Pilots are trained for multiple types of runaway stab trim, high speed and low speed. Even without knowing about the MCAS, specially without knowing about the MCAS, the "indication" is that of a low speed runaway stab trim. Thats fundamental. (meaning nothing particular unusual, or standard practice).
All the whining and crying by American flight crews that Boeing did not tell them about the MCAS system (which is bad) is obscuring the fact that hey, your stab trim not doing what its suppose to do for whatever reason . . . shut off the Stab Cutout switches.
Reading that one report stating the first officer became PF (pilot flying) yet did not attempt to maually trim the airplane, says to me the flight crew stopped working together. Captain has to manage.
If my flight crew had brain-farted and forgot to check the stab trim cutout switches, OR more importantly the instrument transfer switches, I would expect the PNF Pilot not flying to assist in manually control the trim wheel.
Also another factor that is not being talked about, If I understand correctly, the Captain was a "Indian national," first officer Indonesian . . . meaning that for neither crew english is not their mother tongue. Yet to communicate to each other would require them to speak english. Just that fact alone puts them 3 steps behind in a abnormal situation such as this. If they ever recover the CVR and listen, am sure many will be shaking their heads with palm to the face.
"Runaway Trim" checklists are designed around an event of the trim running continuously in one direction or the other, with the yoke trim switch being mechanically jammed internally toward completing the circuit toward either direction. But this was not that scenario -- the trim was only moving intermittently because the MCAS can be interrupted by actuating the yoke trim in the opposite direction momentarily -- stopping the MCAS for a five second interval until it starts again for up to 10 seconds, unless it is again interrupted. That's what happened about 20 times as the crew struggled to analyze what was happening. That's why they went so long in near-level flight, until the MCAS finally actuated long enough to reach full down-trim (first officer had likely just taken control at that time during the last couple of cycles of the MCAS). And the runaway trim scenario taught in the simulator doesn't piggyback on top of a continuous stick-shaker indicating a stall -- that is a compound emergency not addressed in the simulator. The result is a lot of confusion in the cockpit (and maybe compounded, as you said, by cultural/language barriers). It's unfortunate that the crew didn't think of using the Stab Cutout switches, but given the intermittent nature of the MCAS-actuated trim, the fact that the manual trim could not override the MCAS (trim controlled by MCAS still moves opposite trim wheel manual movement), the compressed time factor, and the fact that one or both of them had to struggle to keep the nose up due to yoke forces, it isn't too much of a surprise that they didn't run a checklist that was perceived as secondary to the first problem they experienced with the stick shaker on climbout (and remember at first there was no MCAS activation during initial climbout since the flaps were still extended).
Pilots are right to be upset that Boeing kept this feature of the Max a secret, and Boeing will have to learn it's lesson the hard way. I doubt Boeing will get much sympathy from the public by blaming the crew or by blaming LionAir's training program.
OR more importantly the instrument transfer switches
Which instruments would have made a difference?
Think very carefully before flying a second world and don.t fly a third world airline. Experience and culture are rarely problems in the first world.