Yes. Paulus was a staff officer promoted to field commander. He could only take a brute force approach to the Stalingrad campaign. A better general would have been more deft and might have been better prepared for the Russian pincer movement.
But in the end, it was Hitler’s decision to split the Army Group into two pieces, over the violent objections of his generals, and try and accomplish two years’ objectives in one. That’s what doomed the Sixth Army.
The Russian Pincer movement exploited a very clear weakness in the German lines, namely the allied Romanian and Italian armies.
The Italian 8th Army, already poorly equipped, was covering 60+ miles of frontage with just three weakened Corps, that were hardly the size of a division, including a cavalry division.
With the exception of 4 medium guns, the entire Corps Artillery had been removed for use in Stalingrad. The Romanian Armoured Battalion that was supposed to back them up in the event of an attack, couldn’t move due to snow.
When the Russians hit, at the gap between the Italians and Romanians, entire Battalions of men were simply destroyed in place, without a single survivor.
The Germans never expected the Russians to launch such a large offensive in such horrible weather, even though they had done exactly that just the winter before.