Posted on 02/27/2016 10:59:23 PM PST by 2ndDivisionVet
‘While I would be the first to admit my knowledge of naval tactics is very limited how would a carrier strike force defend itself against an attack by several thousand kamikase drones?’
One way would be through jamming. Most drones rely on signals. But also, defensive drones will ultimately intercept hostile drones. Not sure when that will be needed. Probably fairly soon because part of a drone’s flight could be preset.
A natural advantage we have against small drones of today is that their payload is small. Too small a charge would bounce off armor like bee-bees.
A budget shutdown would have been better. Catch a liberal doing something really unpopular and just get the fight over with.
Another way to take out a large number of drones would be a small EMP, hopefully detonated far enough away from our ships.
We have these active forces:
B-52H: 77
B-1B: 62
B-2A: 20 (which should mostly be held in reserve for nuclear and heavily defended airspace duty)
139 heavy bombers available at a moment’s notice is a good bit beyond “small handful”. A single B-1 can deliver over 120,000 lb of ordnance.
Thank you for (re)posting this analysis. Interesting the need to demonstrate resolve for which the Obama gang have opted to avoid.
At the end of WW2, the United States was the only world power with atomic weapons. The debate was over which service was to control them and how they were to be delivered. The Army Air Forces was lobbying to become a separate service at the time and they had the only platform that could deliver the A-bomb over intercontinental distances (these were the days before air-to-air refueling) and that platform was the B-36 bomber. The B-36 was a WW2 design that had become operational after WW2 had ended. The B-36 was very expensive and it was the largest bomber ever built. Originally it had six piston Wright R-4360 engines arranged in a “pusher” donfiguration, three per wing. This was later augmented by four turbojet engines in a pair of pods under each wing. Friends and foes of the bomber dubbed it the “aluminum overcast” due to the massive amounts of the metal used and its size.
Another disturbing activity being advocated by the AAF/USAF was that it wanted to control ALL aviation assets of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. As far as the USAF was concerned, the atomic age had made them obsolescent and the Air Force could police the world with the nuclear-armed B-36.
Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal was opposed to the loss of the Navy’s carrier force as advocated by the USAF. The carrier admirals thought, correctly, that the Battle of the Atlantic was won by carrier aviation as well as the Pacific War. The Navy had commissioned the follow-on to the Essex-class carriers, the Midway-class – USS MIDWAY (CVB-41), USS FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (CVB-42), and USS CORAL SEA (CVB-43). It had on the drawing board its first super carrier, the USS UNITED STATES (CV-58).
The National Security Act of 1947, itself a compromise, created the DoD and made the AAF an independent service – the USAF. In September 1947, the new USAF began a public relations campaign in journals and newspapers against the Navy’s position for carrier aviation. Hugh L. Hanson, a Navy Bureau of Aeronautics employee, complained to the new SecDef James Forrestal, Secretary of the AF Stewart Symington and SecNav John Sullivan. The attacks continued.
In the spring and summer of 1948, the USN and USAF met at Key West, FL and Newport, RI to work out their differences over the strategic atomic mission and other details. The differences were not resolved.
SecDef Forrestal was unable to moderate the increasingly strident USAF – Navy confrontation. Overcome by depression, he committed suicide. The new Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson, was a former Secretary of War. Johnson looked at the Navy’s new super carrier’s price tag (and the cost for its support) and concluded it was too expensive. (The carrier was also in direct competition with the B-36 program.) GEN Dwight Eisenhower, Army Chief of Staff, GEN Omar Bradley, and the AF Chief of Staff, GEN Hoyt Vandenberg were both opposed to the construction of the super carrier, arguing it would duplicate the AF’s land based bombers.
Over the strenuous objections of CNO Louis Denfeld and after informing President Truman, SecDef Johnson suspended work on USS UNITED STATES. The Navy was livid and SecNav Sullivan resigned in protest. SecDef Johnson recommended his own man, Francis Mathews, to replace Sullivan at SecNav.
Matters came to a head in early 1949. It started out with a Saturday Evening Post article by CAPT John G. Crommelin defending the carrier and categorizing the B-36 as too slow, too vulnerable, and too expensive.
An anonymous document was released, traced to Cedric Worth, that accused SecAF Symington, SecDef Johnson, and Floyd Odlum, chairman of Convair – manufacturer of the B-36 – of using their influence to pressure the USAF to keep buying the bomber despite its deficiencies.
The Vinson committee exonerated Symington and Johnson and found no collusion in the procurement of the B-36. The Navy convened a board of inquiry to investigate the origins and release of the document, supposedly written by Worth. Although it found “distorted propaganda” against the B-36 had been supplied by Op-23 [CAPT Arleigh Burke and aide CDR Thomas Davies], no disciplinary action was warranted.
In October 1949, the Navy got its chance to make its case on unification and strategy in 12 days of hearings by Rep. Vinson’s committee. ADM Arthur Radford led off, and made the point that he did not believe that the threat of an “atomic blitz” provided a deterrent to war. He focused his guns on the B-36, calling it a “billion dollar blunder.” He said its poor performance made it a “bad gamble.” Radford went along with the Joint Chiefs in that strategic bombing was an exclusive USAF role, however he emphasized that the Air Force and the nation had placed excessive reliance on this concept.
Radford was followed by a stellar group of carrier admirals, including ADM William Halsey and ADM Marc Mitscher. CNO Denfeld stressed the manner in which the carrier USS UNITED STATES (CV-58) was canceled.
The fallout from the hearings played out over the next two years, helped along by the North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950.
At the end of the hearings, ADM Denfeld, was relieved and he retired from the Navy. The AF continued to get its B-36’s until Korea. After Korea, spending priorities changed.
Carriers proved their worth soon after the war began. Four CVE’s and CV’s answered the calls for help coming from Korea and were on station shortly after the initial aggression. The U.S. ships were soon backed-up by a British carrier. Aircraft from USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) and HMS TRIUMPH (R-16) attacked NKAF airfields on 3 July 1950 and strikes continued through out the war. No one ever challenged the usefulness of aircraft carriers again.
The vaunted “atomic big stick” of the B-36 was never used, nor did the aircraft ever see combat. The USAF quietly retired the B-36 in 1959, and replaced it with the B-47 and B-52 jet bombers. By 1955, the USAF monopoly on delivering nukes to a target was gone too. New Navy aircraft could carry small, tactical weapons to use against targets around the globe. The carrier nuclear threat gave the Soviets and their supporters big headaches, because, unlike land-based airstrips, these airfields moved.
When the Korean War exploded, USAF and ROKAF airfields were rapidly overrun by advancing North Korean troops. Within six to eight weeks most of these bases were lost, forcing the USAF to fight its war from Japan. Fuel-hungry USAF jets were soon in a position similar to that of the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain, they could only stay over their Korean targets for 20 to 30 minutes. Otherwise, they’d run out of gas on the way back to Japan. Things really got critical once Soviet-supplied MiG-15 jet fighters made their appearance over the Korean battlefield. The Air Force developed air-to-air refueling as a result of this tactical necessity.
SecDef Johnson resigned in September 1950, partially as fallout from the debacle of the Korean War where American, Korean, and Allied troops were having a very difficult time and casualties were high.
SecNav Matthews tampered with the Navy’s promotion list — he had removed CAPT Arleigh Burke and five others from the promotion board’s list — after the fact. Matthews was forced to resign.
The “bomber mafia” of the Air Force won the tactical battle as a result of the Admiral’s Revolt and kept their wonderful “aluminum overcast” in production. In the final analysis, the Korean War proved the worth and flexibility of the aircraft carrier. It also proved the vulnerability of fixed airfields on land. It also proved the limitations of tactical aircraft without aerial refueling.
When you hear the claims of the USAF about their need for gold-plated Cold War dinosaurs like the F/A-22, remember the B-36 and the Revolt of the Admirals.
The folks in southeast Asia definitely remember how we abandoned South Vietnam after Nixon's resignation.
“One way would be through jamming. Most drones rely on signals. But also, defensive drones will ultimately intercept hostile drones. Not sure when that will be needed. Probably fairly soon because part of a drone’s flight could be preset.”
Sea skimming missiles like the supersonic Sunburn are the real threat. From what I understand there’s no credible defense right now.
How many of those are available at any one time? Machines need periodic maintenance and downtime. We once had many thousands of bombers.
B4l8r
“...No, it isn’t even close. The Desert Storm mission from Barksdale to Iraq was a 34 hour crew-frying stunt. It makes sense to deliver a nuke that way in some cases, but for sustained bombing, no dice.
That range for example, means that at best, that aircraft could hit their once target every 2.5 days, with massive tanker support. That carrier bomber could do about 8 missions in that time.
And that means 8 unique targets, with different ordinance. You wont get that flexibility in any manned bomber. And for close air support, the Carrier CAPs can be always nearby. A heavy bomber, not so much.”
DRh is cleverly failing to point out that the AGM-86B sorties for DESERT STORM used B-52 launch platforms, a 1940s design. It’s dishonest to compare them to the CVNs of today, none of which are so old. A strike aircraft of more recent vintage would arrive more quickly - if the nation could bear to develop one.
DRh also cleverly fails to point out that if a strike aircraft and a carrier battle group launched from CONUS at the same time, the carrier and its endless parade of support/screening vessels would not arrive until weeks after the war was over.
USN attempts to compensate by keeping carrier battle groups deployed to forward areas - a giant expense, not to mention a drain on resources and sailor morale. And as hot spots multiply and available battle groups shrink, it starts to look like Whack-a-Mole.
A battle group bobbing about near a shoreside hot spot is also a target. USN prides itself on invulnerability of its warships; it would not be wise to expect that to last indefinitely.
And if the target area is outside the combat radius of the CVN’s strike birds, there isn’t much point to keeping that battle group bobbing about in the ocean.
No aircraft carrier will ever be able to launch and recover a combat aircraft with anything but a tiny little payload or an impossibly short combat radius. The air group is for fleet defense, not strategic strike.
Get rid of the Air Force and there would be plenty of money for the Navy.
Drones equal target practice.
“The fact of life is that today’s CVN is a mobile airfield that can strike from the sea very quickly. ...
“Matters came to a head in early 1949. ... the Navy got its chance to make its case on unification and strategy in 12 days of hearings ... followed by a stellar group of carrier admirals ...”
USN: still seething, that USAAF had the cheek to come out of nowhere and win WWII in the Pacific. Not to mention the nation’s cement-headed refusal to grant USN the higher-than-divine right, to conduct all American military operations that happen to be located offshore.
MG01 is quick to sing praises over the speed with which a carrier battle group can respond - if it happens to be bobbing about on the water nearby. What he neatly fails to mention, is that it can respond only with absurdly short-legged strike aircraft that haul only tiny little payloads. Also missing is the unwelcome fact that a carrier battle group is a pretty big target. USN does pride itself on the supposed invulnerability of The Fleet; are we prepared to assume it will last indefinitely?
The “revolt of the admirals” investigation found no collusion over USAF contracting. In the aftermath, forgiveness flowed both ways: official Washington had no stomach for prosecuting Navy Dept personnel for unauthorized release of classified information, despite evidence of their guilt splashed all over the media. Lesser offenses have earned convictions for high treason and death by firing squad, in less advanced countries; USN has for generations played the bureaucratic game with focus and zeal, a ruthlessness unencumbered by ethical probity, rightly envied by less senior organizations.
Aerial refueling, by the way, was developed over a period of decades, dating back to the 1920s. The British pioneered much of the technology, but the push to deploy it on an industrial scale came from USAF’s long-range strike community - the “heavy bomber mafia” MG01 seemingly cannot abide. Long-range aviators were the only folks with the foresight to realize that air refueling would be essential for the jets that would soon be procured; tac air and Korea had nothing to do with it.
It is a source of wonderment, that the senior, more traditional armed services remain so rock-solid certain that they understand every implication of air power, even as they cling so tightly to two-dimensional, linear thinking.
That said, the Newport, RI and Key West Accords in the spring and summer of 1948 established broadly the roles and equipment of the USAF, USN, USMC, US Army. The USAF fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft including strategic bombers, fighters, fighter-bombers for close air support of the Army, air transport. The USN maintained fixed wing and rotary wing assets, lighter than air (blimps), seaplanes and land based patrol aircraft, tactical bombers, fighters, and fighter-bombers, air transports. The USMC got fixed and rotary wing aircraft primarily for CAS of troops on the ground and generally used the same aircraft as the USN. The US Army got fixed wing aircraft for liaison and observation (no dedicated CAS assets), and rotary wing aircraft. Eventually, the Army developed the helicopter gunship to support its troops on the ground because of conflicts in getting USAF assets for the CAS mission.
Many of these old rivalries are still alive today — even if proponents don't know the story of the Revolt of the Admirals. Ever since the end of WW2, the first question when there is a trouble spot explodes on the globe, the call is: “Where are the carriers?” Unlike fixed land bases on foreign soil that can cause problems if national interests disagree, the carrier is a sovereign piece of U.S. territory in international waters. It is a major power projection tool in diplomacy.
Yes, carriers have their limitations and require suitable protection and a logistics pipeline to keep the supplied, but they are flexible. In the case of the B-36, the USAF got its long range strategic bomber retained in production. However, Korea came along and the B-36 was useless for that war. Bombing of the NorKs and Chinese was done by B-29s. B-26 Invaders were used in the tactical role along with fighters like the F-51, F-80, F-84, and F-86.
Loss of its airbases in Korea during the opening days of the war caused a lot of endurance problems for the fuel hungry jets. The USAF had been in development of aerial refueling systems beginning in 1948. The probe-and-drogue aerial refueling system was used in 1951 when KB-29s refueled F-84 fighter bombers on their way to and from Korea. Unfortunately the majority of USAF aircraft in Korea did not have the necessary refueling acceptance equipment fitted and it was only after Korean airfields were recaptured from the NorKs did heavy USAF close air support become commonplace.
The overrunning of USAF and ROKAF airfields caused the USAF headaches in Korea. Fortunately there were four U.S. carriers plus a British carrier that were soon flying CAS missions for ground troops. Until the USAF was able to refuel its jets in the air and recapture its Korean airfields, it was at a tactical disadvantage.
Response time to a crisis is problematic. For carriers it depends on how close they are to the trouble spot. And yes, with lots of tankers, the USAF can fly its bombers to the scene faster than a carrier can steam. However, when on station the carrier has staying power that the USAf can't match without a maximum effort within the tanker and bomber communities.
The USN did away with its heavy attack (VAH) squadrons after Vietnam and converted those assets to aerial tankers and photo recon platforms. USN fighter and fighter bombers are roughly equivalents in the ordnance hauling department. Navy long range aviation is geared to maritime patrol and ASW.
In so far as a carrier battle group is a large target, that is true. But, the ocean is miles and miles of water. This makes it very difficult to track the ships — especially if they shutdown all electronic emissions.
i can tell you that even the bravest pilot would find it very difficult to catch a CVBG. If located, he would flinch at the amount of firepower that can be thrown at attackers by the carrier escorts, the combat air patrol, and the carrier's defensive systems.
Missiles concern me too. The accuracy of guns can now get close to 100 percent with computer guidance. That’s what I would imagine will be the best defense short of EMP. Maybe laser at some point or even particle beams. Faster ‘projectile’ than guns.
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