David Kay reported Hussein was developing missiles with ranges in excess of UN limitations, saying they were the center pole of the tent under which Hussein would rebuild his WMD as the regime sanctions further deteriorated. He found Hussein retained the scientists and technology to restart production of mustard and VX gas. Hussein was also currently developing an indigenous precursor for VX and a stimulant for freeze-drying anthrax. Kay reported Hussein was rebuilding infrastructure and staff for nuclear weapons. Mahdi Obeidi maintained in the New York Times that when the world looked the other way, the knowledge of hundreds of scientists could be applied to existing designs and a centrifuge prototype to jumpstart the nuclear weapons capacity. Iraq already had 500 tons of yellow cake in the country under U.N. seal, which was confirmed to have no meaning after the North Korean experience. The regime just needed a latter-day Albert Speer or Leslie Groves to replace Hussein Kamel.
The idea Hussein did not have stockpiles of WMD’s was never a creditable assumption. One has to believe that a fracturing, middle eastern dictatorship of several competing and self-interested spheres of influence achieved an unparalleled intelligence deception. The sophisticated intelligence services of U.S.A., Britain, France, Israel, and Germany had independently determined Iraq had stockpiles of WMD. These intelligence professionals applied different methods, used different resources, jealously guarded their insights and prerogatives, and refused to parrot someone else’s analysis.
As an example, the Butler Commission maintained the analysis by the UK Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) that Hussein’s people went to Niger to acquire uranium was creditable. The SIS followed classical methods of validation, analysis, and assessment of several different sources, not including the famous forgeries, to conclude that Saddam Hussein sought significant quantities of uranium. George Bush used this professional intelligence product to claim in his State of the Union message that Iraqi officials had gone to Africa on that mission.
Examine the CIA Fact Book for Niger exports, and you will see uranium is the only business reason Iraqi officials would have in the country. Basic common sense tells you no totalitarian regime would allow key officials the latitude to just collect a few local crafts while vacationing in other countries. In opposition we only have the childish claims of Joe Wilson whose State Department training left him completely unqualified in terms of tradecraft to make an intelligence assessment.
All five intelligence services were not wrong. The most reasonable assumption, for which much evidence exists, is that Syria and Russia received inventories for the regime. By the way, is not anyone curious about how Syria got all those chemical weapons they had to dispose of? Again, one can see from the CIA Fact Book, Syria does not have industries that can be adapted to their production.
The possession of WMD was irrelevant, because the ceasefire ended, and the war begun in 1991 was resumed, because Hussein behaved in material breach of international obligations as reaffirmed with Resolution 1441. Nowhere in Congressional resolutions of 1991, 1998 and 2002, or U.N. Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441 can one see possession of stockpiles of WMD as reasons for confronting him with military action. Behavior in terms of threats, evasion, intimidation, and past behavior, not possession, was always the key. He was to unconditionally accept destruction or removal of all inventories and programs for WMD and for all missiles over 150-kilometre range. He was enjoined from committing, supporting, or providing safe haven for international terrorism.
Resolution 687 incorporated 678 and 19 previous resolutions without amendment and offered Hussein a conditional ceasefire in 1991. The resolution’s key words were to guarantee, reaffirm, accept, submit, declare, yield, forgo, agree, inform, comply, and cooperate. None of these resolutions were cobbled together like a middle schooler’s term paper. Diplomats and politicians laboriously parsed each phrase for clear focus on actions instead of possessions; behaviors, not stockpiles.
Hussein thwarted the program envisioned by menacing, eluding, and deceiving inspectors. The U.N. resorted to surveillance, analysis, and investigation to destroy material and disrupt programs. He also continued forbidden involvement in international terrorism. In response, Bush #1, UN, and Clinton ignored their responsibilities to deal with Hussein’s ongoing material breaches. When Clinton was President, Hussein in 1998 even expelled the inspectors turned investigators.
UN precedent from the Korean War provided for the intended invasion of Iraq and could have been blocked by either China or Russia. The war against Saddam Hussein was resumed because Bush #2 finally obeyed UN and confirming Congressional mandates. The invasion completed UN direction to “restore international peace and security in the area” and forced the UN to confront the reason for its’ existence.
UN Security Council Resolution 678 http://www.javier-leon-diaz.com/humanitarianIssues/Resolution678.pdf
UN Security Council Resolution 687 http://fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm
Korean War Resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f1e85c.html
Unlike his fool of a son, Bush senior was a foreign policy realist. The Project for a New American Century crackpots that Dubya filled his administration with thought otherwise. Since they considered religion irrelevant it never occurred to them that a western nation invading and occupying an Islamic country would stir up a never ending hornet's nest.
The PNAC crew had been champing at the bit to take over Iraq for years. In December 1997 the Weekly Standard ran its "Saddam Must Go" editorial. On January 26, 1998 PNAC issued its Open Letter to Clinton urging him to invade and remove Saddam Hussein.