First was the pressure that Boeing was getting from various airlines to provide more fuel-efficient aircraft.
Second was the pressure from Airbus with the upcoming release of their competitive new SE plane.
Third was an archaic web of regulation that permitted Boeing to not need to undergo a full certification of the MAX to get it out of the door quickly.
Fourth was the configuration of the aircraft from a stability standpoint (a result of Boeing taking a shortcut via the first three above and patching the instability with a software program). You cannot change the wing, loading, and power configuration of the engines without taking into account the body profile itself.
Fifth was the programming of the MCAS system to rely on a single sensor -- the Angle of Attack sensor -- which according to aerospace engineers I spoke to can have an error factor of 10-20%.
Lastly is the somewhat secretive way they rolled this out, keeping the instability of the airframe quiet and not performing full training on the new system to affected pilots.
This aircraft should have never been certified. Boeing needs to pull it and go back to the drawing board to design the way they should have in the first place.
Which is as ridiculous as it sounds, legalease mumbo jumbo for why not sneak an easy fix in to save us time and money.
I don't think there's anything wrong with the concept of the MCAS, most aircraft today are fly by wire. It's the idea of putting a new system in and keeping it a secret.
Well done. All threads should refer back to your comment on this matter.
One item to add to your list—corporate governance.
The Board of Directors is a pathetic combination of political hacks (to con regulators and help obtain military industrial complex contracts) and hedge fund hacks (to con big investors).
24/7 corruption—that is where we are today.