I wish to add a fourth point, which I forgot to mention:
4. “But he was willing to consider opposing Hitler in an alliance with Britain and France, and engaged in some negotiations with an Anglo-French military mission. The problem was that the British and French were not serious about cutting a deal with the USSR, nor were they serious about fighting Hitler. It became quite apparent to Stalin that the Anglo-French strategy was to defeat Hitler by sitting out the war behind the Maginot Line and let the USSR defeat Germany at the cost of copious amounts of Russian blood. Stalin had no interest in this.”
I strongly disagree with this. Actually, I am of the opinion that Stalin never intended to join a French-British coalition (at least not in the initial stage of the war) and a careful analysis of how the negotiations unfolded clearly proves this. In fact, I would say that the Moscow talks were used only to scare Hitler into signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, because Stalin simply set them up to fail. Here are some things to consider:
1. First and foremost, France and England didn’t require the Soviet Union to fight Germany. They requested only for the soviets to maintain a benevolent neutrality in case Poland was attacked. That meant: not to undertake anything against Poland while she was fighting Germany, to allow passage for allied shipments to Poland and to accept to sell Poland weapons if she wanted to buy. That was it. It was the Soviet Union who came with the proposal for an active soviet participation in the war - when Voroshilov told the French and British that the Soviet Union wanted to deploy 2-4 million troops against Germany, with all the necessary equipment.
So, if Stalin did not trust England and France and thought they were not serious about fighting Hitler, why all this additional bravado, which nobody asked for?
2. Assuming that France/England intended only to blockade Germany and sit behind the Maginot line, why does that translate into “copious amounts of Russian blood”? Soviet Union also had its own fortifications, the Stalin line, so what prevented the Soviets from doing exactly the same thing? Prolonging the war was, after all, in the interest of the Allies, because they had access to international markets. Germany didn’t. If the Allies sat behind their defensive lines, the Germany was basically compelled to try breaking the deadlock, because dragging it on meant food and fuel shortages in Germany.
Hitler might have tried to attack the Soviet Union, but he also might have tried to attack France. The chances were 50-50.
Soviet Union had no obligation to defend Poland, but England/France had. Thus it had no obligations to get out of its fortifications and rush to Poland’s help. But France/England had and, for this, they were more likely to be attacked first.
3. When Voroshilov made his proposal, he had one condition: Soviet Union must receive “corridors” through Poland so it could get to Germany. Both this request and the way it was made shows that the negotiations were a sham. Here is why:
- first and foremost, Voroshilov put this request to the French and British delegations, not to the Polish government; a Polish representative wasn’t even invited to the talks. The French and British simply did not have the authority to accept such a request and the fact it was made without consulting the Poles was a diplomatic insult, which made rejection very likely.
- assuming that the Poles somehow accepted, what exactly would have been these “corridors”? Well, basically, it would have meant the occupation of Poland by the Red Army, because you can’t cram 2-4 million troops into some narrow “corridors”.
- Stalin absolutely did not need those “corridors” if he was serious about fighting Germany. There were only 2 possible scenario: either the Polish Army stops the Wehrmacht on his own, in which case the Soviet Union does not need to fight at all, or the Wehrmacht wins and overthrows the Polish government, in which case the Soviets do not need Polish consent anymore.
And, btw, if Stalin took issue with France wanting to stay behind the Maginot line, then why exactly did he want to push the Red Army into Poland (and straight into the advacing Wehrmacht), especially if he was not wanted there?
If that is Stalin thought about the motives of France/England, then he should have let the Red Army stay behind its own Maginot line, no?
There is an anecdotical story I’ve once read in an article on a Russian site which claims that, when Ribbentrop’s visit was arranged, Stalin sent Voroshilov a note which said “Klim! Stop farce. Signed: Koba”.
The story might not be true, but this is exactly what the Moscow talks were from the perspective of the Kremlin.
Stalin wanted revenge for 1920, he was going to get his piece of Poland one way or the other.
According to the men who fought in them, the T-26 was a piece of junk. And it was. The armor was insufficient to stand up to 37mm AT guns, and the engine and transmissions were prone to breakdown. The Soviet Mechanized Corps that went into combat equipped with these vehicles lost more than half of them on the approach marches to the battlefield. When they got there, their soldiers found they were little better than steel coffins. The survivors were pretty adamant about that, too.
By 1941, the Germans were fielding improved Panzer III and IV, but half of their tank park still consisted of the older models. And the soviets were improving as well, with the new T-34 and KV.
Which was exactly my point. The Soviets were producing the KV and T-34 in quantity in June 1941, but that production had only just begun, and the new tanks were only just beginning to be delivered to the Mechanized Corps. Not to mention the fact that the soldiers who were expected to fight in them had not been trained in how to use them yet.
Because analysis of documentary evidence (which surfaced after 1991) indicate that the real problem of the Red Army in 1941 was the resentments of large masses of troops against the soviet power, which led to a massive collapse of morale and will to fight, in the context of the deterioration of the soviet command and control system in the summer of 1941.
You might want to ask the Germans about that. The one thing they found out was that when the French forces were surrounded, they would throw in the towel. Soviet forces, when surrounded, fought hard. Even though the Germans captured millions of them in the summer and fall of 1941, they rarely threw in the towel at the first opportunity. It was only after hard fighting. Also, a frequent problem for the Germans was keeping the pockets of surrounded Soviet troops “hermetically sealed,” something they repeatedly had difficulty doing. Don’t argue that it was because panzer divisions with little infantry could not seal the pockets. That does not explain why soldiers who didn’t want to fight for the USSR didn’t surrender, kept on fighting, or infiltrated back to Soviet lines in great numbers. Which they did, constantly. Most of the mass surrenders took place because a poorly trained, poorly equipped and poorly led mass of soldiers with poor command and control were left in situations that had deteriorated to the point where they didn’t have much choice.
Obviously, such a thing does not fit with the narrative of the Great Patriotic War, which insisted that all the soviet people fought to a man for the soviet regime, hence why the soviet government tried to obfuscate it after the war.
I would always take what the Soviets said with a grain of salt, just as I would the German memoirs. But you might want to take a look at the casualties suffered by the Germans; in the first 10 weeks of Operation Barbarossa, they suffered 440,000 casualties, of which 94,000 were killed. Two hundred German officers were being lost every day. These figures are from Halder’s War Diary, and he knew that the casualty rate, far higher than anticipated, was unsustainable. Somebody must have been fighting in the Red Army.
The Soviet Union produced 2,800 T-34 in 1941, 12,000 in 1942 and 15,000 in 1943. This process would have taken until the summer of 1943, at the very least. But, by that time, the old T-34/76 which were produced from 1940 onwards would have become obsolete as well! In the summer of 1943, as a result of the German upgrades, the Soviets were starting to design new models as well, which will result in the T-34/85 and IS-2.
I don’t think you can consider the low numbers of T-34s produced in 1941 as a valid projection of what the USSR would have produced if the Germans had not invaded. The German occupation of the then-existing Soviet industrial areas, and the dislocation caused by relocating them to the east, significantly reduced the production figures, which did not recover until later in 1942.
And, besides, on what basis should anyone assume that while the Red Army “expanded and modernized”, the German army would have done nothing?
In some of your arguments, you have ignored cause and effect. You assume if the Germans did not invade the USSR in 1941, they would still have made the same development and production decisions. I believe otherwise. Development of the 75mm/PAK40 did begin before Operation Barbarossa, but production was not pursued aggressively. In November 1940, they were only producing 15 models per month. It wasn’t until after June 22 1941 they were pressed to ramp up production when they realized that even the 50mmPAK was not sufficient to fight the T-34. Even then their production was so low that they were forced to use as many captured Soviet M1939 76.2mm guns as they could get their hands on. They even reverse-engineered production of anti-tank ammunition for these guns. The Germans were way too complacent in their armament production, not just after the fall of France, but throughout the war. They never really hit their stride in mobilization of industry until Speer’s reforms took full effect in 1944, and by then it was too late.
But the main thing instead of quibbling over trees is to look at the forest. The Red Army was clearly not prepared or ready for war in 1941 due to a number of structural deficiencies. Only a part of the deficiencies existed in their weapons systems. It was more of a general systemic issue. The officer corps had men who were afraid of being purged asked to command units two or three grades above their level of experience and proficiency, with far from minimal staff support. As a result, command and control was less than effective. Logistically, the network or supporting units simply did not exist, and basic supply and maintenance suffered. The large number of new conscripts were by and large untrained, and they lacked an experienced cadre of NCOs to hold them together.
The fact they inflicted 440,000 casualties on the Wehrmacht showed they were willing to fight. The fact they suffered millions of casualties of their own showed they didn’t know how.
There were huge qualitative deficits in the Red Army, given time, they were going to close that gap simply by becoming an army. The Germans would have improved, but were not under any particular pressure to do so, and would not have made the same strides as they did when faced with real combat. They certainly would not, and could not, have increased their superiority over the Red Army given another year.
This is based on the premise that Hitler would have started the war anyway if he was confronted by an alliance of UK, France and Soviet Union. The thing is, it does not matter whether England and France were serious in their intent to fight Germany. If such a alliance was concluded, it is perfectly possible the war would not have taken place at all.
Your premise violates henkster’s law on several matters. The fact was that the alliance between the USSR, France and Britain didn’t take place exactly because the French and British were not serious about either making an alliance with the USSR or shedding their own blood to stop Hitler. Stalin didn’t have to be particularly shrewd to figure that out. Even a dolt like Voroshilov, who did much of the negotiating with the Brits and French, could tell they weren’t serious. Their whole mission was a farce from the get-go. So of course Stalin is going to cut a deal he thinks will help him with the one guy he knows is serious. Stalin WANTS Hitler to fight the war Hitler obviously wants to fight. That’s exactly why Stalin cut his deal with Hitler. Your scenario asks that the French not be the French, the British not be the British, and more importantly, that Stalin not be Stalin. If there is any additional historical irony in how it all turned out, it’s that Stalin, the man who trusted no one, trusted Adolph Hitler, the man no one should trust.
Actually, I am of the opinion that Stalin never intended to join a French-British coalition (at least not in the initial stage of the war) and a careful analysis of how the negotiations unfolded clearly proves this.
Other than being contradictory to your statement above, it ignores that Stalin had Foreign Minister Litvinov propose a virtual alliance with Britain and France on April 17, 1939, just after the final dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. A proposal that French diplomats thought exceed their highest hopes of getting out of the USSR. A proposal that Winston Churchill urged Chamberlain to accept. A proposal that pre-dated any overtures to Germany. However, Chamberlain would rather deal with Hitler than Stalin, and rejected the proposal outright. The rejection of the alliance caused the sacking of Litivinov, his replacement with Molotov, and the beginning of negotiations with Hitler. Meanwhile, the British vacillated with their vague and insubstantial offers; the ones you outlined. Again, had the British and French been serious about pursuing an alliance with Stalin, all they had to do was say “We accept” to Litvinov’s offer. They weren’t serious. The rejection of the alliance offer showed they weren’t serious as early as April. Stalin was only going to play ball with people who were serious.
Yes, the geographic/strategic issue of Poland was an intractable one. I can understand why the Poles would not want the Red Army on their soil. They knew the Red Army would not leave and they were going to bring the Commissars with them, which was what happened anyway, just five years and much suffering later. The alternative was being conquered by Hitler’s Germany. The Poles thought “with the Germans we lose our country, with the Russians we lose our soul.” But the point remains that had the allies been able to secure Polish consent to Soviet participation in a war against Germany, Stalin would have had much difficulty in rejecting an offer he had proposed.
The real reasons there was no Anglo-French alliance with the Soviet Union was that the British were the British, the French were the French, and the Poles were the Poles.