Posted on 12/07/2017 7:16:21 AM PST by EliRoom8
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Wray won’t/can’t talk about the IG Investigation of the Hillary Top Secret emails or the phony Mueller Trump-Russia Investigation. As a result it doesn’t seem to me that we are going to learn much.
He’s a Stooge.
YES!!!
It sure was and he attempted to set a trap the entire time for Wray which did not work.
Nadler is one of many ‘I'm smart, connected, more clever, and better than you’ NYC politicians whose mommies always told them they were special. If they actually were talented and anywhere near what they think of themselves, they wouldn't have made such a mess of the nation. Few are more pathetic than those who think themselves superior.
Chapter CLXXXV.1
PUNISHMENT OF WITNESSES FOR CONTEMPT.2
1. The Statute. Section 335.
2. Case of Harry F. Sinclair. Sections 336–338.
3. Case of M. S. Daugherty. Sections 339–343.
4. Robert W. Stewart. Sections 344, 345.
5. Thomas W. Cunningham. Sections 346–351.
6. Bishop James Cannon, jr. Sections 352, 353.
335. A statute penalizes recalcitrancy of witnesses summoned to testify
before either House or any committee of either House.
Witnesses summoned to testify may not excuse themselves under the
plea that their testimony would compromise them.
Sections 192–194 of title 2 of the United States Code provide:
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress,
to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or
any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who having appeared, refuses
to answer any questions pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100, and imprisonment in a
common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.
No witness is privileged to refuse to testify to any fact, or to produce any paper, respecting which
he shall be examined by either House of Congress, or by any committee of either House, upon the
ground that his testimony to such fact or his production of such paper may tend to disgrace him or
otherwise render him infamous.
Whenever a witness summoned as mentioned fails to testify, and the facts axe reported to either
House, the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House, as the case may be, shall certify the
fact under the seal of the Senate or House to the district attorney for the District of Columbia, whose
duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury for their action.
336. The case of Harry F. Sinclair, a recalcitrant witness, in 1924.
Counsel for a contumacious witness, present at the examination and
transgressing the bounds of propriety, was admonished.
For declining to testify or to obey a subpoena duces tecum commanding
him to produce certain papers, Harry F. Sinclair was certified
to the district attorney for contempt.
Form of subpoena duces tecum issued by order of the Senate.
A committee in reporting the recusancy of a witness, included a transcript
of the testimony, so as to show in what the contempt consisted.
1 Supplementary to Chapter LIII.
2 See also the case of Marshall, sections 350–354, Chapter CCII, in this volume; also section 542
of the same chapter.
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Don’t know. Not watching. Just hot air.
337. The case of Harry F. Sinclair, continued.
A witness refusing to testify before a committee of the Senate was
indicted and tried in the district court.
Decision of the district court on the right of the Senate to compel testimony
and the production of papers and records.
Pursuant to the order of the Senate 1 a formal certificate was issued, signed
by the acting President pro tempore, and transmitted to the district attorney. A
grand jury returned an indictment on March 31, 1924, and the case was tried in
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
338. The case of Harry F. Sinclair, continued. While emphasizing the
importance of protecting the individual from unreasonable and arbitrary
disclosures of his private affairs, the court holds that either House of Congress
is authorized to require testimony in aid of legislation.
The fact that testimony sought by a committee of the House might militate
against the interest of the witness in a pending suit was held not to
excuse him from supplying information properly within the scope of the
inquiry.
The trial resulting in a conviction and a sentence of imprisonment and fine
having been imposed, the case was carried to the appellate court, which requested
the United States Supreme Court to instruct it on certain points of law involved
in the case. The Supreme Court, however, elected to consider the entire record and
pass on all phases of the appeal instead of answering the specific questions.
Mr. Justice Pierce Butler delivered the opinion of the court on April 8, 1929.
After citing the statute 2 under which indictment was returned, and reviewing the
history of the case, the opinion thus outlines the contention of the appellant:
Appellant contends that his demurrer to the several counts of the indictment should have been
sustained and that a verdict of not guilty should have been directed. To support that contention he
argues that the questions related to his private affairs and to matters cognizable only in the courts
wherein they were pending, and that the committee avowedly had departed from any inquiry in aid
of legislation.
He maintains that there was no proof of any authorized inquiry by the committee or that he was
legally summoned or sworn or that the questions propounded were pertinent to any inquiry it was
authorized to make, and that because of such failure he was entitled to have a verdict directed in his
favor.
He insists that the court erred in holding that the question of pertinency was one of law for the
court and in not submitting it to the jury and also erred in excluding evidence offered to sustain his
refusal to answer.
The court first considers the contention of the appellant as to the limitations
upon the power of Congress to inquire into private affairs and the importance of
1 Second session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 4791.
2 279 U.S. 263, 749.
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480 PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. § 338
protecting the individual from unreasonable and arbitrary disclosures of purely personal
matters:
It has always been recognized in this country, and it is well to remember, that few if any of the
rights of the people guarded by fundamental law are of greater importance to their happiness and
safety than the right to be exempt from all unauthorized, arbitrary, or unreasonable inquiries and
disclosures in respect of their personal and private affairs.
The opinion, however, holds that the issues in the pending case do not relate
merely to private or personal affairs and says:
But it is clear that neither the investigation authorized by the Senate resolutions above mentioned
nor the question under consideration related merely to appellant’s private or personal affairs. Under
the Constitution (Art. IV, sec. 3) Congress has plenary power to dispose of and to make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the naval oil reserves, other public lands and property of the United
States. And undoubtedly the Senate had power to delegate authority to its committee to investigate
and report what had been and was being done by executive departments under the leasing act, the
naval oil reserve act, and the President’s order in respect of the reserves and to make any other inquiry
concerning the public domain.
While appellant caused the Mammoth Oil Company to be organized and owned all its shares, the
transaction purporting to lease to it the lands within the reserve can not be said to be merely or principally
the personal or private affair of appellant. It was a matter of concern to the United States. The
title to valuable Government lands was involved. The validity of the lease and the means by which
it had been obtained under existing law were subjects that properly might be investigated in order to
determine what if any legislation was necessary or desirable in order to recover the leased lands or
to safeguard other parts of the public domain.
Neither Senate Joint Resolution 54 nor the action taken under it operated to divest the Senate
or the committee of power further to investigate the actual administration of the land laws. It may
be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding the
prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through its committees, to
require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged because the information
sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits.
The record does not sustain appellant’s contention that the investigation was avowedly not in aid
of legislation. He relies on the refusal of the committee to pass the motion directing that the inquiry
should not relate to controversies pending in court and the statement of one of the members that there
was nothing else to examine appellant about. But these are not enough to show that the committee
intended to depart from the purpose to ascertain whether additional legislation might be advisable. It
is plain that investigation of the matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under Senate
Joint Resolution 54 might directly aid in respect of legislative action.
The court holds that the resolution empowering the committee to conduct the
investigation was ample authorization for summoning witnesses and eliciting testimony:
There is some merit in appellant’s contention that a verdict should have been directed for him
because the evidence failed to show that the committee was authorized to make the inquiry, summon
witnesses, and administer oaths. Resolutions 282 and 294 were sufficient until the expiration of the
Sixty-seventh Congress during which they were adopted, but it is argued that Resolution 434 was not
effective to extend the power of the committee. As set out in the indictment and shown by the record,
Resolution 434 does not mention 294 or refer to the date of its adoption. The former so far as material
follows: ‘‘Resolved, That Senate Resolution 282, agreed to April 21, 1922, and Senate Resolution 292,
agreed to May 15, 1922, authorizing and directing the Committee on Public Lands and Surveys to
investigate the entire subject of leases upon naval oil reserves, with particular reference to the protection
of the rights and equities of the Government of the United States and the
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§ 338 PUNISHMENT OF WITNESSES FOR CONTEMPT. 481
preservation of its natural resources, and to report its findings and recommendations to the Senate
* * * be * * * continued in full force and effect until the end of the Sixty-eighth Congress. The committee
* * * is authorized to sit * * * after the expiration of the present Congress until the assembling
of the Sixty-eighth Congress and until otherwise ordered by the Senate.’’
There is enough in that resolution to show that where ‘‘292’’ appears 294 was meant. The subject
of the investigation is specifically mentioned. That is the only matter dealt with. The sole purpose was
to authorize the committee to carry on the inquiry. It would be quite unreasonable, if not indeed
absurd, for the Senate to direct investigation by the committee and to allow its power to summon and
swear witnesses to lapse. The context and circumstances show that Resolution 294 was intended to
be kept in force.
The court then rules that the questions propounded were within the scope of
this authorization:
Appellant earnestly maintains that the question was not shown to be pertinent to any inquiry the
committee was authorized to make. The United States suggests that the presumption of regularity is
sufficient without proof. But, without determining whether that presumption is applicable to such a
matter, it is enough to say that the stronger presumption of innocence attended the accused at the
trial. It was therefore incumbent upon the United States to plead and show that the question pertained
to some matter under investigation. Appellant makes no claim that the evidence was not sufficient to
establish the innuendo alleged in respect of the question; the record discloses that the proof on that
point was ample.
Congress, in addition to its general legislative power over the public domain, had a the powers
of a proprietor and was authorized to deal with it as a private individual may deal with lands owned
by him. The committee’s authority to investigate extended to matters affecting the interest of the
United States as owner as well as to those having relation to the legislative function.
Before the hearing at which appellant refused to answer, the committee had discovered and
reported facts tending to warrant the passage of Senate Joint Resolution 54 and the institution of suits
for the cancellation of the naval oil reserve leases. Undoubtedly it had authority further to investigate
concerning the validity of such leases, and to discover whether persons, other than those who had been
made defendants in the suit against the Mammoth Oil Company, had or might assert a right or claim
in respect of the lands covered by the lease to that company.
The contract and release made and given by Bonfils and Stack related directly to the title to the
lands covered by the lease which had been reported by the committee as unauthorized and fraudulent.
The United States proposed to recover and hold such lands as a source of supply of oil for the Navy.
(S. J. Res. 54.) It is clear that the question so propounded to appellant was pertinent to the committee’s
investigation touching the rights and equities of the United States as owner.
Moreover, it was pertinent for the Senate to ascertain the practical effect of recent changes that
had been made in the laws relating to oil and other mineral lands in the public domain. The leases
and contracts charged to have been unauthorized and fraudulent were made soon after the Executive
order of May 31, 1921. The title to the lands in the reserves could not be cleared without ascertaining
whether there were outstanding any claims or applications for permits, leases, or patents under the
leasing act or other laws. It was necessary for the Government to take into accounts the rights, if any
there were, of such claimants. The reference in the testimony of Bonfils to the contract referred to in
the question propounded was sufficient to put the committee on inquiry concerning outstanding claims
possibly adverse and superior to the Mammoth Oil Company’s lease. The question propounded was
within the authorization of the committee and the legitimate scope of investigation to enable the
Senate to determine whether the powers granted to or assumed by the Secretary of the Interior and
the Secretary of the Navy should be withdrawn, limited, or allowed to remain unchanged.
The opinion concludes:
The reasons for holding relevancy and materiality to be questions of law in cases such as those
above referred to apply with equal force to the determination of pertinency arising under section
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482 PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. § 339
102. The matter for determination in this case was whether the facts called for by the question were
so related to the subjects covered by the Senate’s resolutions that such facts reasonably could be said
to be ‘‘pertinent to the question under inquiry.’’ It would be incongruous and contrary to well-established
principles to leave the determination of such a matter to a jury.
The conviction was accordingly affirmed.
I watched about 1 minutes worth, then they went back to Waddler and I clicked off.
Director Wray is not going to disclose one iota of “interesting information” in this kind of public hearing. Just as AG Sessions did not. All as it should be.
If they truly wanted answers to Anything, they would get them, I see a DOG and PONY show!!!
Shelia’s up. Her wackadoodle comments will indeed be interesting.
There’s not enough litter in the world to cover up this crap! All these political whores and stooges don’t have the gray matter to figure that out?
Wray is one slick Dude. SJL is an idiot.
Of course, Sheila was all about the poor down trodden BLMs.
As it should be, you are correct. I don’t understand why people get highly upset when the people testifying don’t just blab all and ruin the investigation.
I just had to turn Wray off as I became sick at his covering up for Mueller and Comey.
Here’s my take: Republicans on the committee ask questions pertaining to the subject of the hearing. Democrats ask questions having nothing to do with the subject matter but rather, their personal liberal viewpoints. Christopher Wray answers all questions as though he is doing a PSA on how important the FBI is to our Nation. To sum it all up; nothing interesting will come out of this hearing and it’s business as usual in DC.
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You nailed it. I quit watching when the black congressspuke asked about White Supremists.
Legalistic precedent at Posts #26 and #28
GO Jim Jordan!!!
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