Good points...I read the report and cannot believe the captain was conducting effective loss-of-steering drills on the bridge watch teams or adequately training watchstanders on this complex, albeit less than intuitive, equipment.
On quiet nights at open sea, the mid-watch was always used to conduct drills of this nature. In fairness, I have been out of the Navy for a long time; but even back then, many distractions were being introduced that adversely impacted readiness.
I know. It seems outlandish. As you said, the time for conducting those types of drills under the BEST of conditions would have to be in an appropriate setting away from an actual docking process. And that after a lot of simulation.
I hope people don’t think I am making excuses for that sailor, but I don’t see him as the primary culprit here. If they had the correct training processes, and the software was properly designed, there should have been little there on that console that was a mystery except for perhaps configuration types of things, which he as an end user would not necessarily have to know, or if he did, would be opened to him via software application permissions.
And if they were open to him, he darn well should have been expected to know about those configuration options and what they did.
I have spent many years after my tour in the Navy and ten years working clinically in health care setting up, training, and supporting software, so I have seen this type of thing from both being a young sailor (I was a jet mechanic) to software interface design, configuration, support, and training.
It is evident to me that the software design had holes in it. This is not unusual, nearly all software has holes or shortcomings...it is the job of the implementers and training coordinators to see those holes and set up processes and procedures to make sure people are aware of those holes and to train around them.
The training was obviously substandard. If I had to guess the BEST case scenario, I would say the software was not well designed to limit the exposure of users to appropriate features and menus (no robust permissions functionality) depending on their job, but was open to everyone, and the trainers said things like “Don’t worry about that menu. It has a lot of things you don’t want to mess with, so don’t go in there”. That is the best case. The worst case is that the software DID have capability to limit functionality to users, but people were too lazy or poorly trained to configure it correctly, and thus people at any time were dependent on users to heed their warning not to “mess around in there”. I have seen it, and due to limitations in software, have had to trust people with more permissions than they needed (because they had a specific function they needed to get their job done) but I overcome that distasteful compromise by extra training to instruct them on what could happen if they did “mess” with something they didn’t understand, and to make sure they understood the ramifications.
The unfortunate thing there is that to set up permissions in software appropriately, you have to understand completely the different roles people play and create specific permission sets exactly for each role, and codify that in solid policies and procedures. I have to think (given my own experience in the way the US military trains people to do their jobs, and how those jobs are carried out) that would be completely set in cement for US Navy bridge teams, but I have never served there, so I am only guessing. I just assume it is very rigid.
Lastly, I sympathize with this sailor. It is easy as an older man to forget, but I recall too vividly learning tasks and feeling very insecure in my ability and knowledge for that task the first number of times I had to perform it without someone supervising me directly. A good example was the concept of calculating a plane’s weight so that the correct amount of catapult pressure could be applied for a successful launch. That was my job for a few months. You had to check the fuel load...the bomb load, add it all up, and present it via a small chalkboard (IIRC, that was a long time ago now) to the pilot as they taxied to the catapult. The pilot was also responsible for adding it up, and the pilot would give you a thumbs up if their calculation squared with yours. You would then give that number to the catapult team, and they would set the catapult strength.
If you screwed up and the pilot was distracted and assumed you did it correctly and gave you a thumbs up, the strength could be set incorrectly. To strong, and it could damage the plane. Too weak, and you would get a cold cat shot, and the plane would end up in the drink with loss of life and property. So it was important.
I was terrified for the simple reason that my math skills were terrible. I agonized over every calculation to make sure I got it right, and I didn’t want to be responsible for a mishap. No person wants to be the “weak sister” at best, and at worst, responsible for someone’s death.
And so these young people like this sailor may not be the best judge of what they do or don’t know enough of. That has to be the person training and qualifying them, because you have to take that uncertainty out of the hands of the young sailor, Marine, airman, or soldier. There have to be processes in place to have a measure of that for a trainer so they can determine qualification.
Given how this happened, I simply cannot see how it is possible they had those processes in place and were followed.