The European Commission's top economists warned the politicians in the 1990s that the euro might not survive a crisis, at least in its current form. There is no EU treasury or debt union to back it up. The one-size-fits-all regime of interest rates caters badly to the different needs of Club Med and the German bloc.So they were encouraging Greeces accession knowing full well that the ECBs interest rate scheme was a bad fit for its state of being back then with respect to its economy. The political turmoil that resulted, they were expecting.
The euro fathers did not dispute this. But they saw EMU as an instrument to force the pace of political union. They welcomed the idea of a beneficial crisis. As ex-Commission chief Romano Prodi remarked, it would allow Brussels to break taboos and accelerate the move to a full-fledged EU economic government.
What benefit was expected from this political turmoil?