Department of the Navy Final Report on the USS FITZGERALD and USS JOHN S MCCAIN collisions.

The collisions were avoidable between USS FITZGERALD (DDG 62) and Motor Vessel ACX CRYSTAL, and between USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) and Motor Vessel AALNIC MC.

The Fitzgerald happened more or less the way I proposed it happened after the initial reports. The Wan Hai (and one other ship) were the ones the OOD was concerned about to the point where he even thought the reports coming to him about the ACX Crystal were reports of a different ship he was observing. In the confusion, he never realized the Crystal was there until it was too late.

The McCain turned out to be due to a steering problem as some initial reporting indicated, although it wasn’t so much loss of steering as it was confusion over who was steering what backup system, apparently. By the time it was figured out, it was too late to avoid the collision.

The appendix to each report lays out the minute-by-minute, and at times the second-by-second, positions of the ships involved and the decisions being made (or not made that should have been made.) All in all, not good advertising for today’s Navy.

If I had a son or daughter on a Navy ship today, I would be very concerned for their safety given the obvious lack of training, and probable over assignment, of the sailors on those ships.

The two Sailors who had been helping people from the bottom of the ladder were eventually forced to climb the ladder as water reached the very top of the Berthing 2 compartment. They continued to assist their shipmates as they climbed, but were eventually forced by the rising water to leave Berthing 2 through the watertight scuttle themselves. Before climbing the ladder, they looked through the water and did not see any other Sailors. Once through the watertight scuttle and completely out of the Berthing 2 space (on the landing outside Berthing 1) they continued to search, reaching into the dark water to try to find anyone they could. From the top of the ladder, these two Sailors were able to pull two other Sailors from the flooded compartment. Both of the rescued Sailors were completely underwater when they were pulled to safety.

I hope these two are recognized for their heroism.

That was the only thing in either report I found surprising:

"...At 0519, the Commanding Officer noticed the Helmsman (the watchstander steering the ship) having difficulty maintaining course while also adjusting the throttles for speed control. In response, he ordered the watch team to divide the duties of steering and throttles, maintaining course control with the Helmsman while shifting speed control to another watchstander known as the Lee Helm station, who sat directly next to the Helmsman at the panel to control these two functions, known as the Ship’s Control Console. See Figures 3 and 4. This unplanned shift caused confusion in the watch team, and inadvertently led to steering control transferring to the Lee Helm Station without the knowledge of the watch team. The CO had only ordered speed control shifted. Because he did not know that steering had been transferred to the Lee Helm, the Helmsman perceived a loss of steering..."

That was the "steering casualty" that had some people blaming the Russians, the Chinese, the North Koreans or the Muslims.

It was just incompetence.

I would disagree to a point, even if I defer to you due to your experience, while admitting I have never stood a bridge watch. I understand your point about the lines of communication, but in a disciplined and well drilled team, this is not historically been the problem it was on these two ships.

In my opinion, the makeup of a bridge team on a warship and a civilian vessel is very different, for obvious reasons. During battle conditions, there must be, by necessity, a far greater number of specialized people present, though the same number of core people (plus probably the Captain) normally engaged in navigation would be there as well.

Because of this requirement, there is a high degree of training and drilling that should have (but clearly did not) take place, and to maintain that level of expertise at all times, the ship’s bridge team is likely manned in that fashion to provide familiarity and experience.

Because of this, I do not believe they go to a fundamentally different bridge team makeup depending on whether it is peacetime or wartime, the core remains the same so that people are familiar with the lines of communications and communication protocols. In combat, it likely becomes very crowded, but the additional crew should not interfere with the navigation and conduct of the core bridge team.

As long at the bridge teams are well trained, they can function efficiently and safely. (while conceding the point that in today’s navy, that seems like a gigantic “if”.)

Protocols of communication and lines of communication on the bridge of a warship likely demand higher levels of discipline and observance to formal protocol than would be necessary or even desirable on nearly any civilian vessel (except perhaps something like one of those LNG tankers or such)

Naval military vessels have operated in extreme conditions for many decades, and at least in our navy, have done well at it, albeit with groundings and collisions that have happened.

The problem here is not the format of bridge team functioning or the process of their navigation. It is, 100%, in the training and execution.

And that all boils down to poor leadership, poor training structure, and worst and most damning of all, poor discipline.

I have been out of the Navy for decades, but I can guarantee without seeing the details, this was the result of poor leadership (no mandate for actual competency or excellence) shoddy training regimens, gun decked performance and competency evaluations and qualifications, lack of focus on the things that are important for a naval vessel’s safe and efficient operation (focus on sexual harassment/gender reassignment/minority and affirmative action issues instead of seamanship and weapons/systems proficiency) and again, worst of all, poor discipline.

A disciplined crew with valid leadership would never have been operating (as the USS Fitzgerald was) without required lookouts...ever. It wouldn’t happen because it wouldn’t be tolerated. But it apparently was, there.

I believe “Vampire Vampire Vampire!” is the call for an incoming missile.

They want you to do things in three sometimes, I presume because in the discord of combat or other situations, saying it once can be critically missed.

In aviation, when a pilot in a mulicrew aircraft has to eject, they are trained to say “Eject Eject Eject!” just to be sure the point gets across correctly in case the pilot mutters something like “This hydraulic pump if an effing reject!” and his RIO hears “Eject!”

Reminds me of that old movie with Richard Widmark “The Bedford Incident” where he has his crew so jacked up with live weapons as they harass a Soviet sub, that when he says to someone “If he fires one, we’ll fire one!” and a crewman only hears him say “...fire one!” and launches an ASROC by accident towards the sub.

On a typical navel vessel their are 6 to 10 people ( McCain had 12) performing the same task and reporting up the chain to a commander who makes decisions to maneuver down through the chain. What could possibly go wrong?

If you've been a Captain for 40 years and are still around to talk about it, I commend you. What size of ships have you captained? The Fitzgerald is over 500 feet long, and has a beam of 65 feet. That's a lot of ship for one person to drive in congested waters.

That said, the Navy has a long, watch standing tradition that has certainly worked well for the past three-quarters of a century, perhaps longer. They do build in redundancy on the bridge watches, and when they're employed correctly, can be very effective at keeping their ships out of danger.

In this case however, it was not that the bridge was under- or over-manned; the personnel were incompetent, especially the OOD. While they were "aware" of three ships coming at them, the OOD appeared not to recognize the imminent danger. They did not ask for assistance, did not fully utilize the resources they had at their disposal, and did not follow international navigational laws.

I do no blame the OOD for everything, though. The fact that the skipper allowed this person to stand watch--to "drive the ship" while exercising such a poor display of seamanship, reflects badly upon him.

I do hold the possibility that perhaps the entire command was under-staffed; perhaps the OOD was a woman or minority, and political pressure forced the Captain to "qualify" them sooner than they were ready. If that was the case, then certainly others above that Captain should pay for this as well. Sadly, 7 sailors paid with their lives.

When I was in the Navy (~30 years ago), I slept in the aft berthing area, beneath the waterline, much like the berthing areas on Fitzgerald and McCain. Never in a million years did I ever concern myself that whoever was driving the ship would place us in danger. I had two captains in the time I spent aboard, and while they were both very different in terms of their management and leadership styles, they would never tolerate that kind of incompetence from their officers or crew.

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