And the forgotten Japanese soldiers whom remained at their field postings for decades awaiting further orders, despite all evidence contrary to the idea of a continued war, speaks of the mental conditioning to never surrender but die serving the Emperor.
Before the war, quite often Japanese naval officers attended western university and gained a different perspective of potential adversaries, relative to the indoctrination of Japanese army officers. The navy therefore had a more realistic view of what the consequences of Pearl Harbor would be, could anticipate outcomes a year or two after that attack, and predicted a necessary staged retreat from escalating US navy force as the outcome.
The army held a narrow philosophy based strictly on service to their emperor, everything and everyone expendable toward achieving the goals of the monarch. Their honor system had a concept of only living to achieve victory, or become not worthy of living. This belief is evident in their subsequent treatment of prisoners of war of that period.
Multiple factions were present within a power struggle seeking supremacy in the hierarchy responsive to the Emperor. Each applied pressures on the monarch’s administrators to become most influential in conducting the war. Many were inflexible when presented with unanticipated outcomes, tending to doggedly continue support of a failed plan. Only overwhelming evidence shifted the narrative toward a choice of negotiating a peace or face obliteration.
“...often Japanese naval officers attended western university and gained a different perspective of potential adversaries...”
When Harvard-trained Adm. Yamamoto learned that the Pearl Harbor raid was seen as a sneak attack, he observed,
“I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant, and fill him with a terrible resolve.”
Earlier he had told the Emperor, “I can raise havoc with the Americans for a year. After that, I can promise nothing.”