“Jackson was also a brilliant military tactician, and a fierce warrior who placed duty and honor above any personal ambition (of which he had next to none). It is my opinion that Lee lost at Gettysburg because he fought the battle as he’d have fought it had he still had Jackson. That is where Lee erred, and fatally.”
Disagree. Jackson was super aggressive to be sure. And he was superb while operating independently in the Valley Campaign. But he also pretty much failed during The Seven Days. He also put some pretty good subordinate commanders in hack.
“Disagree. Jackson was super aggressive to be sure. And he was superb while operating independently in the Valley Campaign. But he also pretty much failed during The Seven Days. He also put some pretty good subordinate commanders in hack.”
Jackson arrived at Mechanicsville after a grueling forced march from the Shenandoah Valley. Lee had just recently taken over from Johnston, who had been seriously wounded early in the Peninsula Campaign, and had intended for Jackson — coming in from the northwest — to put pressure on McClellan’s right flank and “roll it up.” Upon arriving late in the day after the forced march, Jackson determined that his exhausted army could not continue as an effective fighting force without a rest. That was the delay that some historians always point out as a mistake by Jackson. They, of course, were not Jackson, nor were they with his army. If any criticism of Jackson could be credibly levied it would be his action at White Oak when he wasted time trying to rebuild a bridge across the creek. Well, Jackson was not the engineer Lee was.
Jackson was aggressive, but he was not a fool. The fact is that Jackson’s force would have been dead on its feet if it had been thrown in to roll up McClellan’s flank at that time, which would have put that force at risk. There was no doubt anyway that McClellan was going to be able to effect a retreat; the question was how much damage could be inflicted on his army before that. So, inflict some more damage on McClellan but at the risk of losing Jackson’s force, or at best having it significantly degraded?
You have to remember that the Federal forces on the Peninsula were concentrated, and within supporting distance of each other, for the attempt to take Richmond. The Confederate forces however were spread out all over, and were being rushed toward the defense of Richmond. Jackson’s force was the most distant. It is testament to Jackson’s leadership that he got his force in position when he did, but he also knew that by delaying he would allow his force to recover from the march, and at the same time prevent McClellan’s right from making any pincer move on Richmond.
Jackson’s actions at the close of the Peninsula Campaign (the Seven Days) were admittedly not up to the stellar efforts he had shown in the Shenandoah or later at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. But one must consider the totality of the facts present, and draw conclusions or pass make judgments accordingly.