Posted on 05/03/2019 8:50:09 AM PDT by billorites
Boeing limited the role of its own pilots in the final stages of developing the 737 MAX flight-control system implicated in two fatal crashes, departing from a longstanding practice of seeking their detailed input, people familiar with the matter said.
As a result, Boeing test pilots and senior pilots involved in the MAX’s development didn’t receive detailed briefings about how fast or steeply the automated system known as MCAS could push down a plane’s nose, these people said. Nor were they informed that the system relied on a single sensor—rather than two—to verify the accuracy of incoming data about the angle of a plane’s nose, they added.
Investigators have linked faulty sensor data to the flight-control system’s misfire, which led to crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia that took 346 lives. Share Your Thoughts
How involved should pilots be in airplane-engineering decisions? Join the conversation below.
The extent of pilots’ lack of involvement hasn’t been previously reported and could bring fresh scrutiny from investigators and regulators already looking into Boeing’s design and engineering practices. It isn’t clear whether greater pilot participation would have altered the ultimate design of the flight-control system. But the scaling back of pilots’ involvement and their lack of detailed knowledge about the plane’s system add to the list of questions about engineering and design practices facing the Chicago-based aerospace giant.
A Boeing spokesman said test pilots and senior pilots didn’t have less of a role in the design, briefing and testing of the final version of MCAS when compared with counterparts who worked on previous models featuring important new systems.
“Listening to pilots is an important aspect of our work,” the spokesman said. “Their experienced input is front and center in our mind when we develop airplanes. We share a common priority—safety—and we listen to them carefully.”
(Excerpt) Read more at wsj.com ...
<== My Shocked Face, this is it!
When I worked at Boeing, we were under a ton of consent decrees for previous shenanigans they had done. Hell, I was working at the Pentagon and SAW them leading Darleen Druyun out of her office in handcuffs for the stunts she pulled for them. . .
The MCAS system looked down right scary to me, you have to risk breaking your arm/hand to manually override it?
The Software engineers allowed it to engage below 1000 feet?
Of course any decent pilot would never engage these automated systems until they hit altitude.
...
That’s the job of the pilots.
Can't do much of that pilot stuff with the AOA of the horizontal stab max'd out. Pulling back on the elevator then puts a great deal of downward pressure on the trailing edge of the stab and won't overcome the upward forces.
Also Boeing failed to tell Southwest that the AOA disagree alert was option on the MAX. Southwest had incorrect manuals and training concerning this system.
http://www.frequentbusinesstraveler.com/2019/04/southwest-was-unaware-of-optional-boeing-737-max-safety-feature/
Things look bad for both Boeing and the FAA.
“I’ll say it again: In the 737 Max, the engine nacelles themselves can, at high angles of attack, work as a wing and produce lift. And the lift they produce is well ahead of the wing’s center of lift, meaning the nacelles will cause the 737 Max at a high angle of attack to go to a higher angle of attack. This is aerodynamic malpractice of the worst kind.”
I read that article last month...it is a good one.
“The redesign of the 737-800 Max resulted in an aircraft that was unstable in pitch around the lateral axis ...”
I’m not sure the test pilot’s job is to evaluate reliability of things like an angle of attack sensor. Just like they’re not supposed to evaluate the strength of the blades within the engines.
But I’d think they would put the plane through all sorts of unusual maneuvers and problem situations while in flight.
Whether or not they knew explicitly of the MCAS system (autopilot), I’d think they would fly the plane with it both on and off.
I’d say the test pilots wouldn’t even need to know about the MCAS peculiarities beforehand because they would find them when testing.
The first job of the test pilots is to verify that the plane is safe for an ordinary pilot to fly.
But it allows us to make belive that it is still a 737.
And airline rejections of current production aircraft indicate major lapses in plain old quality control. Overall, Boeing is in deep, deep trouble in the market.
IMO only a top to bottom internal purge (board of directors down to its workforce) plus really dramatic change in design and production procedures might save the company. How long it takes Boeing to do that will probably determine whether it survives.
From the comments...
...Very good analysis, but fatally incomplete. One really essential reason those planes crashed was that each time the MCAS triggered, it acted like it was the first time. If it added 1 degree of trim last time, it adds a second this time, a third next time, up to the five degrees that runs the trim all the way to the stops. A second reason is that, under the design still on file at the FAA, it could only add a maximum of 0.8 degrees (each time). This was raised to 2.4 degrees after testing, so only two hits could, in principle, put you almost to the stops. A third was that the only way to override the MCAS was to turn off power to the motor that worked the trim. But above 400 knots, the strength needed to dial back the trim with the hand crank was more than actual live pilots have, especially if it is taking all their strength to pull back on the yoke. A fourth was that, with two flight control computers, the pilot could (partly) turn off a misbehaving one, but there is no way to turn on the other one. You have to land first, to switch over, even though the other is doing all the work to be ready to fly the plane. A fifth was that it ignored that pilots were desperately pulling back on the yoke, which could have been a clue that it was doing the wrong thing. A sixth was that, besides comparing redundant sensors, it could have compared what the other flight computer thought it should be doing.
Thanks for that article reference. It’s the only one to coherently explain the function of MCAS on the 737 MAX. Looks ultimately like a software hack to overcome an inherent bad design; engine nacelles simply too large to properly fit the airframe without a redesign.
“Finally, there’s the need to keep the very existence of the MCAS system on the hush-hush lest someone say, “Hey, this isn’t your father’s 737,” and bank accounts start to suffer.”
“But it allows us to make believe that it is still a 737. “
A plan entirely based upon the idea that calling it a 737 would save Boeing and the airlines millions in retraining. Guess they will have to rethink that one.
In the case of the Ethiopian crash, the first sign of a problem was the stick shaker going off on the captain’s side only. Why didn’t he transfer control of the plane to the first officer at that point?
Reminds me of the Shuttle Challenger fiasco...
Stop spreading lies.
“Is Boeing going to be sued into oblivion?”
No.
BA is too important to the DJIA and the President has made the stock market his official ‘report card’. Plus nikki haley is now on the board of directors and Boeing does too much defense work for the government to allow them to be crippled.
The FAA should be on the hook as well, as they certified the aircraft. But public trust in the FAA is too important to lose, so you will see little to no fallout on their end either.
If BA hasn’t taken a huge hit by now, it isn’t going to. But I applaud the WSJ for their work.
What is your argument? "Stop spreading lies??" That's it?? Don't be an asshole.
The bottom line is that human intervention was over-ridden by AI. Any craft that does not permit the pilot to immediately assume stick control of the aircraft is a flying coffin. Furthermore, FAA should never have certified a craft that was inherently unstable.
Since the larger more powerful engines were used and relocated, and affected the trim on takeoff, you would have to make some physical alterations to the wings and tail of the plane to offset that engine change.
Using MCAS software to accomplish this was the less expensive way of correcting this.
What I don't like is not having the second external flight plane indicator made mandatory and being specific in what to do if you get two radically different readings - Tom
“Since the larger more powerful engines were used and relocated, and affected the trim on takeoff, you would have to make some physical alterations to the wings and tail of the plane to offset that engine change.
Using MCAS software to accomplish this was the less expensive way of correcting this.”
WRONG. THE MCAS is totally disabled from actuation during take off.
It has been obvious from the start, BOEING and/or the FAA engaged in criminal activity to get this plane certified for airworthiness. The model with a single sensor being used to override pilot input could NEVER pass the most basic review.
Either BOEING faked/lied about this to the FAA, or they bribed folks in the FAA to look the other way.
There is ABSOLUTELY NO WAY engineers did not raise concerns about this configuration and there is NO WAY, FAA oversight would not have picked this up. Either BOEING completely lied about how MCAS operated in this version to the FAA, or greased palms there to get it to pass.
The fact the CEO went from “WE OWN IT” in less than two weeks, to telling investors “IT WASN’T OUR FAULT” further reinforces the fact malfeasance occurred.
300+ people are dead, as a result of pure greed, pure and simple.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.