When a North Korean Missile Accidentally Hit a North Korean City

The Diplomat ^ | January 03, 2018 | Ankit Panda and Dave Schmerler

[TigerLikesRooster]

When a North Korean Missile Accidentally Hit a North Korean City

Early last year, a North Korean IRBM crashed in a populated area. What does that tell us?

By Ankit Panda and Dave Schmerler
January 03, 2018

What happens when a North Korean ballistic missile test fails in flight and explodes in a populated area? On April 28, 2017, North Korea launched a single Hwasong-12/KN17 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) from Pukchang Airfield in South Pyongan Province (the Korean People’s Army’s Air and Anti-Air Force Unit 447 in Ryongak-dong, Sunchon City, to be more precise). That missile failed shortly after launch and crashed in the Chongsin-dong, in North Korean city of Tokchon, causing considerable damage to a complex of industrial or agricultural buildings.

According to a U.S. government source with knowledge of North Korea’s weapons programs who spoke to The Diplomat, the missile’s first stage engines failed after approximately one minute of powered flight, resulting in catastrophic failure. The missile never flew higher than approximately 70 kilometers. The location of the missile’s eventual impact was revealed exclusively to The Diplomat and evidence of the incident can be independently corroborated in commercially available satellite imagery from April and May 2017.

[TigerLikesRooster]

At the time, one possible scenario was that NK aborted the launch because they realized it was heading in the wrong direction. To Russia. It could have been a simple accident, too.

[TigerLikesRooster]

P!

[a fool in paradise]

An unarmed nuke was dropped on America once accidentally and it wasn’t one of the tests. The explosive trigger made a crater.

“Luckily, the nuclear core of the bomb had been stored elsewhere on the plane.”

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2135832/Boy-got-lucky-The-incredible-story-U-S-air-force-accidentally-dropped-nuclear-weapon-little-girls-playhouse-1958-South-Carolina.html

[PGR88]

Too bad it didn’t land in China.

Now that would be amusing to watch.

[TigerLikesRooster]

If it happens, the way Chinese usually works is to punish NK for a while, such as oil embargo for 10 days, and quietly go back to normal after NK dispatches its delegation to ‘sincerely’ apologize for the ‘mishap.’ Unless it hits a population center and results in tens of thousands of casualties.

[bitt]

p

[caww]

When a North Korean Missile Accidentally Hit a North Korean City

[Slyfox]

Somebody remotely snapped this photo one-half of a nano-second before it exploded:

[Slyfox]

[COBOL2Java]

A sobering conclusion in the article (bold is mine):

...had the launch succeeded, Rodong Sinmun would likely have printed an image of Kim Jong-un standing in front of the transporter-erector-mounted IRBM in a hardened tunnel.

That would have (and now does) send a dire message to U.S. and allied military planners: North Korea’s missiles won’t be sitting ducks at known “launch pads,” contrary to much mainstream analysis. What’s more, the proliferation of newly constructed hangers, tunnels, and storage sites cannot be assumed to stop at the Pukchang Airfield. Similar facilities likely exist across the country. In 2017, not only has North Korea tested a massive variety of strategic weaponry, but it has done so from a more diverse list of launch sites — what the U.S. intelligence community calls “ballistic missile operating areas” — than ever before. Gone are the days of Kim Jong-un supervising and observing launches at a limited list of sites that’d include Sinpo, Sohae, Wonsan, and Kittaeryong.

It is true that missiles like the Hwasong-12, Hwasong-14, and even the new behemoth, the Hwasong-15, all use liquid fuels and must be fueled prior to launch. (North Korea’s Pukguksong-2 medium-range ballistic missile uses solid propellants and does not have this limitation.) Even with this fueling requirement, U.S. and allied intelligence would have at best a couple hours to detect launch preparations. Finally, though riskier, North Korea could fuel these missiles in a horizontal configuration within their hardened storage sites and use its road-mobile transporter-erector-launchers to launch them with fewer pre-launch signatures.

As North Korea’s production of now-proven IRBMs and ICBMs continues, it will have a large and diversified nuclear force spread across multiple hardened sites, leaving the preventive warfighter’s task close to impossible if the objective is a comprehensive, disarming first strike leaving Pyongyang without retaliatory options. The time is long gone to turn the clock back on North Korea’s ballistic missile program and its pre-launch basing options.