Wrong, disabling the system simply re-engaged it. And did so in an invisible manner. It did so in an increasingly aggressive manner until human power could not over-ride. Disengaging autopilot and trim re-engages MCAS. All was hidden from the pilot so Boeing could fraudulently claim it was just another 737. And your telling on the accident sequences in both crashes are utterly incorrect.
But if it makes you feel better to blame foreign pilots, that’s cool with me.
“Wrong, disabling the system simply re-engaged it. “
hmmm. If it is disabled it won’t re-engage.
Go home to have lunch and guess what showed up on the AVWeb site? Story is finally beginning to leak out. You better get busy because you’ve got lots of people that need correcting, apparently even the Indonesian FAA:
First Airplane
The committee said it couldn’t determine if the installation of a repaired AoA vane was properly tested, but it said the mis-calibration wasn’t detected and the airplane took off in an unairworthy condition. The sensor’s calibration was 21 degrees in error, according to the report. The investigation revealed lack of documentation in flight and maintenance logs such that the accident crew was unaware that a flight the previous day had experienced runaway trim due to the faulty MCAS. That crew disabled the stabilizer trim system after the faulty MCAS activation, but it didn’t report the fault once it landed at the destination.
Second Airplane
The report said the pilots of Lion JT 610, the accident aircraft, were distracted by multiple alerts, repetitive MCAS activations and numerous ATC communications and didn’t manage the emergency effectively, partly because of poor crew resource management. The committee noted that these deficiencies had been identified previously in training and reemerged during the accident flight. When the MCAS activated, it took the first officer four minutes to locate the proper checklist because he wasn’t familiar with required memory items. During training, the same pilot had shown unfamiliarity with Boeing and airline standard operating procedures and had weak aircraft handling skills, the report revealed. Although the FO was experienced in the 737–4286 hours in type–his training record reflected numerous deficiencies, including “major problems” controlling the aircraft and being too rushed and too rough with the controls on approach.