Giuliani: What Comey, Brennan Orchestrated ‘As Close To Treason As You Can Get’

Breitbart ^ | 5-11-2020 | Trent Baker

[woodpusher]

Comparing the circumstances of Virginia Minor’s birth to the definition of Natural Born Citizen it had just set forth, the Court concluded she was a Natural Born Citizen thereof.

The U.S. Supreme Court did no such thing.

In Minor, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:

The question is presented in this case, whether, since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, a woman, who is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri, is a voter in that State, notwithstanding the provision of the constitution and laws of the State, which confine the right of suffrage to men alone.

. . .

It is contended that the provisions of the constitution and laws of the State of Missouri which confine the right of suffrage and registration therefor to men, are in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void. The argument is, that as a woman, born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is a citizen of the United States and of the State in which she resides, she has the right of suffrage as one of the privileges and immunities of her citizenship, which the State cannot by its laws or constitution abridge.

. . .

There is no doubt that women may be citizens. They are persons, and by the fourteenth amendment "all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" are expressly declared to be "citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." But, in our opinion, it did not need this amendment to give them that position. Before its adoption the Constitution of the United States did not in terms prescribe who should be citizens of the United States or of the several States, yet there were necessarily such citizens without such provision.

It was stipulated fact that Virginia Minor was a person born in the United States, subject to the jurisdiction thereof. The Supreme Court found in Minor that, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, all persons born in the United States, subject to the jurisdiction thereof, were citizens of the United States.

Then the Court then proceeded to reflect on the status of persons before the Fourteenth Amendment, which had precisely nothing to do with deciding any issue before the Court in Minor.

To determine, then, who were citizens of the United States before the adoption of the amendment it is necessary to ascertain what persons originally associated themselves together to form the nation, and what were afterwards admitted to membership.

. . .

Whoever, then, was one of the people of either of these States when the Constitution of the United States was adopted, became ipso facto a citizen—a member of the nation created by its adoption. He was one of the persons associating together to form the nation, and was, consequently, one of its original citizens. As to this there has never been a doubt. Disputes have arisen as to whether or not certain persons or certain classes of persons were part of the people at the time, but never as to their citizenship if they were.

. . .

The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens. The words "all children" are certainly as comprehensive, when used in this connection, as "all persons," and if females are included in the last they must be in the first. That they are included in the last is not denied. In fact the whole argument of the plaintiffs proceeds upon that idea.

That pile of slop is all dicta, opining about citizenship before the Fourteenth Amendment, something not remotely before the Court.

In Minor, the Supreme Court deemed it necessary to first determine whether Virginia Minor was a Natural Born Citizen or not before delving into the question of whether she was a citizen pursuant to the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.

That is precisely backwards. As Virginia Minor was not running for President, whether she was native-born, natural-born, or naturalized was irrelevant. As the case originated after the Fourteenth Amendment, its reflections upon the pre-14th era was self-indulgent dicta.

SCOTUS was acting as an appellate court. All findings of fact are made in the court of first instance, the trial court. In reality, Minor v. Happersett was a concocted or moot case with no real controversy at all. The two sides conspired together to concoct a single constitutional question for presentation to the U.S. Supreme Court and then the two sides stipulated to all other facts relevant to the concocted case.

As I previously quoted from the Transcript of Record, the two sides stipulated as an agreed upon fact that Virginia Minor, "the plaintiff is a native-born, free white citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri."

The defendant filed a demurrer, not contesting any claim of plaintiff, and essentially arguing that considering all arguments to be true and correct, they are insufficient as a matter of law.

There was no jurisdiction for SCOTUS to determine the citizenship of Virginia Minor as it was stipulated and accepted fact in the courts below. It was stipulated that she was a native-born citizen. The Fourteenth Amendment was alive and well in 1872. The Court could opine whether the lower Court had correctly interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, and correctly applied that interpretation to the facts. A male citizen of any description enjoyed the privilege of voting in Missouri according to Missouri law, as did alien men with certain qualifications. A female, citizen or alien, did not enjoy the privilege of voting in Missouri according to Missouri law. The question before the Court was whether the Missouri constitution was repugnant to the Federal Constitution. The Missouri constitution was upheld in the lower courts, through and including the Missouri Supreme Court, the highest court of that state.

The below amendment to the Missouri Constitution, ratified in 1870, was relevant to the Minor case and the 1872 election.

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 1865.

RATIFIED NOVEMBER 8, 1870.

Art. II. New sections added: Section I. Every male citizen of the United States, and every person of foreign birth who may have declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, according to law, not less than one year nor more than five years before he offers to vote, who is over the age of twenty-one years, who has resided in this State one year next preceding his registration as a voter, and during the last sixty days of that period shall have resided in the county, city, or town where he seeks registration as a voter, who is not convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime, nor directly or indirectly interested in any bet or wager depending upon the result of the election for which said registration is made, nor serving, at the time of such registration, in the Regular Army or Navy of the United States, shall be entitled to vote at such election for all officers, State, county, or municipal, made elective by the people, or any other election, held in pursuance of the laws of this State; but he shall not vote elsewhere than in the election district where his name is registered, except as provided in the twenty-first section of the second article of the constitution. Any person who shall, after the adoption of this amendment, engage in any rebellion against this State or the United States, shall forever be disqualified from voting at any election.

Sec. 2. Hereafter it shall not be required of any person, before he is registered as a voter or offers to vote, to take the oath of loyalty prescribed in the sixth section of the second article of the constitution; but every person, before he is registered as a qualified voter, shall take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Missouri.

Sec. 3. Sections five, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, of the second article of the constitution, and all provisions thereof, and all laws of this State not consistent with this amendment, shall, upon its adoption, be forever rescinded and of no effect.

New section rescinding section II: Section i. The eleventh section of the sec­ond article of the constitution of this State, requiring jurors to take the oath of loy­alty prescribed in the sixth section of said article, is hereby stricken out and forever rescinded.

The ineligibility of Virginia Minor was solely on the basis that she lacked a penis and had a vajayjay. She should have pleaded that she identified as a man, and in the election she would be batting for the men's team. As far as I know, whatever the Constitution says about that now, it said it then as well.

As far as the Missouri constitution went, the U.S. Supreme Court properly found that there was nothing in the Federal Constitution giving the voting privilege to anyone, male or female. It was a power of the sovereign people who withheld it from the Federal government and reserved it to themselves, to later delegate it to their State government, the People of each State doing as they pleased.

The U.S. Supreme Court was sitting in appellate review of the legal opinions and judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri. That opinion is recited in the Transcript of Record sent to the U.S. Supreme Court and I quote it below from that record.

Opinion of the court.

In the supreme court of the State of Missouri, March term, 1873.

Virginia L. Minor et al., P. E.,
vs.
Reese Happersett, D. E.

Error to St. Louis circuit court.

Opinion of the court

This was an action brought in the St. Louis circuit court by husband and wife against the defendant, who was a registering officer, for refusing to register Virginia L. Minor, the wife, as a lawful voter.

The defendant demurred to the petition on the ground that the said Virginia had no right to vote at the general election held in November, 1872, referred to in said petition, and on other grounds not necessary to mention. The defense being based upon the constitution of the State of Missouri, which provides that “every male citizen of the United States, &c., * * * * shall be entitled to vote at such election for all officers, State, county, and municipal, made elective by the people, or any other election held in pursuance of the laws of this State,” and upon the registration law of said State, approved March 10,1871, to the same effect, and requiring the registration officers to register such voters, &c., and it is claimed, therefore, that defendant was justified in refusing to register the plaintiff (Virginia L. Minor) on account of her sex.

The validity of this clause of the State constitution and the registration act based thereon is denied by the plaintiffs, they contending that said constitutional provision and the act of the legislature in pursuance thereof are in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and particularly to the clauses thereof specified in the petition.

There is no question made in reference to the sufficiency of the petition in other respects, provided that females have a right to be registered as voters and vote at elections held under the constitution and laws of this State, notwithstanding the provisions of the constitution and laws of the State to the contrary thereof.

The question presented, theu, is, whether there is a conflict between the Constitution of the United States and the constitution and laws of the State of Missouri on this subject.

That the different States of the Union had a right previous to the adoption of what is known as the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States to limit the right to vote at elections by their constitutions and laws to the male sex, I think, cannot at this day be questioned. The (I may say) universal construction of the Constitution of the United States on this subject and the almost universal practice of all of the States in reference to this subject from the adoption of the Constitution to the present time ought to be sufficient to prevent the necessity of an investigation of the subject now.

There are certainly some questions that the courts of the country have a right to consider as settled, and that question, I think, is one of them.

By the 14th amendment to the Constitution it is provided as follows:

“Sect. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall auy State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

“Sect. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crimes, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizeus shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.”

When we take in consideration the history of the times in which this amendment was originated, and the circumstances which in the view of its originators produced its necessity, we will have but little trouble, it seems to me, to give it its proper interpretation. The whole slave population of the South had just been freed, and were about to enter in an entirely new relation with the balance of society, and were to assume new obligations and responsibilities. In this changed state of affairs it was thought by those who originated and adopted this amendment that it was absolutely necessary that these emancipated people should have the elective franchise in order to enable them to protect themselves against unfriendly legislation in which they could take no part. That unless these people had the right to vote and thus protect themselves against oppression, their freedom from slavery would be a mere mockery, and their condition but little improved. It was to remedy this that the 14th amendment to the Constitution was adopted. It was to compel the former slave States to give these freedmen the right of suffrage, and to give them all of the rights of other citizens of the respective States, and thus make them “ equal with other citizens before the law.” There could have been no intention to abridge the power of the States to limit the right of suffrage to the male inhabitants. It was only intended to give the freedmen the same rights that were secured to all other classes of citizens in the State, and that if the other male inhabitants of the State over the age of twenty-one years enjoyed the right of suffrage, so should the males amongst the freedmen over the age of twenty one years enjoy the same right. It was not intended that females or persons under the age of twenty-one years should have the right of suffrage conferred on them. This is not only shown by the history of the times when the amendment was adopted, and the history of the times when the amendment was adopted, and the circumstances which produced it, but by reference to the 2nd section of said amendment it will be seen that the right to restrict the right of suffrage to the male inhabitants by a State is clearly recognized. If “the right to vote, &c., is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,” &c., is the language used; this clearly recognizes the right and seems to anticipate the exercise of the right on the part of the States to restrict the right of suffrage to the male inhabitants.

I think the circuit court committed no error in sustaining the demurrer to the petition.

Judge Wagner absent; the other judges concurring, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

H. M. VORIES.

(Endorsed:) Virginia L. Minor et al., P. E., vs. Reese Happersett, D. E. Opinion per Vories. Judgment affirmed. Filed May 7,1873. J. Thornburgh, clerk.

As may be seen, the citizenship of Virginia Minor were natural born or naturalized had no relevance to Missouri voting privilege, or to her eligibility to bring suit in Federal court.