague said a couple days ago… the real test is going to be where China comes down on sanctions enforcement. Whether it's going to provide relief to Moscow in the near, well, in the near term as the sanctions get ramped up and secondly where the Chinese are going to come down on any U.N. vote in condemnation or in terms of U.N. action against the Russians.

The Chinese have walked this line and danced it before during the Crimea Crisis back in… and earlier they have, on a couple of occasions, taken the easy way out of abstaining from a vote, but it depends on whether they feel strongly enough about the risks to their relationship and the benefits of with Moscow and the benefits of retreating from it that they might even consider a veto on U.N. action.

I think that would be a disastrous decision for them but I think sanctions and U.N. deliberations are going to be the two areas where we need to look next to determine how the Chinese are going to play into the situation.

Well, obviously, the U.N. vote is very important and Russians have some high hope, but my impression is that they are not sure themselves what the Chinese are going to do in the United Nations, but the real question for Moscow… the real question is whether they will get any assistance with sanctions. Whether the Chinese would help them… would help major Russian banks to deal with restrictions which were just imposed on them and of course again new restrictions to technology transfer to Russia. Will China be willing to help? And I think that what China is going to do in this area will not only have an impact on a Russian relationship with China. It will have an impact on how much flexibility Putin will display in dealing with this Ukrainian crisis.

Would you dare to make any prediction?

It is hard to predict because I mean… I think the Chinese are still uncertain themselves as to where they want to come down tactically on some of these issues. I think you're right, that, you know, if they believe that they need to influence who in a more restrained direction they certainly do have the leverage with economic sanctions and technology transfers, but I you know I think they have this kind of aversion to doing that if they think it's primarily a favor to us and to the West. So I think that - I'm not in a position to predict. I'm not sure where they're going to come down on this, but I think that they have to they have to make a choice as to, you know, what kind of relationship they can sustain and particularly with the Europeans, because I think the year the Europeans might even have a greater influence on the Chinese than Washington may have at this stage on this point because the Chinese, I mean, for different reasons, the Chinese may think that the, you know, a better relationship with Washington may be close to a lost cause but they still hold out hope for the Europeans and they don't want to alienate them. So I think that has to factor into their decision as to how, how much… how they want to play and how much they want to respond on the sanctions issue.

Thank you very much! And that was, I hope, you will help us to understand: what does it all mean for the United States? And anything you want to say about U.S. policy on this issue so far.

Thank you very much. I suppose that I should begin by saying I agree with everything that everybody else has said. That would make it easy. Unfortunately, there is more to it. I think the United States has now made itself almost completely irrelevant to what has happened. Our unrelenting hostility towards Moscow is not something that positions us to influence anything in any sort of positive direction, so I don't think it really matters what we say or do at this point. We're no longer welcome at the table. I think the initiative for any sort of resolution that makes sense probably rests with the Europeans, other than Mr Putin, undoubtedly [German Prime Minister] Scholtz and secondarily [French President] Macron. Let's be frank: When you talk about the E.U., it's a gathering of pygmies except for the one six-foot-five giant in the room and that's Germany. Everything else almost shrinks to insignificance. The Russo-German relationship is extremely important. Scholtz is paying lip service to a lot of things, but he's privately made it very clear the Germans will not support excluding Russia from SWIFT. I think as time goes on and things settle down in Ukraine, and I think they will, there will be less and less interest in Europe but specifically with Germany in doing anything that could disrupt or harm commerce and business with Russia.

I think Mr Putin is… should be very pleased with the conduct of the operations, for what it's worth. I'm sure that we will continue to pour buckets of filth and abuse all over the Russians but the truth is I think the operation is being professionally conducted and the Russians have exercised great restraint with regard to the use of firepower, trying to minimize unnecessary damage, and I think now they've essentially accomplished most of what they set out to do, which is to seize eastern Ukraine all the way down to the southern coast and up to the border with Russia. The question is: What's next? There are reports coming out that he's talking to Macron and others and trying to meet with the Ukrainians in Minsk. Who knows? He controls the situation. He's decided, at least for the moment, to pause at the upper river, which I think is very wise on his part. He is going to define the parameters of the Ukrainian state. There's no question about it. But if the Germans and the French and others weigh in, they will have some influence. I just don't see that. We will and eventually we will be isolated because the hard sanctions and the reaction is not going to be supported throughout most of Europe.

A quick note on the Chinese: I think we can bet very… with great certainty… that the Chinese are opposed to conflict in any form. They're all about business and making money. End of discussion. And they need the Russians desperately in Central Asia. The Russians provide the muscle and also have the relationships in Central Asia to keep that stable. If Central Asia is not stable, then the Russians cannot move commerce or, excuse me, the Chinese cannot move commerce to Europe. It's as simple as that. But the notion that China is going to step out and somehow [or] another criticize Russia or join a sanctions regime, I think is ridiculous and even though the Japanese have their reasons for feeling hostility towards Russia because of the Kuril Islands and other matters, I think they'll end up buying Russian oil through China if necessary and gas and so forth.

So my prediction is this: We'll all settle down we'll end up with a new Ukrainian construct.

Who runs it? I have no idea. Will the West simply become a neutral almost landlocked lily pad? It may it's hard to tell but I think we're going to watch NATO fragment. I think Washington's leadership will be diminished and eventually become completely irrelevant as we turn inwards. Well, we will have to make one decision which will make us relevant at least I think so. It seems to me that the Russians will have at least a partial military victory in Ukraine. I completely agree with you that the Russians are running a rather professional operation. Their force is clearly much stronger than Ukrainian force. We already have a lot of reports that Ukrainian nationalist battalions are fighting bravery but Ukrainian regulars… Well, some of them go to the Russian side and some of them create an impression that they just don't feel that this war has much to do with them. I think that, from the military standpoint, Russian victory is practically assured. At the same time, what I see from the Russian press and conversations with the Russians is that they take European and particular sanctions quite seriously… much more seriously than ever before… and they don't understand that for the first time these sanctions can inflict real pain on the Russian economy and have destabilizing impact on the Russian regime. So there is a question if Putin is interested in having a deal and clearly this deal would not be so much with Zerensky. It would have to be with the United States and the European Union, particularly with the United States. If you were running American foreign policy, what kind of a deal would you offer the Russians? Or would you would simply say: "Look, you bastards, you misbehaved. You have done terrible things. It is your own responsibility to find a way out. Or would you try to negotiate with them some kind of a deal?

Your adviceel?

Well, I would advise talking immediately to President Putin. Of course, thus far any, attempt to reach him from Washington has failed and I think we need to keep that in mind he's been talking to us for a very long time and we've ignored him, but I would urge us to simply accept the facts on the ground. Look at the map which we've seen many, many times and try to negotiate neutrality for the western portion of Ukraine. That's a convenient buffer for him and a convenient buffer for us that keeps Russian forces and capabilities far from NATO's eastern border. I think the NATO allies would accept that. I simply see no evidence that we're going to be even remotely reasonable. We have truly painted ourselves into a corner. If you continue to insist that the president of Russia is a vicious thug and that anything he does is unlawful and illegal, you have no influence, so the first thing you have to do is step back and acknowledge what's happened. There's a rationale for it. Accept it and let's talk about what we can do from this point forward to end the conflict as quickly as possible and restore some measure of order and prosperity to the region. I think that will resonate strongly with the Germans with Hungarians the Slovaks. I think even the Baltic States would welcome that, as would Romania, but I don't see us doing it, unfortunately, so as a result of our unwillingness to do that, to Dimitri, I think we're going to be marginalized and over time we'll lose all our influence in Europe because the rest of the Europeans will say thank you very much we don't want to participate with the exception of course of our friend Boris who's ultimately interested in being the principal blowhard for the Anglo-American alliance.

Douglas, thank you very much! Let's go to questions!

A question from Kevin Black: Any idea of the Russian people's response or attitude to Putin's attack? Does it matter, George?

I think it's to you.

I'll start with the second of those questions: Does it matter? And I would say "no!" Not at this point. I don't think it has any impacts on the decisions that one man in Russia is making and that's Vladimir Putin. I don't think he's concerned about protest at this point. He's indicated that he will act decisively to squash it as necessary, so it is interesting to watch. I don't think it at this point is anywhere close to the point where it is threatening Putin, affecting his decision-making or threatening prospects for Russian stability in the near term. Could it evolve in that direction in the future? Sure, conceivably it could. I think a lot of Russians are shocked by what has happened, including many in the Russian elite who didn't expect that Russia would actually initiate this war. They believed that this military force was being assembled for purposes of coercion, of compelling a deal on the part of the West preparing for the possibility of Ukrainian attack in some way but they didn't imagine that it would actually be a war that Russia initiated, so that shock matters and I think Putin does regard his base within the Russian elite as important right now. I think although they're shocked ,they're also cowed. I don't think there's anybody in the elite that's willing to step up and challenge him and I don't think that will change unless the Russians face some sort of calamity on the battlefield or a real crisis with the West that endangers Russia's security. But for now, I don't think there's a danger

Well, let me push you on this a little bit. There was this unprecedented letter by a bunch of Russian generals, criticizing Putin for a decision to intervene and actually demanding information, and these people were not some pacifists. They were led by a famous Leonid three-star general who was always considered a hardliner and there were some people with a real combat experience. Then we you and I know that some leading Russian experts do not want to appear on tv and to comment on this situation because clearly they are apprehensive about what Putin is doing now. In both cases, we are talking about a minority, but I haven't seen even that kind of a minority before challenging Putin. Sections do we believe that this is significant? That this way indicates a growing opposition to Putin or if his foreign policy or it is just a passing incident.

Well, I think human beings are such that they tend to support winners and I think that's what's going to happen in this case. If Putin pulls us off and is in some way successful, the problem is not going to become significant. If he fails or is perceived as failing, that's a different matter. So that's really what's at stake here and that actually reinforces, I believe, Putin's determination to be successful and to do whatever is necessary here to ensure success as he defines it.

Thanks! Second question is from somebody who knows China well grammarism. He writes "With respect, I disagree with Paul. Will China have Russia's back? What will they say? My bet is they will and I know Graham for many years. He's not normally a betting man, so what I'm sure you will take this challenge seriously, I know Graham not as well as you perhaps but, I'm not sure I'll take the bet but I'm not sure I disagree that much with him that we disagree. I mean, I think you know what I was trying to say. I think Beijing will basically have it will be more it'll have Moscow's back or at least be more on that side than the other. I think the question is you know how substantive I think it's going to be less than full-throated support. I mean Doug made the point and I agree that China's not going to join the sanctions regime against Moscow. The only question is: What kind and what level of sanctions relief will the Chinese provide? I think that's going to be calibrated and I think again they will have Moscow's side, but there will be limits because the Chinese are uncomfortable with this. They want this to stop. I mean I think Doug made the point, you know there is, I think, the Chinese actually would agree with the position that this conflict needs to end. I think frankly the Chinese would support the idea of Ukrainian neutrality being the exit ramp from this. The question is whether there's a version of that that's mutually acceptable to Moscow and Washington and the Europeans. The Chinese are gonna try to stay out of the center of this, but for the reason… for strategic and tactical reasons… and unless they see both positive more than just negative positive incentives, they're not going to retreat from that. They're going to, well, I mean, from Washington or the Europeans, they're going to stay basically aligned with the Russian position because they don't see any powerful incentives to assume the risk of alienating Moscow.

Thank you very much! And now from Robert Manning of the Atlantic Council: "How does this end is it a question of pay payment our emulator can there be any stable outcome without some type of Ukrainian neutrality and understandings with Russia?"

I think it's Douglas.

No, I don't think you can have a positive outcome for anyone without some sort of arrangement for neutrality, but I also think that you're going to have to accept the fact that where Russian troops currently stand is now going to be effectively part of Russia. The notion that the Russian forces will withdraw from eastern Ukraine is absurd and that's one of the points that I think Mr Putin has made in the past. You know, stop talking about leaving Crimea. He's not going to accept the notion that they're going to withdraw from Odessa, from Crimea or anywhere else. As for the rest of it, I think he's receptive to it. The problem is the Europeans are going to have to take the lead here because Washington is almost paralyzed. It's paralyzed by its own words. But this administration seems incapable of formulating any sort of reasonable policy. The only thing it can do is insult people that it doesn't agree with and then threaten or impose economic sanctions, but as I said before: Over time, these sanctions mean less and less and I think in particular in Europe, Berlin is not going to support it. All they'll pay lip service to it. I mean the joke in Berlin is that Scholtz said, "Sure, you know, we'll delay North Stream." Well, the truth is the North Stream is being delayed anyway it's going to come into effect within the next days. He knows that he can sit tight, wait for this to stop, and then it'll be turned on. I think we're the ones that have marginalized ourselves. So to go back and say we've got to have the U.S. involved in this, I think it would be nice if we'd shut up, sit, be somewhat more reasonable, and encourage Europeans to cut some sort of arrangement with Moscow, but I don't see us doing it, so unfortunately, I think the whole thing can end. I think Macron and Scholtz can do that and others in Europe. [Hungarian President] Urban can certainly help with that, but I don't see us having much impact.

George, when you look at this whole situation in Ukraine and how it was approached by Putin, I at least have an impression that very few people in the Russian leadership quite knew what kind of a decision Putin was going to make. My impression is that even the foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, I shouldn't say, was in the dark but was not entirely informed about what Putin was going to decide and what criteria he was going to use. Are we dealing with the situation when in Moscow there is not just one real decider but a situation when a formal decision-making system is much less relevant that than putting personal relations in consultation with his inner circle and if the lady is correct who these people are?

Well, I agree with the picture that you've just painted there. I think this is a situation where Putin is interacting with a very narrow circle of people. Not very many Russians have access to Putin's thinking or decision-making in all of this, and I think many people last week including myself thought that the Russians were going to give this a little bit more time to see whether a deal could be made, and it turned out that Putin decided you know I think maybe a week earlier than I expected him to launch this invasion but, who is in that inner circle? I think one can only guess, really. I last meant in terms of specific names, but what kind of people, well, what kind of people I think is pretty clear. You know, the term that the Russians use is the syllabic e the people in the military and intelligence community and largely in the intelligence circles over there, who are pretty tough hard-nosed people. They play full-contact politics. For them, you know, war is not a game: It's a very serious matter. They play to win, they play to win inside Russia and outside Russia and they have quite strong views about the West and regard the United States and NATO as enemies with very hostile intentions toward Russia who must be dealt with that in mind, so I think we're seeing that play out.

Thank you! Now Thomas Connor, senior foreign policy right at Newsweek.

Is there a concern that the breakdown in U.S. Russian relations over Ukraine paired with the collapse of bilateral arms control agreements in the past years, could lead to a new arms race in Europe as both NATO and Russia seek to once again fortify their positions?

That was their mind if we will.

Thank you! Well, I suppose if you think you can just print money in perpetuity without any consequences we could have an arms race, but to be quite frank I think we're nearing bankruptcy here in the United States. It was interesting for me to note that the Russian GDP-debt-to-GDP ratio is about which is easily manageable it makes good sense our debt-to-GDP ratio is plus percent perhaps more. We're not healthy. We cannot afford this major buildup that people talk about. We've wasted trillions on all sorts of bright shiny objects. There's been no strategic focus to guide any of the spending. I think we've about had it, so I don't see this arms race necessarily materializing as some people do. Obviously, there are lots of people on the hill that would love that. I don't think we can afford it. I don't think it's going to happen, and I think our internal affairs are going to constrain us dramatically in the near future.

Ah, thank you, George!

Of bosca given the sizeable public protests in Russia against Putin's law and the dissatisfaction of the oligarchs because of the punitive sanctions, is there any plausible prospect of regime change? Can they always do anything to further the cause? I think it's to you, George. Cleary.

Well, the simple answers to that are "no" and "no, we should not." The Americans, I think, for years have been tantalized by the prospect of some sort of magic solution to this long-standing dispute with Russia and the magic solution is that Putin goes away and once he goes away since he's the source of all our problems Russia will be become quote-unquote normal again and will have some sort of rebirth of new thinking and perestroika and partnership with the Russians and we don't really have to do anything on our own here to make adjustments in this relationship, and I think that's simply a dream. Whoever succeeds Putin - and I have no idea who that might be - is not going to divert fundamentally from long-standing Russian traditions. What is a widespread belief that Russia should not have a hostile military alliance on its borders, that that sort of magic won't happen and the danger here is that the United States believing that something like that is possible will do things to threaten Russia with internal instability in some way that only reinforces the belief that the United States is an irreconcilable enemy of Russia, fundamentally russophobic, that there's no point in Russia trying to find some sort of accommodation with the West and we wind up in a real long-standing and quite dangerous confrontation between the two countries.

I think we have to start from the premise that, in the nuclear era, Russia and the United States Russia and the West are co-hostages. One security cannot be secured at the expense of the others. We have to recognize that for us to be secure, for Europe to be stable, we have to provide some measure of adequate security to Russia, as well. Otherwise, we'll all be losers in this. That's the situation that we're facing. We might not like that reality, but there it is. We have to deal with it.

May I say something absolutely it's my impression that of the various Russian leaders that we could have had over the last years, we've been very fortunate with Vladimir Putin simply because he actually knows something about the West. Historically, we haven't had very many people in the Kremlin who do understand the West, so I think that's the real question right now is:"Can we repair the damage with Mr Putin?" Again, I'm not sure that we can and then finally in contrast to Russia, where Mr Putin is obviously in command, we don't know who's running what. In Washington D.C., it's a collection of people seen and unseen with a president who's viewed as very unsteady. That's not a good recipe for success anywhere. Right now strategically.

Doctor, thank you very much! And the next question is about China from somebody who doesn't need much introduction: Thomas Pickering, who, of course, was Under-Secretary of State for Policy and was a very successful ambassador to Moscow.

When I'm saying very successful, I am not giving my humble judgment, but it was widely acknowledged at the time in Washington and Moscow alike and what Ambassador Pickering is asking now is: "Who leads?"

Stalin and Mao broke or apart over this the second question from Ambassador Pickering is: "Will Chinese Ukraine as a template for brc using force to unify Taiwan with it?" I think it's clearly to Paul.

Right, yes, thank you. No, those are both excellent questions, actually, and they're getting a lot of commentary over the last hours, well, on the Taiwan issue, but longer than that I think on the Stalin/Mao issue, I think that highlights the discomfort that Beijing feels at this moment.

I think Beijing has had every reason to see itself - although not probably talking this way with the Russians - as the senior partner in the relationship, you know, because of the relative material power and weight that they have and here as a colleague of mine reminded me this morning… here the Chinese are seeing the discomfort with that that they're being held hostage or at least being made uncomfortable by actions by the junior partner that it wishes had not happened. So I mean, I think that, analytically, it makes sense that this could be the basis for a decision by Beijing to distance itself maybe not as dramatic as the break between Mao and Stalin, but I still come back to the point I made earlier in that calculation. I think the Chinese are still disinclined to do that because they have yet to see any clear positive benefit to their interest that would accrue from a decision to break with Moscow. You know, I think those positive benefits are readily, you know, observable in theory, but I think the Chinese are skeptical that the Washington and the West are prepared to provide those benefits and is some kind of a reciprocal response to a decision by Beijing to break with Moscow.

On the second question about what this means for Taiwan: I mean, there are all kinds of implications there. I think the bottom line, I mean, there's different ways to frame the question, too. I think the way that Ambassador Pickering framed it was: "Will the Chinese see this action as a template or a decision by them to use spores against Taiwan?" And my short answer is: No, because I think there are several differences between the Ukraine case and the Taiwan case.

I mean certainly from the Chinese perspective… the Chinese, they're dealing… they're struggling with the fact that they've always seen Ukraine as the sovereign entity. They do not see Taiwan as a sovereign entity, so it's as far as they're concerned it's not applicable. But I think the more important element to answer the question is that it's about the potential U.S. response. I mean the Chinese have observed as we all have a pretty explicit indication that the United States is not going to intervene militarily at least up to this point in defense of Ukraine. The Chinese I think have long assumed that we would do so in the case of Taiwan. I think that the Chinese… they can read what's been published in the West about the difference between the vital interests that the United States appears to assign to Taiwan compared to the definition of vital interest in Ukraine, which apparently has not met the threshold for military intervention. I think you know the bottom line is: I don't think the Chinese are seeing this as an opportunity or an excuse to use force against… they're not gonna against Taiwan they're not gonna take advantage of our preoccupation because even aside from this crisis in Ukraine I still believe the Chinese are not looking for excuses or opportunities to attack Taiwan. They're still not ready to do so yet. They're still looking for reasons not to. So I think that there are lessons that can be learned from the Taiwan with regard to Taiwan both in Taipei and in Beijing. But just as an aside: I think one of the most important lessons that Washington should be taking away for this that's relevant to Taiwan gets back frankly I think and this is just an aside to the NATO expansion issue: To whatever extent Putin attacked Ukraine because of what he perceived as years of Washington's disregard or the West's disregard for his legitimate security interests with regard to NATO expansion, the Chinese have a similar prism. They perceive Washington's inattention to what Beijing sees as the erosion of our China commitments and sooner or later their patience might be exhausted in the same way that Putin's was.

Paul, thank you very much! And the next question is from Jacob Halbron, who is the editor of the National Interest, and he is asking about Michael Kaufman, who is a prominent Russian defense policy analyst, and he is asking whether people like Mr Kaufman are correct suggesting that perhaps the Russians assault were disappointed with the military progress in Ukraine so far.

George, well, if you don't mind I'd like to defer that question to Doug, who I think is in a better position to assess Moscow's military progress so far.

Well, you know, Dimitri, I think at this point it's premature to reach any judgments. We have an expression in the military I'm sure there's one for it in Russian, too, "The first report is always wrong." And, of course, there's the famous one: "The first casualty in every war is the truth."

I don't think we know a great deal of what's been happening on the ground. We get different reports from different people, but my impression is, on the whole, Putin and the leadership are not displeased with how things have gone and again Putin has tried very hard to avoid killing large numbers of people. He's given those instructions, I'm sure, to the generals, and I think they've tried very hard to follow this. It's too soon to make any sweeping judgments about how effective or ineffective anybody is. The only thing we can say with certainty is that the Ukrainian resistance has largely fallen apart and that's not surprising if you have no air cover if you have no air defenses per se once you're identified you could be encircled targeted and destroyed.

Thank you so much! and the Christian Whiten who was a senior advisor at the State Department during the Trump administration… before: the Bush administration… He's asking questions about, Baltic republics and whether Moscow may be tempted to try something there.

You know, Dimitri, I don't see any evidence that Vladimir Putin wants to intervene in the Baltic states. I just don't. I think he would rather have good business relations with them. Obviously, he'd prefer that they were neutral and not a platform for NATO, but I don't see any interest that he wants to change that particular set of circumstances. I think he's very sensitive to what happens now in Ukraine because that can set the stage for future relations with Europe and NATO, but I don't see any evidence for any of that. Furthermore, remember the Russian army is very small. It's only about… it's smaller than the United States Army. I think it's a good army. It's well equipped, well trained, properly organized, better than ours, but I don't think that's the sort of force that you build if you want to launch large-scale offensive operations against the West. That's just nonsense. Yesterday, I was on Russian tv with a gentleman who is past vice chairman of the Russian parliament committee. The Russian domain committee on this so-called newly independent states and I actually raised the same question and I mentioned Estonia as an example, and his answer was very interesting. He said that for many years Russia did not view Baltic states as any kind of security challenge to Russia and did not even have forces positioned against them, but the more they become involved in conflict with Ukraine… provide Ukraine with new weapons and the more, U.S. and European forces the native infrastructure are being moved to places like Estonia and history as some of you know is very close to St. Petersburg, he said that inevitably… he said Russian military planners begin to view Estonia as a challenge. Not Estonia in terms of its own capabilities, but because of growing NATO presence.

Would you have a response to that?

You know I think you just made a very important point and this is the argument in Washington people are now making. Very, very ill-advised statements concerning the shipment of weapons to Ukrainians with the goal of cultivating an insurgency. This is precisely the sort of thing that rubs Moscow in the wrong direction. If anything, we should be interested in halting this kind of business and again it's back to this question of what is Moscow going to do with its forces. Where will they be positioned and where are we going to position errors what partic what do we gain from dominating the Baltic, from conducting maneuvers and operations in the Baltic sea, kilometers from St. Petersburg? We gain nothing. It does nothing for us. It's irrelevant. The Baltic is a pond, but we continue to treat that as we're showing the Russians this is sheer stupidity. So the point is valid. We don't need large numbers of forces in Estonia, Lithuania, or Latvia. That's the opposite of what Mr Putin has been trying to achieve. We ought to recognize that and put a stop to this, but again it all begins with ending the nonsense in Ukraine once and for all. He's changed the facts on the ground. We've got to accept that and talk about this issue of what remains is neutralized and then we can go on to these other matters about what will or will not be forward but the whole idea this forward presence for the U.S. forces is stupid. We cannot be the first responders for these Europeans. That was President Trump's argument. He's right, and we need to get out of that business.

Well, that would be a great answer to complete the program, but I have one question from our long-term colleague who now moved us elsewhere.

Paul Saunders and I think the last question should belong to him and Paul is asking something very important.

"Has Putin already reached the point you described considering the United States as a reconcilable form given the predictable U.S. response which surely was known to Russian leadership? Might his decision to invade Ukraine be one indication of that?"

George, yes I do think he's reached that point, now what that means however is that it's not that he believes he has to fight against the United States at infinitum or that we will fight with Russia without end either. I think what he probably has in mind is treating the United States as an irreconcilable foe with whom the conflict can be managed and contained within acceptable bounds that protects Russia's core security interests. I think that's what the way we're going to have to proceed moving forward as well not that we're going to be friends, not that we're going to be competitors, we are going to be foes moving forward, but foes that have to find a way to manage this animosity in ways that do not become mutually destructive.

George, let me end on one last question to you: Putin has said something pretty dramatic, but I'm not sure everybody understood what he meant. In a recent speech, he issued a warning to anyone in Europe and I think probably the United States not to meddle in Ukrainian affairs in Russian campaign against Ukraine and then he said and if somebody tries to do it, they may face consequences beyond anything they could contemplate or have experienced. Was he talking about tactical nuclear weapons?

Well, I doubt that he meant that specifically, at least not immediately, but there is certainly concern in Russia that this could escalate to nuclear levels and when you try to deter a nuclear power, as Thomas Shelling pointed out way back when in his work on deterrence, it is actually rational to convince the other side that you're willing to do things that are in fact irrational acts in order to deter them from taking steps that would threaten you and I've put this in that particular category. He is attempting to tell us that he's willing to do things that appear irrational in order to prevent us from taking steps that he would regard as fundamentally threatening to Russia. That's the situation we're dealing with. It's a very dangerous situation, George. I have to say it's very difficult for me to mention that Putin would really use tactical nuclear weapons. Let's say even against Estonia, simply because they don't like Estonian weapons supplying to Ukraine. It's very difficult for me to imagine, but the situation that the head of nuclear power would even mention this possibility I think it is a new development in European and international politics, and we have to take it seriously.

On this happy note, thank you so much for taking part in the program. Thank you for our speakers and for the audience! Goodbye!

Regards,

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