Posted on 07/06/2017 8:02:14 AM PDT by daniel1212
USS Pueblo (AGER-2) is a Banner-class environmental research ship, attached to Navy intelligence as a spy ship, which was attacked and captured by North Korean forces on 23 January 1968, in what is known today as the "Pueblo incident" or alternatively, as the "Pueblo crisis".
The seizure of the U.S. Navy ship and its 83 crew members, one of whom was killed in the attack, came less than a week after President Lyndon B. Johnson's State of the Union address to the United States Congress, just a week before the start of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, and only three days after 31 men of North Korea's KPA Unit 12 had crossed the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and killed 26 South Koreans in an attempt to attack the South Korean Blue House (executive mansion) in the capital Seoul. The taking of Pueblo and the abuse and torture of its crew during the subsequent 11-month prisoner drama became a major Cold War incident, raising tensions between the western democracies and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and People's Republic of China.
North Korea stated that Pueblo deliberately entered their territorial waters 7.6 nautical miles (14 km) away from Ryo Island, and that the logbook shows that they intruded several times.[1] However, the United States maintains that the vessel was in international waters at the time of the incident and that any purported evidence supplied by North Korea to support its statements was fabricated.[2]...
On 5 January 1968, Pueblo left U.S. Navy base Yokosuka, Japan, in transit to the U.S. naval base at Sasebo, Japan; from there she left on 11 January 1968, headed northward through the Tsushima Strait into the Sea of Japan. She left with specific orders to intercept and conduct surveillance of Soviet Union "Red Navy" activity in the Tsushima Strait and to gather signal and electronic intelligence from North Korea.[8] The declassified SIGAD for the National Security Agency (NSA) Direct Support Unit (DSU) from the Naval Security Group (NSG) on Pueblo during the patrol involved in the incident was USN-467Y.[9] AGER (Auxiliary General Environmental Research) denoted a joint Naval and National Security Agency (NSA) program.[10]
At 17:30 on 20 January 1968, a North Korean modified SO-1 class Soviet style submarine chaser passed within 4,000 yards (3.7 km) of Pueblo, which was about 15.4 miles (24.8 km) southeast of Mayang-do at a position 39°47'N and 128°28.5'E.[11]
In the afternoon of 22 January 1968, the two North Korean fishing trawlers Rice Paddy 1 and Rice Paddy 2 passed within 30 yards (27 m) of Pueblo. That day, a North Korean unit made an assassination attempt in the "Blue House" executive mansion against the South Korean President Park Chung-hee, but the crew of Pueblo were not informed.[11]
According to the American account, the following day, 23 January, Pueblo was approached by a sub chaser and her nationality was challenged; Pueblo responded by raising the U.S. flag. The North Korean vessel then ordered it to stand down or be fired upon. Pueblo attempted to maneuver away, but was considerably slower than the sub chaser. Several warning shots were fired. Additionally, three torpedo boats appeared on the horizon and then joined in the chase and subsequent attack.[citation needed]
The attackers were soon joined by two MiG-21 fighters. A fourth torpedo boat and a second sub chaser appeared on the horizon a short time later. The ammunition on Pueblo was stored belowdecks, and her machine guns were wrapped in cold weather tarpaulins. The machine guns were unmanned, and no attempt was made to man them. An NSA report quotes the sailing order:
(...) Defensive armament (machine guns) should be stowed or covered in such manner so that it does not cause unusual interest by surveyed units. It should be used only in the event of a threat to survival (...)
and notes
In practice, it was discovered that, because of the temperamental adjustments of the firing mechanisms, the .50-caliber machine guns took at least ten minutes to activate. Only one crew member, with former army experience, had ever had any experience with such weapons, although members of the crew had received rudimentary instructions on the weapons immediately prior to the ship's deployment.[11]
Reported positions of USS Pueblo North Korean chart showing where they say they captured USS Pueblo
U.S. Navy authorities and the crew of Pueblo insist that before the capture, Pueblo was miles outside North Korean territorial waters. North Korea says the vessel was well within North Korean territory. The mission statement allowed her to approach within a nautical mile (1,852 m) of that limit. North Korea, however, describes a 50-nautical-mile (93 km) sea boundary even though international standards were 12 nautical miles (22 km) at the time.[12]
The North Korean vessels attempted to board Pueblo, but she was maneuvered to prevent this for over two hours. A sub chaser then opened fire with a 57 mm cannon, killing one member of the crew. The smaller vessels fired machine guns into Pueblo, which then signaled compliance and began destroying sensitive material. The volume of material on board was so great that it was impossible to destroy it all. An NSA report quotes Lieutenant Steve Harris, the officer in charge of Pueblo's Naval Security Group Command detachment:
(...) we had retained on board the obsolete publications and had all good intentions of getting rid of these things but had not done so at the time we had started the mission. I wanted to get the place organized eventually and we had excessive numbers of copies on board (...)
and concludes
Only a small percentage of the total classified material aboard the ship was destroyed.
Radio contact between Pueblo and the Naval Security Group in Kamiseya, Japan, had been ongoing during the incident. As a result, Seventh Fleet command was fully aware of Pueblo's situation. Air cover was promised but never arrived. The Fifth Air Force had no aircraft on strip alert, and estimated a two to three-hour delay in launching aircraft. USS Enterprise was located 510 nautical miles (940 km) south of Pueblo, yet its four F-4B aircraft on alert were not equipped for an air-to-surface engagement. Enterprise's captain estimated that 1.5 hours (90 minutes) were required to get the converted aircraft into the air.[11] By the time President Lyndon B. Johnson was awakened, Pueblo had been captured and any rescue attempt would have been futile.[citation needed]
Pueblo followed the North Korean vessels as ordered, but then stopped immediately outside North Korean waters. She was again fired upon, and a sailor, fireman Duane Hodges, was killed. The ship was finally boarded at 0555 UTC (2:55 pm local)[13] by men from a torpedo boat and a sub chaser. Crew members had their hands tied and were blindfolded, beaten, and prodded with bayonets. Once Pueblo was in North Korean territorial waters, she was boarded again, this time by high-ranking North Korean officials.[citation needed]
The first official confirmation that the ship was in North Korean hands came five days later, 28 January 1968. Two days earlier a flight by a CIA A-12 Oxcart aircraft from the Project Black Shield squadron at Kadena, Okinawa flown by pilot Ronald "Jack" Layton made three high altitude high speed flights over North Korea. When the aircraft's films were processed in the United States they showed Pueblo to be in the Wonsan harbor area surrounded by two North Korean vessels.[14]
There was dissent among government officials in the U.S. regarding how to handle the situation. Rep. Mendel Rivers suggested the President issue an ultimatum for the return of Pueblo on penalty of nuclear attack, while Senator Gale McGee said the U.S. should wait for more information and not make "spasmodic response[s] to aggravating incidents".[15] According to Horace Busby, Special Assistant to President Johnson, the President's "reaction to the hostage taking was to work very hard here to keep down any demands for retaliation or any other attacks upon North Koreans", worried that rhetoric might result in the hostages being killed.[16]
Although American officials at the time assumed the seizure of Pueblo had been directed by the Soviet Union, it has emerged in recent years that North Korea acted alone and the incident actually harmed North Korea's relations with most of the Eastern Bloc.[17]
Aftermath See also: Operation Combat Fox
Pueblo was taken into port at Wonsan and the crew was moved twice to POW camps. The crew reported upon release that they were starved and regularly tortured while in North Korean custody. This treatment allegedly turned worse[18] when the North Koreans realized that crewmen were secretly giving them "the finger" in staged propaganda photos.[19]
Commander Lloyd M. Bucher was psychologically tortured, such as being put through a mock firing squad in an effort to make him confess. Eventually the Koreans threatened to execute his men in front of him, and Bucher relented and agreed to "confess to his and the crew's transgression." Bucher wrote the confession since a "confession" by definition needed to be written by the confessor himself. They verified the meaning of what he wrote, but failed to catch the pun when he said "We paean the DPRK [North Korea]. We paean their great leader Kim Il Sung".[20][21] (Bucher pronounced "paean" as "pee on.")[22]
Negotiations for the release of the crew took place at Panmunjom. At the same time, U.S. officials were concerned with conciliating the South Koreans, who expressed discontent about being left out of the negotiations. Richard A. Ericson, a political counselor for the American embassy in Seoul and operating officer for the Pueblo negotiations, notes in his oral history:
The South Koreans were absolutely furious and suspicious of what we might do. They anticipated that the North Koreans would try to exploit the situation to the ROK's disadvantage in every way possible, and they were rapidly growing distrustful of us and losing faith in their great ally. Of course, we had this other problem of how to ensure that the ROK would not retaliate for the Blue House Raid and to ease their growing feelings of insecurity. They began to realize that the DMZ was porous and they wanted more equipment and aid. So, we were juggling a number of problems.[23]
He also noted how the meetings at Panmunjom were usually unproductive, due to the particular negotiating style of the North Koreans:
As one example, we would go up with a proposal of some sort on the release of the crew and they would be sitting there with a card catalog... If the answer to the particular proposal we presented wasn’t in the cards, they would say something that was totally unresponsive and then go off and come back to the next meeting with an answer that was directed to the question. But there was rarely an immediate answer. That happened all through the negotiations. Their negotiators obviously were never empowered to act or speak on the basis of personal judgment or general instructions. They always had to defer a reply and presumably they went over it up in Pyongyang and passed it around and then decided on it. Sometimes we would get totally nonsensical responses if they didn’t have something in the card file that corresponded to the proposal at hand.[23]
North Korean Propaganda Photograph of prisoners of USS Pueblo. Photo and explanation from the Time article that blew the Hawaiian Good Luck Sign secret. The sailors were flipping the middle finger, as a way to covertly protest their captivity in North Korea, and the propaganda on their treatment and guilt. The North Koreans for months photographed them without knowing the real meaning of flipping the middle finger, while the sailors explained that the sign meant good luck in Hawaii.
Ericson and George Newman, the Deputy Chief of Mission in Seoul, wrote a telegram for the State Department in February 1968, predicting how the negotiations would play out:
What we said in effect was this: If you are going to do this thing at Panmunjom, and if your sole objective is to get the crew back, you will be playing into North Korea's hands and the negotiations will follow a clear and inevitable path. You are going to be asked to sign a document that the North Koreans will have drafted. They will brook no changes. It will set forth their point of view and require you to confess to everything they accuse you of... If you allow them to, they will take as much time as they feel they need to squeeze every damn thing they can get out of this situation in terms of their propaganda goals, and they will try to exploit this situation to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the ROK. Then when they feel they have accomplished all they can, and when we have agreed to sign their document of confession and apology, they will return the crew. They will not return the ship. This is the way it is going to be because this is the way it has always been.[23]
Following an apology, a written admission by the U.S. that Pueblo had been spying, and an assurance that the U.S. would not spy in the future, the North Korean government decided to release the 82 remaining crew members, although the written apology was preceded by an oral statement that it was done only to secure the release.[24] On 23 December 1968, the crew was taken by buses to the DMZ border with South Korea and ordered to walk south one by one across the "Bridge of No Return". Exactly eleven months after being taken prisoner, the Captain led the long line of crewmen, followed at the end by the Executive Officer, Lieutenant Ed Murphy, the last man across the bridge. The U.S. then verbally retracted the ransom admission, apology, and assurance. Meanwhile, the North Koreans blanked out the paragraph above the signature which read: "and this hereby receipts for eighty two crewmen and one corpse".[clarification needed]
Bucher and all the officers and crew subsequently appeared before a Navy Court of Inquiry. A court-martial was recommended for the CO and the Officer in Charge of the Research Department, Lt. Steve Harris for surrendering without a fight and for failing to destroy classified material, but the Secretary of the Navy, John Chafee, rejected the recommendation, stating, "They have suffered enough." Commander Bucher was never found guilty of any indiscretions and continued his Navy career until retirement.[25]
In 1970, Bucher published an autobiographical account of the USS Pueblo incident entitled Bucher: My Story.[26] Bucher died in San Diego on 28 January 2004, at the age of 76. James Kell, a former sailor under his command, suggested that the injuries suffered by Bucher during his time in North Korea contributed to his death.[27]
The USS Pueblo is still held by North Korea. In October 1999, it was towed from Wonsan on the east coast, around the Korean Peninsula, to the port of Nampo on the west coast. This required moving the vessel through international waters, and was undertaken just before the visit of U.S. presidential envoy James Kelly to the capital Pyongyang. After the stop at the Nampo shipyard Pueblo was relocated to Pyongyang and moored on the Taedong River near the spot that the General Sherman incident is believed to have taken place. In late 2012 Pueblo was moved again to the Botong River in Pyongyang next to a new addition to the Fatherland Liberation War Museum.[4]
Today, Pueblo remains the second-oldest commissioned ship in the U.S. Navy, behind the USS Constitution ("Old Ironsides"). Pueblo is one of only a few American ships to have been captured since the wars in Tripoli. Breach of US Navy communications security
Reverse engineering of communications devices on the Pueblo allowed the North Koreans to share knowledge with the Soviet Union that led to the replication of those communications devices. This allowed the two nations access to the US Navy's communication systems until the late 1980s when the US Navy revised those systems. The seizure of the Pueblo followed soon after US Navy warrant officer John Anthony Walker introduced himself to Soviet authorities, setting up the Walker spy ring. It has been argued that the seizure of the Pueblo was executed specifically to capture the encryption devices aboard. Without them, it was difficult for the Soviets to make full use of Walker's information.[28][29][30] In the communist camp
Documents released from National Archives of Romania suggest it was the Chinese rather than the Soviets who actively encouraged the reopening of hostilities in Korea during 1968, promising the DPRK vast material support should hostilities in Korea resume.[citation needed] Together with Blue House Raid, the Pueblo incident turned out to be part of an increasing divergence between the Soviet leadership and the DPRK. Fostering a resumption of hostilities in Korea, allegedly, was seen in Beijing as a way to mend relations between North Korea and China, and pull North Korea back in the Chinese sphere of influence in the context of the Sino-Soviet split. After the (then secret) diplomatic efforts of the Soviets to have the American crew released fell on deaf ears in Pyongyang, Leonid Brezhnev publicly denounced DPRK's actions at the 8th plenary session of the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[31] In contrast, the Chinese (state controlled) press published declarations supportive of DPRK's actions in the Pueblo incident.[32]
Furthermore, Soviet archives reveal that the Soviet leadership was particularly displeased that the North Korean leader had contradicted the assurances he previously gave Moscow that he would avoid a military escalation in Korea. Previously secret documents suggest the Soviets were surprised by the Pueblo incident, first learning of it in the press. The same documents reveal that the North Koreans also kept the Soviets completely in the dark regarding ongoing negotiations with the Americans for the crew's release, which was another bone of contention. The Soviet reluctance at a reopening of hostilities in Korea was partly motivated by the fact that they had a 1961 treaty with North Korea that obliged them to intervene in case the latter got attacked. Brezhnev however had made it clear in 1966 that just as in the case of the similar treaty they had with China, the Soviets were prepared to ignore it rather than go to all-out war with the United States.[33]:12-15
Given that Chinese and North Korean archives surrounding the incident remain secret, Kim Il Sung's intentions cannot be known with certainty. The Soviets revealed however that Kim sent a letter to Alexei Kosygin on 31 January 1968 demanding further military and economic aid, which was interpreted by the Soviets as the price they would have to pay to restrain Kim's bellicosity. Consequently, Kim was personally invited to Moscow, but he refused to go in person owing to "increased defense preparations" he had to personally attend to, sending instead his defense minister, Kim Ch’ang-bong, who arrived on 26 February 1968. During a long meeting with Brezhnev, the Soviet leader made it clear that they were not willing to go to war with the United States, but agreed to an increase in subsidies for the DPRK, which did happen in subsequent years.[33]:15-18
With the Pueblo under attack, crewmen in the communications center were busy trying to burn sensitive documents and to destroy top-secret code machines and equipment using sledge hammers. McClarren was calling the bridge every few minutes, trying to relay the position of the Pueblo to potential rescuers.
“I never typed so damn fast in my life,” he said. “We kept asking for assistance. They kept saying we were trying to get it for you.”
No help ever came. The gunfire killed an American sailor and wounded 10 others. Realizing there was no escape, Bucher decided to save his men by surrendering the Pueblo without firing a shot, Cheevers said. His actions would be condemned by Navy brass as breaking the time-honored code of “Don’t give up the ship.”
In “Act of War,” Bucher said that he surrendered because he felt trapped and woefully outgunned and did not want his men to be slaughtered in a futile
battle. Shocked and moved by tales of loyalty toward one another, the American public hailed Bucher and his men as heroes, Cheevers said.
However, the Navy saw Bucher as an officer who caved in too easily. Upon his release from captivity, Bucher was brought before an official board of inquiry and faced a possible court martial. The public rallied behind Bucher because they felt the captain was being treated as a scapegoat for mistakes made at higher echelons, Cheevers said.
“Nobody was willing to take responsibility,” McClarren said. “They were trying to drop it all on Bucher. We were supposed to have an escort but they told us it was a minimal security risk. There was no contingency plan. http://cumberlink.com/news/local/history/uss-pueblo-veteran-recalls-ordeal-at-hands-of-north-koreans/article_51066846-86ca-11e3-90e3-0019bb2963f4.html
It seems to be me that the Pueblo "incident" is more example of failing to recognize and effectively deal with a belligerent demonic state, as part of the proxy war with the USRR, which was a result of another failure to decisively deal with malevolent leadership before it became a competing superpower.
From considering the mission of the spy ship to have a minimal security risk and not have an escort or contingency plan, to not training the seamen to use the weapons stored, to not dealing with the act of war by the North Korean regime at that time but allowing them to use this for there own ends, to the response of other Presidents, has simply enabled this "military with a country" cult to continue to subject its own captives to cruelty and become an increasing threat to other countries.
With Pres. Trump taking an aggressive stance, i kind of expect North Korea to attack the South (which seems to have elected a liberal), and then some, even if it may be suicidal.
I do pray that the North Korean souls are set free, at as small a cost in lives as possible to those who can be redeemed. Whether the modern politically correct "salute the flag of Sodom" US military (which I must admit i was never in) is up to what that may require is a question.
The Pueblo attack on the USA caused me to go to Korea instead of Vietnam, which was a good thing for me but I did not know that then.....I was there and saw the folks release drive by our compound way up north......I spent many night out in listening post but never drew fire....Thank God but heard lots of fire very close. I believe the crew of the Pueblo did their as best they could...may they never be forgotten.
Let Fat Boy know what he’s in for.
Send in whatever it takes to sink the Pueblo and film it.
After we kick the Unleader’s rear I want the ship back.
And fifteen years later, in 1983, the Soviets shot down a Korean airliner over the Sea of Japan killing 269 souls. Tough part of the world during tough times. Looks like we’re there again.
My Father was assigned to S.Korea with Naval Intel during crisis. He often said Bucher should of taken his suicide pill.
Higher ups failed to ensure that the ship was fully prepared for the unexpected. The NORKs probably surmised this after awhile and calculated that their aggression would be rewarded. We likely assumed there would be some warning signs of an impending attack, but the NORKs didn't oblige. Consequently, the nation suffered a catastrophic compromise of intelligence data and methods. Those in positions of responsibility did what they normally do: dodge responsibility and look for a scapegoat.
The Pueblo was not an isolated incident. A U.S. Navy EC-121 was shot down by a North Korean MiG-21 aircraft over the Sea of Japan a little over one year after the Pueblo seizure. Again, there was no meaningful retaliation by the U.S. I hope we are better prepared for their next act of aggression.
A friend of mine who was in Crypto in the navy said that the one fatality was by someone on the ship to prevent his capture and the Norks finding out things only he knew. He was also in Crypto and was prevented from travel Internationally for many years after he finished his career there so I take his word as pretty solid
If we had made it clear to the NORKs that any act of aggression against a U.S. vessel would be met with a strong and decisive response, perhaps this incident never would have occurred. Pueblo was a sitting duck. Worse, it emboldened the NORKs because in the following year, they shot down one of our surveillance aircraft. Again, we failed to respond.
Weakness invites aggression. Always has, always will.
Please see my #8.
Commander Lloyd M. Bucher said that the total lack of response to Israel’s attack on the USS Liberty in June 1967, is what encouraged the North Koreans to take the Pueblo.
The biggest disgrace for America with the Pueblo was that in the late 90s, they towed it from Wonson to Pyongyang. That’s right folks....all the way around the South Korean peninsula!
If we had any self respect we would have sunk it. If we had any right now, we would hit it with a JDAM one night from a B2 and blast it to smithereens.
We still own it and should make that fine point that WE decide its final disposition. There’s time’s that you gotta slap your crank right down on the table.
“USS Enterprise was located 510 nautical miles (940 km) south of Pueblo, yet its four F-4B aircraft on alert were not equipped for an air-to-surface engagement. Enterprise’s captain estimated that 1.5 hours (90 minutes) were required to get the converted aircraft into the air.”
I was aboard the USS Enterprise at the time. I was with Fighter Squadron VF-96 and we had F-4J’s. The B model had been swapped out earlier. There were two F4 squadrons on board with the other being VF-92.
We did indeed have to work a lot of hours to get all the airplanes ready. We always had a couple from each squadron ready to go. It was cold as hell up there in January and ice would from on the deck. We had to cut sleeves off of sweaters to pull over our heads to keep warm. By the way I worked on the flight deck.
“He often said Bucher should of taken his suicide pill.”
Idiots said the same thing about Gary Powers. Expecting an American in the service of the nation to commit suicide is Un-American, period. Col Flagg on MASH was supposed to be comedy, not a role model.
Suicide pill indeed. Besides, if one was personally disposed to do such an act, then why not man the two 50 cal machine guns, break open the small arms locker and fight for all you were worth?
It was certainly no worse odds than the 3 destroyers and 4 DEs attacking 4 Japanese Battleships, 6 Heavy Cruisers, and 2 Light Cruisers.
But glad those sailors survived and I doubt any of them wish they would have died that day.
The real failure that day was zero contingency plan by the spook world to assist that ship with violence.
I don’t believe that Duane Hodges was murdered by his own crew, not even for an instant. The Soviets and Korcoms got pretty much everything they needed without a Fireman E3 (Not even a crypto tech) being available for grilling.
I do believe CDR Bucher was unfairly court martialed, but as anyone who has had anything to do with the USN knows...that is their modus operandi. I don’t know if CDR Bucher really expected anything less. It was unfair, but there is nothing fair about those processes, it is all done “for the good of the Naval Service”, which means if you are a human being, you are secondary. that is just how it was, and how it is.
My father was the Communications Officer as well as the Security Officer stationed at Yokosuka at that time. He socialized with CDR Bucher when he was in port, and knew him well. A drinking buddy of sorts is my guess, knowing both of their histories.
When the Pueblo Incident went down, we didn’t see my dad for several weeks.
I believe the USS Pueblo was in international waters when she was taken, because that is in character with the Korcoms, and it was an act of war. But we were already involved in one war, so they skated, with that Hamlet of a President wringing his hands the entire time.
As far as I am concerned, we should fly a few B-2s in and drop a dozen JDAMS right on the USS Pueblo and put her out of her misery. Just for starters. It is long overdue.
See my post at #16. I agree with all three of your posts. As you correctly point out, this is different than the battle off Samar.
This poison pill crap is stupid.
And you are correct...the biggest failure was the inability to support them. Even then we knew the Korcoms were dangerously mentally unstable as a country.
As far as I am concerned, we have owed them since the Pueblo was captured and the Connie was shot down.
Damned Johnson. He had himself tied in knots at that point. When the EC-121 was shot down, Nixon had only been in office a couple of months, so I give him a little break.
The Viet Nam war was weighing heavily on Johnson who wanted out.
He was as much a chicken shit as Carter during the Iran hostage crisis.
In both instances each president should have given each country 24 hours to release EVERYONE or get f=ing nuked at the 24 hour and one minute mark.
Thank God and you (and other vets) for your service.
It was commonly rumored that there are always marines on these ships. In this case, two USMC Sergeants were part of the crew and were not designated as “CT”s.
I don’t know this to be true, but as rumor had it, that they were not there for protection, but to make certain you wouldn’t be captured alive.
Scuttlebutt, to be sure, but this was the rumor at this time. So maybe there is some validity to your story.
If I were to tell you how I know this and where I was when the Pueblo was captured, I’d have to kill you.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.