I became a SWO in 1985. Completely agree with you on the manning assessment. One thing I noticed quite early was most of the ‘manpower analysis’ folks I met were female and not one of them had spent a single day underway on a ship since their commissioning. Funny how NAVMAC’s ‘vision statement’ is ‘We lead the Navy in manpower solutions’. The only thing we ever heard from them was how we could reduce manning.
When we went all proactive and sent extra people to school to become rescue swimmers or AIC’s, we’d eventually get raided just prior to deployment by the Squadron, so instead of being up two we’d be down one.
Just my opinion, but the addition of women made it worse. We were 0 of 1 for a Harpoon Maintenance Tech (HMT) and couldn’t receive our Cruise Missile Tactical Qual (CMTQ) until we had that person onboard. We waited a full year for her (FC1) to finish school and show up. The day she arrived we called our DESRON; two days later and the FC1 was gone. She reported for duty two months pregnant. Found out later she’d done that on her last ship too. No penalty for her, but we deployed without a HMT.
The Battle Group XO’s spent Saturdays trading people involved in romantic relationships, so we could get them on the Sunday Holy Helo. That’s one goat rope I don’t miss. It’s unfortunate none of this is reported - try to find the Navy pregnancy rates and you’ll hear ‘they don’t track that information’. Sure they do - it’s just so abysmal they don’t want the numbers out.
Thank you and all for their service, but you mean there is a problem?
Worse than you thought: inside the secret Fitzgerald probe the Navy ... Jan 13, 2019 - Their report documents the routine, almost casual, violations of standing orders on a ... Some radar controls didn't work and he soon discovered crew members who didn't know how to use them
When Fort walked into the trash-strewn CIC in the wake of the disaster, he was hit with the acrid smell of urine. He saw kettlebells on the deck and bottles filled with pee. Some radar controls didn’t work and he soon discovered crew members who didn’t know how to use them anyway.
Fort found a Voyage Management System that generated more “trouble calls” than any other key piece of electronic navigational equipment. Designed to help watchstanders navigate without paper charts, the VMS station in the skipper’s quarters was broken so sailors cannibalized it for parts to help keep the rickety system working.
The Fitz’s commanding officer, Cmdr. Bryce Benson, and Lt. Natalie Combs, who ran the CIC, are battling similar charges in court but contend unlawful command influence by senior leaders scuttled any chance for fair trials.
About three weeks after the ACX Crystal disaster, Fort’s investigators sprang a rules of the road pop quiz on Fitz’s officers. It didn’t go well. The 22 who took the test averaged a score of 59 percent, Fort wrote. Also, The ghost in the Fitz’s machine: why a doomed warship’s crew never saw the vessel that hit it .
He found a pee bottle that had tipped and spilled behind a large-screen display. Fort’s eyes started to take over for his nose, and he took it all in. “There was debris everywhere,” Fort said under oath. “Food debris, food waste, uneaten food, half-eaten food, personal gear in the form of books, workout gear, workout bands, kettlebells, weightlifting equipment, the status boards had graffiti on them.”
And, A warship doomed by ‘confusion, indecision, and ultimately panic’ on the bridge
Coppock wasn’t communicating with her CO or his XO but she also wasn’t talking to the ship’s electronic nerve center — the Combat Information Center, or CIC. Bridge and CIC teams are supposed to constantly share information on what they’re seeing and their sensors detecting, working together to navigate a ship safety through the night. But Coppock wouldn’t talk with the CIC because her counterparts there “had given her bad information in the past,” according to the report.
The CIC was led by Lt. Natalie Combs. Testifying under oath at a hearing last year to determine if Combs should stand court-martial, Fort said it was “unfathomable” that the bridge didn’t talk to the CIC on the night of the disaster.
Then there is
A junior sailor stationed on the amphibious assault ship Essex pleaded guilty this month to bringing a handgun onto a base, driving his car toward a command master chief and smoking marijuana, among other charges. http://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/01/31/junior-sailor-pleads-guilty-to-driving-car-at-command-master-chief/?utm_source=clavis