No it did not. An organization, voluntarily entered, ought to be voluntarily leavable.
Why, then, should the D of I have not simply been a one-liner announcing that fact?
Because it wouldn't have produced the sort of impact the founders were wanting. King George III mostly ignored it, but the rest of the European countries marked it, and so did the English public.
We've already been over that - the D of I is not mandatory legal authority but rather persuasive authority and yet the D of I does state some requirements for secession already mentioned.
It asserts that it's authority derives from "the laws of nature and of nature's God." There is no higher authority. This was at the pinnacle of the "Natural Law" enlightenment which was sweeping Europe and America at the time. In the 1770s, "natural law" was a thing. It was a body of thought that explained the rights of man in regards to certain fundamental assumptions. That men were created by God, and " endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights".
a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to separation.
What is the target object of that sentence? It is "A decent respect to the opinions of mankind."
It isn't setting forth a necessary requirement to leave, it is setting forth a requirement for what must be done if you wish to demonstrate respect for the "opinions of mankind."
Whether "mankind" respects you or not is irrelevant to your having a fundamental right to stop associating with other people, if you so wish.
The rest of the D of I, which you summarily reject, explains and shows what a declaration of session should look like, including what are NOT "light and transient causes".
Should? Who are you to say what a Declaration of Independence should look like? That's just a bunch of formal pomp and circumstance gobbledygook.
I am talking about natural rights, and you are talking about "following symbolic precedent." It's like asserting to someone that they must be your friend until they have given you some sort of formal written document which gives you reasons that you consider satisfactory.
No. You aren't owed an explanation, and your friend's right to leave your company is not contingent upon whatever formalities and flowery language you wish to demand.
A friend or a girlfriend does not have to justify her reasons for leaving you.
And there is a legitimate argument that statehood is a contractual agreement with the Union and one that can't simply be broken without certain steps having been taken.
When you explain to me how this bond should have been regarded as stronger than the English Union, you will have my attention. Bear in mind, your explanation must clarify how we had a right to leave England, but how the Southern States did not have a right to leave Washington D.C.
Not when it is a formal association with contractual obligations. You conveniently skip over the whole contractual agreement argument. There is a strong argument that statehood is a contractual political treaty and agreement that carries benefits and obligations and penalties for breach.
clarify how we had a right to leave England, but how the Southern States did not have a right to leave Washington D.C.
Already did that but I'll do it again, but we're starting to go around in circles because that which the D of I sites as justification for session you reject as "not a requirement" and we're back to square one with your simplistic view of "free to come, free to go" regardless of contractual, formal, or political agreements. I'll give it one more try, and after that I'm done.
The D of I lays out the extensive level of England's breach of political agreement. Whatever political compact existed between England and the colonies, including the laws of nature but not limited to that, was broken repeatedly and eventually "insufferably" by England. It is generally understood backed by common and state law, One party breaches a contract or agreement, the other party is free to abandon it.
However, the authors of the D of I wanted to make it very clear that it wasn't just one breach, but 27 listed, specific "injuries and usurpations".
So, as I have said, the D of I announced that after 1) “patient sufferance” while “evils are sufferable” 2) notifying and submitting the facts of abuse “to a candid world” (27 specific abuses), and finally 3) “when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty to throw off such Government” as “Prudence, indeed, will dictate...”
The South on the other hand showed very little "patient sufferance while evils are suffereable". The South did not deliver any notification of a list of unconstitutional acts by the North, because as far as I know, there were none - only the anticipation of such. So no "patient sufferance". What about the "long train of abuses and usurpations" that justify secession?
So the colonies had more than enough evidence of extensive breach by England of their agreement. The heart of the contractual political agreement between the Southern states and the Union is of course the Constitution. The South showed no unconstitutional acts, much less "a long train" of such, by the North that would constitute a breach their agreement.
If you respond again with "no requirement" then we're done, just going around in circles. As far as I and the Founders and "Prudence" and "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind" are concerned, without this or some equally valid rationale for political breach, the South was required to show such and failed to do so and the North was in the right to take action.
Again, I used to think like you do about this but after long study and reflection, I changed my mind. Also bear in mind, on a personal note, if you look at my posts you'll see I'm one of the few that I know of on FR that calls for states to exert their sovereignty by nullifying unconstitutional federal acts which by are acts of tyranny. I don't call for session - yet - because I believe it is necessary to resist on a case-by-case basis first.