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Sins of the Generals series:
Open Letter to the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps | Open Letter to General Michael Hagee
Open Letter to General Peter W. Chiarelli | The Loss of Strategic Legitimacy
Political Equivocation at LtCol Chessani's Board of Inquiry| Indefinite Delay | Strategic Legalism

HADITHA: SINS OF THE GENERALS

Undue Influence from the Start

Bob Weimann, LtCol USMC (Ret) | October 30, 2008 | Pdf version

Initially, when the Haditha story broke, a number of things did not make sense to me and sent my mental warning flags flying. One of the concerns was that so many of the Pentagon generals seem to be involved while the investigations were still being conducted. In addition, the Washington generals were not relying on the combat commanders in Iraq to establish the facts of Haditha but were responding to the Washington political pressure and media.

Another flag was the censure and relief of the Marine Corps combat chain of command. Again, the censures and relief occurred before the investigations established the facts.

The Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the UCMJ are a commander’s tools that provide war fighters the legal authority to execute combat operations. In fact, I would make the argument that combat command authority and the Rules of Armed Conflict is actually a symbiotic relationship. If you delete one the other cannot successfully exist. A UCMJ investigation’s primary purpose is to establish the facts. If you censure and relieve the combat chain of command from general officer to squad leader, you have effectively taken out the mechanism to establish the facts of what actually happened.

I will walk you through my thinking on this and specifically why I feel the Commandant exercised “undue influence”.

In 1986, the US Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols DOD (Department of Defense) Reform Act. This Congressional Act, made major changes to DOD and effectively split the DOD into two spheres of command influence with specific roles and authority. One set of command authority is administrative (think of the service heads; e.g., like USMC Commandant, General Hagee); and one set is the joint service war fighting authority (think the combat commanders here; e.g., like General Schwarkopf of Desert Storm fame).

The service head is responsible to recruit, train, and equip service forces. The Combat Commander is responsible for the fighting forces in their assigned regional areas. One of the purposes of the Goldwater-Nichols Reform Act was to correct the known imbalance between Services (administrative) and Joint Command (combat) interest. The Congressional Armed Forces Committee describes the imbalance here:

Under current arrangements, the three Military Departments and four Services exercise power and influence which are out of proportion to their statutory duties. The predominance of Service perspectives in DoD decision-making results from three basic problems: (1) the Office of the Secretary of’ Defense (OSD) is not organized to effectively integrate Service capabilities and programs into the forces needed to fulfill the major missions of DoD; (2) the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) system is dominated by the Services which retain an effective veto over nearly every JCS action; and (3) the unified combatant commands are also dominated by the Services, primarily through the strength and independence of the Service component commanders within those commands and constraints placed upon the authority of the unified combatant commanders. In sum, the problem of undue Service influence arises not from Service malfeasance, but principally from the weaknesses of organizations that are responsible for joint military preparation, planning, and operations. [1] (Emphasis added to the words “undue Service influence”)

The Goldwater-Nichols Act established a set of command relationships to correct this imbalance for the combat chain of command, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries. This Congressional Act also established the Regional Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and provided them with Combat Command (COCOM) authority. Mr. Rumsfeld would later change this name from CINC to Combat Commander. The Combat Commander is the only military commander that has Combat Command Authority and therefore, they are the only generals with authority to command US forces in combat operations. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, as a service chief, does not have combat authority nor is he in the combat chain of command.

At the time of the Haditha incident, Lt General Chiarelli, Commander MNF-I (Multi-National Force-Iraq) worked directly for the Combat Commander, US Central Command General Abizaid. Iraq is one of the countries that fall into General Abizaid’s regional authority.

General Chiarelli, as the Combat Commander’s direct representative in Iraq is therefore, the senior combat commander in Iraq. The Marine combat chain of command in Iraq essentially started with 3/1 in Haditha and goes to the senior Marine Command of Multi-National Forces (MNF)-West. When General Chiarelli ordered the Haditha investigations, he was well within his authority to establish the facts and circumstances of the Haditha fight because it is clearly a combat action falling within the combat chain of command authority.

Chiarelli’s responsibility in this case, is to complete the investigations, thereby establishing the facts, stating logical opinions and making recommendations for further actions. Upon completion, General Chiarelli can refer the investigations to one of his subordinate commanders (in the combat chain of command) for further investigation or actions. Chiarelli, in fact, does this by referring the first investigation (the Watt Investigation) to Major General Zilmer, his subordinate Marine Commander. Chiarelli can also decide to refer the investigation to his boss, Commander Central Command also in the combat chain of command. Once in General Abizaid hands, he can then refer the matter to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense can, in turn, refer the investigation to the Service head. Before all this can be accomplished, however, we see the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Hagee, getting involved.

The Commandant deploys NCIS (Naval Criminal Investigation Service) to Iraq arriving in Haditha, March 13, 2006, only two days after Lt General Chiarelli refers the first investigation to his Marine Commander, Major General Zilmer, Multi-National Forces (MNF)-West. NCIS also arrives while the second investigation is still on going.

Sending NCIS to Iraq is where the administrative or political DOD states to interfere and influence the combat command side of DOD. The Commandant is essentially jumping the chain of command. He is doing this in response to the political pressures he is receiving in Washington, far from the realities of combat. At the time, the Commandant was particularly vulnerable to political pressure because he was seeking $12 billion dollars over his annual budget in equipment costs. Additionally, Hagee was fighting a battle with Washington to keep the Corps' end strength at 180,000 rather than the 175,000 prescribed by the Quadrennial Defense Review. [2]

Hagee is, in fact, meddling in the combat affairs of the in-country ground commanders who are closest to the actual situation. By jumping the chain of command, he is exercising undue influence. This is exactly a situation that the Goldwater-Nichols Act is designed to prevent.

As I stated, the Rules of Armed Conflict is a combat command tool that establishes the legal limits in destroying your enemy. These rules also establish the principles of military necessity and proportionality governing the legal use of force in armed conflict. “Military necessity is governed by several constrains: an attack or action must be intended to help in the military defeat of the enemy, it must be an attack on a military objective, and the harm caused to civilian or civilian property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”[3]

The determination of military necessity is the field commander’s responsibility and not the Commandant’s. The first investigation, or Watt Investigation, does not find any violations to the Law of Armed Conflict. When the Commandant starts to meddle in the combat commander’s investigations, for example, when he orders NCIS to Iraq, we see the Haditha case quickly spin out of control politically and publicly. In the Haditha case, because he does not have combat responsibility, the Commandant is clearly acting outside his authority bringing undue influence to bear on the case. He continues to exercise that undue influence as he visits the Marine Corps commands giving his “On Marine Virtue” speech before the investigations are complete.

The Marines of Haditha are the individuals that pay the price for the Commandant’s and other general officer mistakes. Six of the Marine’s charges have been dropped or dismissed. These six Marines have paid a terrible price in an unnecessary test of honor, endurance and loyalty. Cpl Justin Sharrett and his family still battles on in their quest for what is right regarding Congressman Murtha’s slander. Two still remain in the legal process and continue to pay that same price as the legal maneuvering of their cases drags on. I can only state that if I were in their shoes, the feelings of betrayal and distrust would be gnawing at my insides to the point of testing my sanity. We must continue to support the Haditha Marines, especially SSgt Frank Wuterich and LtCol Jeffrey Chessani, both are victims of general officer political motivations to meddle in the affairs of warriors.

Semper Fi,

Bob Weimann
LtCol USMC (Ret.)
Former Commanding Officer, Kilo Company 3/1

_[1]Committee on the Armed Forces Of the United States; Department of the Defense Reorganization Act, Report 99-280; p7; April 14, 1986

_[2] Interview with General Hagee, Military.com, June 23, 2006

^[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_necessity

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Bob Weimann, a veteran of the first Gulf War, is the former Commanding Officer, Kilo Co., 3/1, and a senior contributing editor to Defend Our Marines.

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Read more on the Haditha case by Bob Weimann:

Open Letter to the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps concerning the 3/1 Haditha Marines, February 8, 2008.

Open Letter to General Michael Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps (2003-2006), October 11, 2008

Huzzah! Huzzah! HUZZAHHH!, June 6, 2008.

The Case for a Squad Leader: SSgt Wuterich in Haditha July 25, 2008.

Open Letter to General Peter W. Chiarelli, Commander of the Multi-National Corps in Iraq (November 2005-February 2006), February 8, 2009.

The Loss of Strategic Legitimacy, December 1, 2009.

Political Equivocation at LtCol Chessani's Board of Inquiry, December 6, 2009.

Indefinite Delay, July 15, 2011.

Strategic Legalism, December 31, 2011.

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Explore Haditha documents:

Haditha evidence room

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Go to the Defend Our Marines main page

Undue influence cited in Chessani case
Ruling by military judge could have major impact in prosecution of Haditha Marine lieutenant colonel

By Mark Walker
North County Times
May 21, 2008

Camp Pendleton - A military judge has found that top Marine Corps officers were unlawfully influenced by a general’s legal adviser when they decided to file criminal charges against a colonel whose troops killed two dozen civilians in the Iraqi city of Haditha in 2005

The impact of this week’s ruling by Col. Steven Folsom in the case against Lt. Col. Jeffrey Chessani was not immediately clear, but his attorneys described it as a “major speed bump.”

A legal expert with no ties to the case said it may mean the case will have to start anew.

The ruling forces prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no unlawful command influence led to charging Chessani, according to his attorneys. The Colorado native faces charges of dereliction of duty and violating a lawful order for failing to conduct a full-scale investigation into the civilian deaths.

Eight Marines from Camp Pendleton’s 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment were originally charged with wrongdoing at Haditha. Four enlisted men were charged with murdering the Iraqi civilians and four officers were charged with offenses related to failing to investigate the incident. The dead included several women and children.

Chessani is the highest-ranking officer charged in connection with the incident, which came after a roadside bomb destroyed a Humvee, killing a lance corporal and injuring another Marine.

The ruling in part found that Marine generals overseeing the case were influenced by the legal adviser during closed-door discussions about Chessani’s role.

Brian Rooney, one of Chessani’s attorneys, said Wednesday that the ruling creates a steep hurdle for prosecutors.

“They have to be able to show conclusively that there was no unlawful command influence, which which the judge found that there was,” Rooney said during a telephone interview.

Lt. Col. Sean Gibson, a Marine Corps spokesman for the Haditha trials, said the service would have no comment on the ruling. Prosecutors are barred by policy from commenting on any aspect of an ongoing case.

Chessani is being represented by the Thomas More Law Center in Ann Arbor, Mich. Richard Thompson, the firm’s president and chief counsel, praised Folsom’s ruling.

“Considering the politically charged nature of this case and particularly this motion, Col. Folsom made a courageous decision,” he said in a written statement.

Thompson also said that “the taint of unlawful command influence started from the inception of the investigation when high-ranking Pentagon officials decided to make Chessani a political scapegoat to appease a liberal, anti-war press and politicians.”

Gary Solis, a military law expert who teaches at Washington’s Georgetown University and is a former Marine Corps attorney, prosecutor and judge, said the ruling could have a major impact on the prosecution.

“It most likely means the Marine Corps will have to re-initiate the charging process because you cannot proceed with a case in which there is a finding of unlawful command influence,” Solis said Wednesday during a telephone interview. “In a sense, the Marine Corps is fortunate that the ruling comes now. If it came after the case was decided and there was a conviction, that conviction would have to be set aside.”

Solis also said the ruling could mean that a new convening authority overseeing the case may have to be appointed. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the convening authority decides what charges should be brought, relying on the advice of a military prosecutor. The convening authority over the Chessani case is Camp Pendleton’s Lt. Gen. Samuel Helland.

In the months since the men were charged, five of the defendants have seen their cases dismissed. The only remaining defendants in addition to Chessani are 1st Lt. Andrew Grayson and Staff Sgt. Frank Wuterich.

Wuterich faces several counts of manslaughter and related offenses. His trial is pending as is Grayson’s. Chessani, who was the battalion commander when the killings occurred Nov. 19, 2005, is scheduled to go on trial before a military jury at Camp Pendleton next month.

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General Mattis testimony: History repeats itself

by Nathaniel R. Helms | June 4, 2008
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The not surprising testimony of General James N. Mattis on Monday in response to alleged undue command influence charges during the Haditha investigation was a serious setback for the highest ranking officer to be criminally charged in the cover-up case.

Lt. Col Jeffrey Chessani is charged with dereliction of duty and orders violations for failing to investigate and report an incident on November 19, 2005 when one Marine and 24 Iraqis died during an Al Qaeda inspired complex ambush in a squad of Marines.

Mattis, the Marine Corps general known as the “Warrior Monk”, said Monday he wasn’t influenced by his personal attorney and long-time confidant Col. John Ewers during 25 meetings in which Chessani and his role at Haditha were discussed. At the time, Mattis was deciding whether or not to prosecute Chessani.

Before joining Mattis at Camp Pendleton as his personal lawyer and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force Staff Judge Advocate, Ewers investigated the Haditha incident for Army Maj. General Eldon Bargewell. The Army general’s scathing indictment of Chessani and his superiors led to charges against Chessani and three other officers in 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. Two of those officers have been exonerated and a third is in trial at this time.

Mattis’ long anticipated testimony regarding Ewers revealed that the dynamic lawyer known in the Corps as “Golden Ass” for his ability to always come up shining sat mute while Mattis discussed with another attorney the case Ewers had investigated. Mattis told the military judge hearing the defense’s undue influence motion that he never asked Ewers for advice or information.

The Mattis – Ewers relationship is a long and involved one, the evidence revealed. When Mattis was a Major General commanding the 1st Marine Division in 2003, Ewers was the divisions’ top lawyer. He is also the architect and implementer of the Reportable Incident Assessment Team (RIAT) adopted Marine Corps wide to “afford the Commanding General with a means to counteract media backlash,” Ewers had projected.

A failed exercise by a RIAT public relations officer two years later created the climate of suspicion that triggered the initial inquiry by a Time magazine reporter challenging the veracity of the Marine’s account of the Haditha incident, evidence has already revealed.

Ironically, Ewers envisioned RIAT would provide Mattis with “ground truth” regarding serious incidents, ranging from friendly fire shootings to war crimes perpetrated by one side or the other, according to the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force “Lessons: Learned” post-deployment report.

His intention was to put together a “small, internally sourced team” that could “help the Commanding General decide whether additional investigation and reporting to higher headquarters were required.” The RIAT core team consisted of the SJA as team leader; the Division Public Affairs Officer; combat cameraman; and the Division Surgeon.

When the RIAT effort fell on its face in February 2006 somebody had to take the blame and Chessani was the battalion commander on the ground where the incident happened. He isn’t the first fall guy in Marine Corps history. Two hundred and thirty-two years of unpredictable politics have left more than a few good Marines to satisfy the gods.

The past lives

One legendary scapegoat was Marine Major Littleton Waller Tazewell “Tony” Waller, in 1901 the commander of 315 hardcore Marines serving under US Army command in the Philippines. His story will seem vaguely familiar.

His boss was Brigadier General Jacob H. “Hell-Roaring Jake” Smith, the commanding officer of an ad hoc joint service unit called the 6th Separate Brigade. American military officers of quality had snappy nicknames in the age before orders were roared over fax machines and e-mails.

Waller, like most of his Army counterparts, based his operations on the fact that the majority of the natives were hostile to U. S. actions and could not be trusted, despite pretenses by the villagers to be pro-American. It was well known that many of those supposedly pro-American villagers were actually members of the unpredictable insurrection.

President William McKinley, a humane man and “progressive” politician, demanded new thinking. Reports of extreme cruelties by American troops were surfacing in the press and he insisted it stop. Toward that end, there arrived the U.S. Army’s Company C, 9th Infantry, commanded by Captain Thomas W. Connell, a strong advocate of McKinley’s theory of “benevolent assimilation.” Connell attempted to assert his unwelcome benevolence upon Balangiga, Samar, one of the Philippines hundreds of islands.

Samar in 1901 was populated by an extremely violent, primitive society. One 9th Infantry officer later testified that he considered the natives “. . . savages; they were low in intelligence, treacherous, cruel; seemed to have no feeling for their families or anyone else.” Obviously the dehumanization of opponents is not a 21st Century phenomena.

On 28 September, 1901, 46 days after arriving in Samar, the insurgents mounted a surprise attack on Company C. Led by town officials, the locals slaughtered the American soldiers. Only 26 of the 74 troopers in C Company survived the massacre. Most were tortured to death and their bodies mutilated. The massacre pretty much ended the practice of benevolence on Samar.

On October 24, Waller’s Marines were sent to punish the rebels. Unlike Connell, he held a less munificent view of the situation on Samar. Waller issued explicit orders to his officers concerning relations with the natives and the rules of engagement:

“Place no confidence in the natives, and punish treachery immediately with death. No trust, no confidence, can be placed in them. . . . The men must be informed of the courage, skill, size and strength of the enemy. We must do our part of the work, and with the sure knowledge that we are not to expect quarter.”

Waller’s orders were within the limitations of General Order No.100 of 1863 dealing with the rules of engagement with irregular warfare. The order stated that if enemy units “gave no quarter and became treacherous upon capture,” it was lawful to shoot anyone belonging to that captured unit.

“Hell Roaring Jake” told Maj. Waller to kill everybody he encountered over the age of ten… including the woman. Waller didn’t want to do it, and told his Marines not to. His Marines had fought in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and most recently in China knocking down wild-eyed Boxers with deadly accurate rifle and new-fangled machine gun fire. For the most part they complied.

After a short, glorious campaign that wiped out the insurgent’s mountain headquarters Waller inexplicably marched his men 35 miles through the jungle to the other coast. It took them 29 days. It was rough going. His men were reduced to eating roots.

Along the way ten Marines in one column actually starved to death before they were rescued. After the Marines were led to safety they accused eleven of the Filipino porters who accompanied them of hoarding food. A delirious lieutenant told Waller three of the porters tried to kill him with a machete. None of it was true.

Waller, himself bewildered by jungle fever, ordered them summarily executed. He telegraphed “Hell-Roaring Jake” that, “It became necessary to expend the prisoners.”

Waller explained he had 45 effectives to guard 93 prisoners and defend against 3,000 restive natives. He simply couldn’t afford the trouble the allegedly mutinous porters were causing.

Word of the atrocity got back to Washington in the dark days after President McKinley’s assassination. It was all the war’s legion of opponents needed to bash the unpopular campaign. Despite incoming President Theodore Roosevelt’s best effort to shield Waller, whom he admired from their campaign together in Cuba in 1898, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge initiated hearings to find out why Waller had executed 11 Filipinos “in cold blood.”

The story was all over the indignant New York and Washington press. Big newspapers had entered an impassioned era of advocacy journalism in the wake of America’s “new” imperialism. Before long tales of water torture, beatings, and senseless murder emerged. Most of the atrocities were true, in this war perpetrated however by soldiers, not Marines. But then as now, the press often got them confused.

Mark Twain, the era’s most trusted populist, got into the act, suggesting the American flag should be redesigned with “white stripes painted black and the stars replaced with the skull and crossbones.”

Not to be outdone, publisher William Randolph Hearst’s New York Evening Journal covered its entire front page with a banner headline, “KILL, KILL”: MAJOR WALLER ORDERED TO MASSACRE THE FILLIPINOS.

At his court-martial Waller accepted full responsibility for ordering the executions. He naively believed “Hell-Roaring Jake” would do the honorable thing and admit he had ordered his favorite Marine to kill everybody over ten years of age who even seemed belligerent. After all, Waller reasoned, “Hell Roaring Jake” was an Army general and generals of any stripe were honorable men.

Waller was wrong. “Hell-Roaring Jake” blamed his subordinate for everything. He testified he had ordered the Marine officer to treat everyone humanely. Enraged at his erstwhile superior’s lack of honor, Waller remounted the witness stand and recounted Brig. Gen. Smith’s specific order.

“I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, and the more you kill and the more you burn the better you will please me,” he testified Smith had ordered. “… I want all people killed who are capable of bearing arms.”

Waller: “I would like to know the age limit.”

Smith: “Ten years.”

Then Waller produced enough corroborating witnesses to convince the panel he was innocent. Waller was exonerated and restored to duty, eventually rising to the rank of major general.

But Waller was never appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps as Roosevelt and other powers of the day wanted it, despite having aces like two-time Medal of Honor recipient Maj. Gen. Smedley “Old Gimlet Eye” Butler in his corner.

The entire affair was a terrible black mark on the Marine Corps that historian Max Boot says “put a pall over the entire U.S. war effort in the Philippines.”

Wait around long enough and history always repeats itself.

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Nathaniel R. Helms
Defend Our Marines
4 June 2008

Note: Nat Helms is a Contributing Editor to Defend Our Marines. He is a Vietnam veteran, former police officer, war correspondent, and, most recently, author of My Men Are My Heroes: The Brad Kasal Story (Meredith Books, 2007).

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Did he get the idea from you? 8^) Here's the actual outcome...

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THE TRIAL IS OVER:

SSGT WUTERICH PLEADS GUILTY

TO ONE COUNT OF NEGLIGENT

DERELICTION OF DUTY

by Nathaniel R. Helms and David Allender | Monday, January 23, 2012

Camp Pendleton, Calif. – The General Court Martial of US Marine Corps SSgt Frank D. Wuterich ended Monday morning after a plea deal was reached over the weekend. In return for a guilty plea to one count of Negligent Dereliction of Duty, the six-year ordeal of the 31-year old father of three is finally over.

Negligent dereliction is a lesser included offense detailed in Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Dereliction of Duty. Before the agreement, SSgt Wuterich was charged with “Willful Dereliction of Duty,” a much more severe offense. In return for his plea, 13 charges, including nine counts of Voluntary Manslaughter, two counts of Aggravated Assault, and two other charges of willful dereliction were dropped.

SSgt Wuterich faced more than 160 years in prison if he had been found guilty and sentenced to the maximum sentence allowed by law on each count. That option was never really on the table although the specter of life in prison wore heavily on everyone associated with the case since SSgt Wuterich and seven other Marines were charged with massacring 24 civilians in Haditha, Iraq on Nov. 19, 2005.

The maximum sentence military judge LtCol David Jones can now impose on SSgt Wuterich is three months confinement and loss of two -thirds of his pay while he is confined. The staff sergeant told the judge he earns $3,486 a month. At risk if he is incarcerated are his three little girls, who are otherwise without a resident parent.

SSgt Wuterich admitted he failed to maintain "adequate tactical control" of three Marines he was leading and made a "negligent verbal order." While answering the military judge’s questions before the deal was done, SSgt Wuterich said comments he made to troops he was leading were negligent and may have led to the "tragic" deaths of the women and children.

"I took a team of Marines to clear houses to the south of the site [where House 1 and House 2 are situated] and did use the words 'shoot first, ask questions later,' or something to that affect prior to clearing or entering there," he said.

The six-year long tragedy was triggered by a specious story in Time magazine in which reporter Tim McGirk accused a squad of Marines from Kilo, 3^rd Battalion, 1^st Marines of running rampant through two houses full of civilians killing everyone they saw in revenge for the IED death of one of their own. McGirk graduated from University of California Berkeley and is now teaching there with money the university obtained from donors to create a fellowship teaching investigative journalism. McGirk was never at Haditha and relied on two known insurgent sympathizers masquerading as human rights workers for his “facts.”

Twenty-four Iraqis were killed, the Marine Corps has said, including six women and four children as Marines tried to find the gunmen who had been firing on them from houses near the bomb blast. Five Iraqi men died on a road the Marines called Route Chestnut, the only hard-surfaced thoroughfare into the southern part of the city. SSgt Wuterich testified he took a knee and shot them when they tried to flee after they inexplicably showed up seconds before the bomb exploded. Several witnesses testified they were the only Iraqis driving on the road when the blast occurred.

McGirk’s helpful human rights advocates, one of whom had just been released from Abu Ghraib prison , and the other whom Marine signal-intercept specialists had been monitoring for months, were heard before the attack planning how to record the event for propaganda purposes. Six of the victims died in the first house the four Marines stormed and eight more died in the second they cleared with grenades and rifle fire.

The event was precipitated by the gruesome death of twenty-year old LCpl Miguel “T.J.” Terrazas, who died when a remotely detonated roadside bomb tore both him and the Humvee he was riding in to pieces. The bomb was buried in the hard-surfaced road and then concealed with fresh cement in plain view of the victims who lived there. Two other Marines were wounded in the attack. The decimated squad was then fired upon by unseen gunman they believed were hiding in and around two houses filled with civilians.

After the initial hearing concluded about 9:00 am PT, SSgt Wuterich shook hands with his attorneys and then turned to hug his parents David and Rosemarie Wuterich, who have been in the court room every day since testimony began two weeks ago.

Lead defense attorney Neal Puckett told LtCol Jones the negotiations that caused a flurry of speculation Wednesday and Thursday never ended but in fact had continued through the weekend. He offered the observation after LtCol Jones told the court that the first round of bargaining “fell through” before court resumed Friday morning.

"Nothing ever fell through,” Puckett corrected the unusually patient judge before the settlement was announced. “I’d like to get that on the record.”

Defend Our Marines has e-mailed McGirk for a comment. As of this writing he has not replied.

Sentencing is scheduled for Tuesday morning at 8:30 am PT.

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Nathaniel R. Helms
Defend Our Marines
23 January 2012

Note: Nat Helms is a Contributing Editor to Defend Our Marines. He is a Vietnam veteran, former police officer, war correspondent, and, most recently, author of My Men Are My Heroes: The Brad Kasal Story (Meredith Books, 2007).

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